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Refreshing Contractual Analysis of
ADR Agreements By Curing Bipolar
Avoidance of Modern Common Law
Amy J. Schmitzt
Vicky enjoys her job, but is ready to quit. Vicky can no longer
endure her boss's sexually explicit remarks, but she is frightened to
confront him and is uncertain whether her contract permits her to
sue him for sexual harassment. Her employment contract provides
that "any and all disputes arising out of or related to employment at
this company must be submitted to an informal dispute resolution
process, in which all parties shall seek to resolve the disputes in an
amicable manner." Does Vicky's contract require arbitration or some
other type of dispute resolution process? If the process is not arbitra-
tion, then must Vicky still pursue the process before filing a harass-
ment suit in court?
It seems obvious that Vicky's contract contains an agreement to
participate in a non-binding alternative dispute resolution ("ADR")
process, instead of binding arbitration.' However, it is uncertain how
a court would analyze or enforce the agreement. Many courts ap-
proach these agreements in a bipolar manner: they either treat the
process as "arbitration" under arbitration statutes to summarily com-
pel participation in the process or assume any process not governed
by statute is unenforceable under antiquated and narrow common
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1. "ADR," or Alternative Dispute Resolution, generally refers to any non-litiga-
tion dispute resolution process, which theoretically would include court-annexed pro-
grams and binding arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") and
Uniform Arbitration Act ("UAA"). However, the ADR term is riddled with ambigui-
ties. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Is Binding Arbitration a Form of ADR?: An Argu-
ment That the Term "ADR" Has Begun to Outlive Its Usefulness, 2000 J. DiSP. RESOL.
97 (discussing confusion among various forms of non-judicial dispute resolution and
possible implications). This Article uses the term to refer to non-judicial dispute reso-
lution processes outside the FAA and UAA.
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law.2 This bipolar "all-or-nothing" approach perpetuates misapplica-
tion of statutory remedies and procedures at one extreme, while dis-
counting parties' contract promises and process values of ADR at the
other extreme. Such an approach ignores legislative prescriptions, as
well as modern contract and remedy tools. This Article proposes that
courts cure this bipolar avoidance of modern common law in two
steps: (1) eliminate antiquated doctrines and narrow assumptions
about private dispute resolution; and (2) refresh contractual analysis
of non-statutory ADR agreements. This refreshed analysis should
promote cooperative relations while protecting parties from perils of
coerced ADR.
Agreements to participate in non-binding ADR processes, which
this Article will refer to as "ADR agreements,"3 are becoming increas-
ingly important as parties tailor ADR provisions to their transac-
tions. 4 ADR agreements are outside the purview of the primary
arbitration statutes, the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")5 and the
Uniform Arbitration Act ("UAA"). 6 These acts govern only written
agreements to resolve disputes through binding arbitration. 7 Never-
theless, courts misapply the acts to ADR agreements and automati-
cally order parties to participate in ADR without balancing equitable
2. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Contract and Conflict Management, 2001 Wis. L.
REV. 831, 831-35 (warning against application of arbitration laws to dispute resolu-
tion "willy-nilly without discussion").
3. I use the term "ADR agreements" in this Article to concisely refer to execu-
tory, or unperformed, contracts requiring parties to submit disputes to non-judicial
dispute resolution processes not governed by the FAA and UAA. This includes oral
arbitration agreements and agreements calling for negotiation, mediation, mini-trial,
non-binding arbitration, evaluative processes, and other ADR processes outside the
purview of the acts. The related debate regarding what processes are sufficiently fi-
nal to be governed by the FAA is beyond the scope of this Article. See Amy J. Schmitz,
Ending a Mud Bowl: Defining Arbitration's Finality Through Functional Analysis, 37
GA. L. REV. 123, 124-32 (2002) (discussing the meaning of finality under the FAA).
4. See Robert A. Baruch Bush, Substituting Mediation for Arbitration: The
Growing Market for Evaluative Mediation, and What it Means for the ADR Field, 3
PEPP. Disp. RESOL. L.J. 111 (2002) (emphasizing expansion of mediation due, in part,
to growing criticism regarding fairness and judicialization of binding arbitration
under the FAA, and challenging mediation proponents to protect mediation as "a
product that succeeds, or fails, on its own").
5. 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2002).
6. UNiF. ARBITRATION ACT ("UAA"), 7 U.L.A. § 1 et seq. (1997). Discussion of
FAA remedies generally implicates application of the UAA because the UAA is FAA's
state law twin, and it has been adopted or is substantially similar to the law in fifty
jurisdictions. See infra pp. 10-12 (discussing the UAA).
7. See Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 366-68 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding private
resolution procedure under the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Num-
bers ("ICANN") Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy ("UDRP") is not
arbitration governed by the FAA because the procedure does not provide a binding
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factors to determine whether it is appropriate to order specific per-
formance of an agreement. This means courts may apply the acts'
mandatory enforcement scheme even in cases like Vicky's, where
compelling a claimant to informally discuss harassment claims with
an alleged harasser may emotionally harm the claimant.8 Further-
more, the acts' presumptive enforcement schemes were crafted for
binding arbitration agreements through which parties waive their
rights to litigate, whereas parties to non-binding ADR processes pre-
serve their rights to have claims resolved in court. 9 Indeed, policy-
makers recently declined to extend the UAA to mandate summary
enforcement of promises to participate in mediation.10
That is not to say courts should never order parties' compliance
with ADR agreements. Courts should specifically enforce ADR agree-
ments where enforcement will properly hold parties to their contract
promises, further cooperative discussions, and perhaps promote ben-
eficial settlement.1 1 For example, it may be appropriate for a court to
compel parties in a highly interdependent or relational transaction to
comply with their agreement to mediate disputes arising out of that
transaction.
It is not appropriate for a court to assume all ADR agreements
are unenforceable under antiquated "ouster" and "revocability" doc-
trines that traditionally precluded specific enforcement of pre-dispute
third party determination and "unlike methods of dispute resolution covered by the
FAA, UDRP proceedings were never intended to replace formal litigation").
8. See infra pp. 53-55 (discussing courts' discretion in ordering equitable relief
under common law). But see Alan Scott Rau, Contracting Out of the Arbitration Act, 8
Am. REV. INT'L ARB. 225, 243-44 (1997) (proposing that "the applicability of the FAA
seems to be a question of largely theoretical interest given the undoubted power of a
court to enforce such agreements as a matter of ordinary contract law"); ALAN SCOTT
RAU, ARBITRATION 156, n.73 (proposing the same, while acknowledging practical sig-
nificance of the FAA's application with respect to procedural provisions).
9. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995) (em-
phasizing pro-enforcement purpose of the FAA); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd,
470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985) ("The legislative history of the Act establishes that the pur-
pose behind its passage was to ensure judicial enforcement of privately made agree-
ments to arbitrate.").
10. See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 5(i) (Annual Meeting Draft, Jul. 23-30, 1999) (not-
ing that the National Council of Commissioners on State Laws ("NCCUSL") recently
considered and rejected the expansion of the UAA to mandate specific enforcement of
agreements to mediate). In addition, drafters of UMA did not prescribe enforcement
legislation regarding enforcement of agreements to mediate because they assumed
that common contract law provides for enforcement analysis. See also THE UNIFORM
MEDIATION ACT, reprinted in 22 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 165, 166-72 (2002) (providing final
draft without summary enforcement provisions).
11. See infra pp. 63-64 (discussing enforcement of ADR agreements where partic-
ipation in the process may not necessarily result in settlement, but at least will pro-
mote cooperative behavior or provide other collateral benefits).
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agreements to arbitrate.12 Ouster theory proposed that parties can-
not "oust" courts' power to resolve legal claims, and revocability con-
doned a party's unilateral revocation of an arbitration agreement.13
These doctrines have no solid basis. 14 Nonetheless, some courts con-
tinue to apply them, perhaps due to judicial skepticism of private
processes or resentment of the Supreme Court's seemingly pro-arbi-
tration agenda. 15 Some courts also mask these doctrines in presump-
tions against ordering participation in ADR under rigid classical
contract principles and traditional limitations on coercive remedies.
This has left contracting parties lost in a landscape of "funda-
mentally aimless, meandering, and above all, confusing" judicial deci-
sions governing enforcement of ADR agreements.' 6 The time is ripe
to clarify the law applicable to these agreements and to spark modern
contractual enforcement of these non-FAA!UAA procedures.' 7 To the
extent it may be appropriate for policymakers to legislate enforce-
ment rules and standards, they cannot complete that task without
clarification of current law. Modern contract law remedies already
12. See infra Part III (discussing and criticizing ouster and revocability
doctrines).
13. See infra pp. 21-42 (discussing doctrines and their development).
14. See infra pp. 26-29, 38-46 (discussing legal developments denouncing ouster
and revocability doctrines).
15. It seems that over-application of the FAA to all dispute resolution agree-
ments, regardless of whether an agreement requires binding arbitration governed by
the Act, inappropriately federalizes a vast area of contract law. See IAN R. MACNEIL,
AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZA-
TION 175-78 (1992) (noting nationalization of commercial arbitration law through the
FAA's preemptive interpretation and application); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465
U.S. 1 (1984) (holding the FAA preempts state law in both federal and state court).
16. MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 172 (observing further that the arbitration story
"illustrates the cover-up function of formalism," and reveals the inevitable conclusion
that "a major force driving the Court is docket-clearing pure and simple"). See also
John H. Wilkinson, Alternative Dispute Resolution: What the Business Lawyer Needs
to Know 1999, in DONOVAN LEISURE NEWTON & IRVINE ADR PRACTICE BOOK § 15.33,
at 987-88 (1999) (advising attorneys that in light of courts' unclear enforcement of
agreements to participate in non-binding procedures, "as a practical matter, it would
seldom, if ever, make sense to sue for breach of an ADR clause").
17. This Article seeks to spark and inform discussion regarding proper enforce-
ment of ADR agreements, by offering an "interpretive analysis" of the applicable law.
See Richard Craswell, In that Case, What Is the Question? Economics and the De-
mands of Contract Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 903, 917-19 (2003) (borrowing the term "in-
terpretive analysis" from Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Theory of Contracts, in THE
THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW 206, 213-22 (Peter Benson ed., 2001)). In other words, the
Article seeks to clarify and reconstruct concepts applicable to ADR agreements in
terms familiar to judges, lawyers and others in the legal academy so that we can
engage in a coherent normative discussion of how these concepts should be applied in
given cases.
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provide courts with tools for developing an equitable enforcement ap-
proach.18 Contract law also is more adaptive than the FAA/UAA
summary enforcement scheme. It allows courts to consider contex-
tual, relational, and equitable factors when determining application
of specific enforcement remedies. 19 This allows courts to use these
tools not only to foster contract compliance and cooperative relations,
but also to protect individuals from coerced participation in ADR that
will cause undue financial or emotional hardship, or otherwise defeat
the very purposes of ADR.20
Accordingly, Part I of this Article discusses how courts' misappli-
cation of the FAA and UAA to ADR agreements has hindered devel-
opment of applicable contract law remedies. Part II explores how
survival of ouster and revocability principles has further confused
proper enforcement of ADR agreements by haunting judicial analysis
of arbitration and contributing to some courts' narrow perceptions of
other dispute resolution processes. Part III then calls for courts to
"oust" the ouster and revocability doctrines because they are based on
flawed notions of jurisdictional and agency principles. It argues that
courts should refresh contractual analysis and specific enforcement of
ADR agreements in light of common law's evolved respect for differ-
ing bargaining contexts and for virtues of ordering specific relief.
This Article contends courts should finally cleanse the law of faulty
anti-enforcement doctrines and antiquated remedy limitations in or-
der to develop a process-oriented approach for enforcing ADR agree-
ments. Building on modern common law principles, Part IV proposes
contract and remedy tools for implementing this refreshed common
law approach.
I. MISAPPLICATION OF THE FAA AND UAA TO ADR AGREEMENTS
Binding arbitration under the FAA and UAA is separate and dis-
tinct from evaluative and facilitative ADR processes. It is governed
18. See Mark Boyko, State Legislatures See Flood of ADR Bills in First Quarter of
2003, Disp. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2003, at 29 (noting fragmented and varying ADR
statutes).
19. Professor Katz aptly proposed that parties to ADR agreements should be able
to rely on contract remedies, namely specific performance, as means for obtaining the
benefit of their bargains. Lucy V. Katz, Enforcing an ADR Clause - Are Good Inten-
tions All You Have?, 26 AMv. Bus. L.J. 575, 576-77 (1988) (suggesting further that a
"process oriented" definition of ADR should be adopted, and that courts applying this
definition may then "order specific performance or award substantial damages for
breach, including punitive damages for bad faith breach of contract"). This Article
extends that discussion.
20. See infra Part I.B. (discussing courts' enforcement of contracts calling for
non-binding procedures).
Spring 20041
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by the acts' "integrally related" pro-enforcement schemes that do not
merely mimic contract law. 2 1 Instead, the FAA and UAA mandate
that courts automatically order specific performance of valid agree-
ments to arbitrate, without balancing equities and exercising discre-
tion as a court otherwise must do before ordering coercive remedies
under common law.2 2 In addition, the FAA/UAA scheme prescribes
strict enforcement procedures that include streamlined motion prac-
tice, liberal venue provisions, immediate appeal from orders adverse
to arbitration, arbitral immunity, limited review of awards, and
treatment of awards as judgments.23 Some courts have emphasized
that it is appropriate to strictly enforce written agreements requiring
binding arbitration because such agreements provide proof of parties'
intent to waive litigation. 24 ADR argreements do not provide this
21. See Sedco, Inc. v. Petroleos Mexicanos Mex. Nat'l Oil Co., 767 F.2d 1140,
1142-45 (5th Cir. 1985) (emphasizing courts must broadly construe arbitration agree-
ments, and compel arbitration unless opponent rebuts enforcement presumption with
strong evidence that dispute is not covered by an agreement); Lisa C. Thompson, In-
ternational Dispute Resolution in the United States and Mexico: A Practical Guide to
Terms, Arbitration Clauses, and the Enforcement of Judgments and Arbitral Awards,
24 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 1, 31 (1997) (contrasting extraordinary enforcement
schemes applicable to arbitration and contract law remedies applicable to other non-
arbitration procedures); Gregory Firestone, An Analysis of Principled Advocacy in the
Development of the Uniform Mediation Act, 22 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 265, 277 (2002) ("Me-
diation can be distinguished from binding arbitration in that the parties are the deci-
sion-makers and the mediator has no decision-making authority."); Ohio Council 8 et
al. v. Ohio Dept. of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities et al., 459
N.E.2d 220, 222-23 (Ohio 1984) (refusing to apply arbitration law to a non-binding
dispute resolution procedure, and emphasizing that arbitration and mediation "are
not functionally equivalent"). See also City of Omaha v. Omaha Water Co., 218 U.S.
180, 192-99 (1910) (finding that appraisal was not arbitration, and therefore "the
strict rules relating to arbitration and awards do not apply"); Collins v. Collins, 26
Beav. 306, 313-14 (1858) (finding that Act of Parliament governing enforcement of
arbitration did not apply to appraisal, and therefore remedies for breach of an ap-
praisal agreement under common law would apply). See also Wesley A. Sturges &
Richard E. Reckson, Common-Law and Statutory Arbitration: Problems Arising
From Their Coexistcnce, 46 MINN. L. REV. 819, 820 (1962) (emphasizing that the sec-
tions of the FAA "are integrally related and are not a series of independent
provisions").
22. See Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 931 (10th Cir. 2001) (empha-
sizing FAA's special statutory scheme). Under contract law, courts only will exercise
discretion to specifically enforce a contract when ordering damages would be inade-
quate, and coercive relief is appropriate in light of all facts and circumstances, as well
as the public interest. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 357 cmt. c. (1977).
See also U.C.C. § 2-716(1) (1977) (providing that courts may order specific perform-
ance of a sale of goods "where the goods are unique or in other proper circumstances").
23. See infra Part I.A.1. (discussing the FAA's broad remedial scheme).
24. See Bowen, 254 F.3d at 935 (emphasizing that parties to a binding arbitration
contract agree to forego judicial recourse, and therefore "trade the procedures and
opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition
of arbitration") (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31
[Vol. 9:1
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same proof of waiver. Therefore, courts should not misapply the acts
to ADR agreements in contravention of legislative principles urging
narrow application of statutory remedies and procedures. Further-
more, courts' improper reliance on the FAA and UAA hinders devel-
opment and application of common law remedies that allow courts to
exercise discretion in enforcing ADR agreements. 25
A. Limited Application of FAA/UAA Statutory Remedies and
Procedures
Drafters of the FAA and UAA did not expressly define "arbitra-
tion" in the acts. 26 They effectively limited the acts to protect binding
arbitration, however, by requiring enforcement of a consensual proce-
dure that "settles" disputes through a final and binding third party
determination.2 7 The acts mandate that courts summarily order par-
ties to participate in arbitration, and confirm awards, subject only to
(1991) and Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
628 (1985)).
25. See infra Part IV (proposing flexible and process-oriented application of com-
mon law remedies to enforce ADR agreements).
26. Wolsey, Ltd. v. Foodmaker, Inc., 144 F.3d 1205, 1207 (9th Cir. 1998). See also
Karthaus v. Yllas y Ferrer, 26 U.S. 222 (1828) (wrestling with the meaning of arbitra-
tion). The revisors of the UAA also opted not to define "arbitration." See Richard E.
Speidel, The Characteristics and Challenges of Relational Contracts, 94 Nw. U. L.
REV. 189 (2000).
27. See MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 7 (defining arbitration's characteristics to in-
clude "a binding award" with the arbitrator's decision "subject to very limited grounds
of review, final and enforceable by State law in the same manner as a judgment"). See
also 9 U.S.C. § 2 (directing FAA's application to written agreements "to settle by arbi-
tration" disputes arising out of transactions involving interstate commerce); 7 U.L.A.
§ 1 (prescribing UAA's application to agreements to "submit" disputes to arbitration);
Wesley A. Sturges, Arbitration-What Is It?, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1032 (1960)
(emphasizing arbitration's role as a conclusive process); 1 GABRIEL M. WILNER, DOMKE
ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1.01, at 1 (3d ed. 1989) (citations omitted) (similarly
defining arbitration); William H. Knull & Noah D. Rubins, Betting the Farm on Inter-
national Arbitration: Is it Time to Offer an Appeal Option?, 11 AM. REV. INT'L ARB.
531, 531-34 (2000) (acknowledging that "finality" under arbitration law means "the
lack of appeal on the merits of the dispute"); Harry Baum & Leon Pressman, The
Enforcement of Commercial Arbitration Agreements in the Federal Courts, 8 N.Y.U.
L.Q. 238, 239-40 (1930) (emphasizing arbitration's privacy and independence);
Schmitz, supra note 3, at 123-32 (emphasizing finality of arbitration under the FAA
and UAA).
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very limited judicial review. 28 Moreover, policy-makers recently rein-
forced the FAA!UAA models' targeted application to binding arbitra-
tion by refusing to extend the UAA to govern enforcement of
agreements to mediate.
2 9
1. FAA's Mandatory Enforcement Scheme Crafted for Written
Arbitration Agreements
Legislators enacted the FAA in 1925 using New York's 1920 Ar-
bitration Law as a model, and conceiving arbitration as a final and
independent process. 30 Both the federal and New York legislation
mandated automatic specific enforcement of executory arbitration
agreements and established a remedial scheme for summarily enforc-
ing awards and protecting the process from judicial intrusion.3 1 The
legislation was revolutionary because it cast aside discretion and eq-
uitable principles courts otherwise apply in determining whether to
order specific performance of executory contracts.3 2 Policy-makers
rejected proposals to reinstate common law contract and remedy
analysis for these written agreements to arbitrate.3 3 Instead, they
28. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2002); UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 23 (amended 2003), 7 U.L.A.
43 (West Supp. 2003) (originally § 12 (1955)).
29. 1 WILNER, supra note 27, 1.02 at 4 ("Mediation is an advisory, arbitration a
judicial, function. Mediation recommends, arbitration decides.") (Citation omitted).
See also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.4 cmt. 5 (2002) (recognizing arbitra-
tion's finality as a key distinguishing characteristic in differentiating a lawyer's duty
of candor in binding arbitration versus other dispute resolution processes); Katz,
supra note 19, at 589-90 (noting limited review is key to arbitration's "specific mean-
ing" under arbitration statutes).
30. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (covering domestic arbitration) and §§ 201-08 (implementing
the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards);
N.Y. Laws 1920, chap. 275. See also Sabra A. Jones, Historical Development of Com-
mercial Arbitration in the United States, 12 MINN. L. REV. 240, 247-49 (1927) (dis-
cussing FAA history); American Bar Association Committee on Commerce, Trade and
Commercial Law, The United States Arbitration Law and its Application, 11 A.B.A. J.
153 (1925) (providing legislative history of FAA, originally enacted as the United
States Arbitration Law).
31. ABA Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, supra note 30, at
154-56.
32. See Philip G. Phillips, The Paradox in Arbitration Law: Compulsion as Ap-
plied to a Voluntary Proceeding, 48 HARv. L. REV. 1258, 1265-67 (1932-33) (emphasiz-
ing the law's elimination of discretion and equitable balancing of harm and benefits
courts otherwise would apply to determine whether to order specific performance of a
contract).
33. As one commentator proposed:
Instead of thrusting a "duty to enforce" all arbitration agreements on the
courts, the arbitration statute should grant the power to enforce arbitration
clauses in the proper case - but the plaintiff might well have to show an
[Vol. 9:1
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legislated that a court coercively enforce these agreements by compel-
ling arbitration if "the making of the contract or submission or the
failure to comply therewith is not in issue."34
The FAA directs courts to stay judicial proceedings 35 and order
arbitration 36 with few procedural formalities. 37 The Act also pro-
vides liberal venue options 38 and immediate appeal from orders ad-
verse to arbitration. 3 9 If the parties agree that judgment may be
entered on an arbitration award, "the court must grant such an order
irreparable loss to him in the event that the contract to arbitrate is not spe-
cifically enforced before his petition to compel would be granted; and the de-
fendant should certainly be able to defeat a motion to compel by showing the
impracticability or injustice of granting the motion. Of course, we do not pro-
pose to revert to the absolute revocability of the old common law.
Id. at 1278.
34. Id. at 1265. The FAA makes arbitration agreements "valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2.
35. Once the court is "satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding
is referable to arbitration under such an agreement," the court must stay judicial
proceedings until completion of arbitration. 9 U.S.C. § 3.
36. 9 U.S.C. § 4. If a valid arbitration agreement exists, any issues going to the
validity of the underlying contract are for the arbitrators to decide. Prima Paint
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co, 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967) (announcing the "sepa-
rability doctrine" that deems the arbitration clause separable from the main contract,
thereby requiring that a court compel arbitration of underlying issues once it deter-
mines there is an arbitration agreement). Furthermore, if the parties do not empanel
an arbitrator, the court will do so. 9 U.S.C. § 5.
37. The FAA mandates simple motion procedures to request a stay of judicial
proceedings or an order directing parties to proceed to arbitration and rejects techni-
calities and delay of filing a lawsuit under usual civil procedure rules. 9 U.S.C. § 6
(applications to the court to modify, vacate, or confirm an arbitration award "shall be
made and heard in the manner provided by law for the making and hearing of mo-
tions, except as otherwise herein expressly provided"); Productos Mercantiles E In-
dustriales, S.A. v. Faberge USA, Inc., 23 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding section 6
of the FAA does not require compliance with the pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)). Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4-10.
38. See 9 U.S.C. § 9 (supplementing general venue options); Cortez Byrd Chips,
Inc. v. Bill Harbert Constr. Co., 529 U.S. 193, 195 (2000) (holding FAA venue provi-
sions are permissive and therefore expand possible sites for federal motions to con-
firm, vacate, or modify an arbitration award).
39. See 9 U.S.C. § 16 (specifying appeal provisions); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v.
Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 86-87 (2000) (reiterating that section 16 expands traditional
immediate appeal provisions). Although not expressly required by the FAA, arbitra-
tion law also provides for arbitral immunity. See Austern v. Chicago Bd. Options
Exch., Inc., 898 F.2d 882, 886 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 850 (1990) (holding
arbitrators absolutely immune from liability in damages for all acts within the scope
of the arbitral process). Arbitrators also have been immune from suit under state
common law due to their special role as final judges of law and fact. See Kabia v.
Koch, 713 N.Y.S.2d 250, 253-56 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2000) (holding Judge Koch was an arbi-
trator entitled to immunity from liability for statements made on People's Court be-
cause his determinations were "final and binding").
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unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in
sections 10 and 11 of [the Act]. "40 Under section 10, an arbitration
award may be vacated only on very limited grounds aimed at ensur-
ing basic procedural fairness.4 1 Courts narrowly apply these grounds
for challenging an award in order to protect the independence and
finality of arbitration.42 If the parties do not agree that judgment
may be entered on an award, the FAA does not apply to its
enforcement. 43
2. States' Complimentary Prescription for Enforcement of
Binding Arbitration
a) Uniform Arbitration Act
While Congress adopted the FAA, the American Bar Association
("ABA") and the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (now known as "NCCUSL") negotiated and drafted the first
40. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (emphasis added).
41. The sole means for challenging a binding arbitration award under the FAA is
a motion to vacate under section 10, which allows a court to vacate an award:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or
either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence per-
tinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which
the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter sub-
mitted was not made.
9 U.S.C. § 10 (West 2003). The UAA and RUAA provide essentially the same limited
grounds for judicial review of arbitration awards. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 12 (1955);
UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 23(a)(1-6) (2000).
42. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995) (empha-
sizing that an arbitrator's decision will be set aside "only in very unusual circum-
stances"); Eljer Mfg., Inc. v. Kowin Dev. Corp., 14 F.3d 1250, 1253 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 512 U.S. 1205 (1994) (highlighting that "the scope of review of a commercial
arbitration award is grudgingly narrow"). The FAA's limited review is further cur-
tailed by strict notice and time limitations for asserting any challenge to an arbitra-
tion award. 9 U.S.C. § 12; Florasynth, Inc. v. Pickholz, 750 F.2d 171, 174-75 (2d Cir.
1984) (holding three month limit for challenging an award is mandatory).
43. Most arbitration agreements expressly, or through incorporation of American
Arbitration Association ("AAA") rules or other arbitration rules, require that judg-
ment may be entered on any award. See P&P Indus., Inc. v. Sutter Corp., 179 F.3d
861, 866-68 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding parties consented to judicial confirmation of
their arbitration award by incorporating AAA arbitration rules requiring that parties
allow judgment to be entered on any award). The FAA, however, does not apply to an
award rendered pursuant to an agreement that does not implicitly or explicitly pro-
vide for consent to judgment. See Oklahoma City Assocs. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
923 F.2d 791, 794 (10th Cir. 1991).
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model arbitration law to be recommended to the states for adoption. 44
The first UAA model law, however, was unsuccessful, largely because
it rejected the FAA's progressive enforcement scheme. 45 Instead, it
mandated enforcement of only post-dispute agreements to arbi-
trate.46 NCCUSL therefore withdrew the act from states' considera-
tion in 1934 and ultimately adopted a revised UAA in 1955. This Act
has been enacted in 35 states and is substantially the same as the
arbitration statutes in 14 other jurisdictions.47
The 1955 UAA, like the FAA, requires courts to automatically
and specifically enforce valid agreements to submit existing and fu-
ture disputes to binding arbitration. This means courts must stay
litigation and/or compel participation in arbitration.48 The UAA also
directs arbitrators to decide issues of fact and law, and courts to enter
judgment on arbitration awards that parties agree shall be binding.49
Courts may review these awards only for fraud, partiality, action be-
yond the scope of an arbitration agreement, and arbitrator miscon-
duct that has substantially prejudiced the rights of a party.50
44. Wesley A. Sturges, Arbitration Under the New North Carolina Arbitration
Statute - The Uniform Arbitration Act, 6 N.C. L. REV. 363 (1928) [hereinafter Arbi-
tration Under the UAA] (explaining and analyzing the first UAA, which was enacted
by the North Carolina legislature in 1927, Laws of North Carolina, 1927, ch. 94).
45. Id. at 365 (quoting comments of the AAA Committee on Commerce, Trade,
and Commercial Law regarding proposed arbitration laws).
46. Id. at 369, 407 (noting adoption of "Illinois idea").
47. See UNIf. ARBITRATION ACT, Prefatory Note, (Tentative Draft No. 4, February
19, 1999). The revised UAA was approved by NCCUSL and the ABA in 1955, and
superseded the prior, withdrawn model. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT, 7 U.L.A. 2 (1997).
Zhaodong Jiang, Federal Arbitration Law and State Court Proceedings, 23 Loy. L.A.
L. REV. 473, 475 n.7 (1990) (invoicing state arbitration statutes). See also Record of
Passage of Uniform Model Acts, As of September 30, 1994, in 1994 HANDBOOK OF THE
NAT'L COUNCIL OF COMM'S ON UNIF. STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS 1451 (indicating
49 of 53 jurisdictions have adopted the UAA or substantially similar laws).
48. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT §§ 1-2, 7 U.L.A. 6 (1997).
49. Id. §§ 8-11, at 202, 244, 250, 264.
50. The act provides that a court shall vacate an award where:
1. The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means;
2. There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral or
corruption in any of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of
any party;
3. The arbitrators exceeded their powers;
4. The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearings upon sufficient cause be-
ing shown therefore or refused to hear evidence material to the controversy
or otherwise so conducted the hearing, contrary to the provisions of Section 5,
as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party; or
5. There was no arbitration agreement and the issue was not adversely de-
termined in the proceedings under Section 2 and the party did not partici-
pate in the arbitration hearing without raising the objection[.]
Id. § 12(a), at 280.
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Furthermore, a court's confirmation of an award is enforceable like
any court judgment.5 1
In 2000, after re-examination of the UAA, NCCUSL completed a
Revised UAA ("RUAA") that affirms strict enforcement remedies and
procedures for arbitration. The RUAA again mandates summary en-
forcement of executory agreements to arbitrate and binding awards
subject to very limited judicial review. With respect to mediation,
however, NCCUSL's Scope and Program Committee rejected a propo-
sal to revise the UAA to provide for summary enforcement of agree-
ments to mediate disputes.52 Instead, the Committee distinguished
binding arbitration from non-binding ADR and confirmed that the
UAA's enforcement scheme should apply only to binding
arbitration. 53
b) Uniform Mediation Act
While drafting the RUAA, NCCUSL also began to study and
draft the first Uniform Mediation Act ("UMA"). 54 Like drafters of the
RUAA, the UMA drafters refrained from legislating summary en-
forcement of agreements to mediate. 55 Instead, drafters of the UMA
assumed that courts order parties to participate in mediation in ac-
cordance with contract and equity principles, and therefore deter-
mine enforcement in light of public interest, transactional facts, and
any irreparable harm due to a failure to mediate.56 Drafters decided
that the UAA summary enforcement scheme was not appropriate for
mediation because it directs enforcement through motion procedures
and without a jury trial. The drafters believed it might be preferable
51. Id. § 14, at 419 (1997).
52. See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 5(i) (Annual Meeting Draft, Jul. 23-30, 1999) (re-
porting RUAA drafters' rejection of a proposal to provide summary enforcement of
mediation agreements).
53. See Judge Michael B. Getty, The Process of Drafting the Uniform Mediation
Act, 22 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 157, 158 (2002) (explaining mediation was treated sepa-
rately from arbitration and UAA revisions due to great consensus that mediation
"shouldn't be part of arbitration, it's a separate freestanding thing"). In 2002 there
were reportedly over 2,500 state and federal statutes, rules and regulations affecting
mediation in its own right. Id. at 161.
54. Id.
55. Id. See also Firestone, supra note 21, at 270 (noting rejection of proposals to
require summary enforcement of mediation in the UMA); UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, Pref-
atory Note, reprinted in 22 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 165, 166-72 (2002) (emphasizing the
variety of dispute resolution procedures tailored to individual needs pursuant to par-
ties' agreements).
56. See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 5(i) (Annual Meeting Draft, Jul. 23-30, 1999) (dis-
cussing courts' equitable analysis in determining whether to specifically enforce medi-
ation agreements).
[Vol. 9:1
Contractual Analysis of ADR Agreements
to preserve legal process protections for enforcement of mediation
agreements. 5 7
In addition, the UMA Reporters commented that they assumed
courts would more readily enforce mediation, despite courts' tradi-
tional hostility to arbitration. 58 Reporters warned, however, that
some courts may be reluctant to order specific performance of agree-
ments to mediate due to their narrow focus on settlement, "because,
unlike arbitration, mediation does not always provide a resolution." 59
Drafters of the UMA nonetheless concluded that enforcement of
agreements to mediate should be left to courts' application of contract
law or state legislatures' determinations pursuant to local policy. 60
In the end, the UMA drafting process produced model legislation
focused mainly on confidentiality and fair bargaining rules. 6 1 Simi-
larly, states such as Minnesota have enacted mediation statutes
aimed at protecting confidentiality, fair bargaining, and enforcement
of settlement agreements arising out of the mediation. 62 States have
not adopted broad statutes requiring summary enforcement of all
agreements to mediate. 63 Instead, policy-makers have left proper
57. Id.
58. The Reporter indicated an assumption that courts are willing to enforce me-
diation agreements, and that "there seems to be little concern in the literature about
a need for greater or more expedited enforcement." Id. The Reporter, however, only
cited two non-labor cases enforcing mediation agreements and cases decided under
FAA, and not contract law, for the conclusion that it is not clear courts will summarily
enforce agreements to mediate. Id. (citing Cecala v. Moore, 982 F. Supp. 609 (N.D. Ill.
1997), a case in which the court applied Illinois's UAA to summarily enforce an agree-
ment to mediate, and two other cases based on applicability of the FAA to non-binding
dispute resolution procedures).
59. See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 5(i) (Annual Meeting Draft, Jul. 23-30, 1999).
60. See id. See also Firestone, supra note 21, at 270 (noting that enforcement is
and should be left to courts and state legislatures).
61. See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT §§ 1-16 (2001), reprinted in 22 N. ILL. UNIV. L. REV.
165 (2002) (stating rules for confidentiality, mediator privileges and disclosures, and
party representation, but not addressing enforceability of mediation agreements);
Elizabeth Strong, The Uniform Mediation Act, An Opportunity to Enhance Confidenti-
ality in Business Mediation, 7 ADR CURRENTS 5, 6 (June-Aug. 2002) (discussing confi-
dentiality focus of UMA).
62. MINNESOTA CIVIL MEDIATION ACT, MINN. STAT. § 572.31-.40 (1998) (delineat-
ing requirements for setting aside, reforming, and enforcing agreements arising out of
mediation, but not addressing enforcement of executory mediation agreements). See
also Haghighi v. Russian-American Broad., 173 F.3d 1086, 1087-89 (8th Cir. 1999)
(declaring that the Minnesota Civil Mediation Act precludes enforcement of a hand-
written settlement agreement arising out of mediation).
63. See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 5(i) (Annual Meeting Draft, Jul. 23-30, 1999) (re-
porting that "[p]rovisions to provide summary and immediate enforcement of agree-
ments to mediate (including mediation clauses), in contrast to arbitration clauses, are
uncommon," and citing only two statutes calling for such enforcement, both of which
apply only to conciliation in international disputes). See also MINN. STAT. § 572.31-
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enforcement of ADR agreements to common contract and remedy
principles. 64
B. Courts' Use of FAA/UAA Remedies to Escape Common Law
Analysis of ADR Agreements
An ADR procedure, regardless of what the parties label it, is not
binding arbitration governed by the FAA or UAA if it relies on the
parties' separate settlement agreement to end disputes.65 In other
words, when a process is substantively non-binding, resolution is not
achieved through a third party's binding decision - a key component
of arbitration under the FAA and UAA. Instead, an ADR neutral
may facilitate settlement or provide an evaluation of the parties'
cases, but leaves parties free to walk away.66 If parties reach a set-
tlement agreement through such an ADR process, then a court must
determine enforceability of that agreement under contract law.
.40 (not addressing enforceability of executory arbitration agreements). Fairly ex-
haustive research of state dispute resolution statutes in 2002 did not reveal any
states that had adopted laws broadly requiring that courts summarily and specifically
enforce all executory agreements to mediate commercial disputes. (Notes are on file
with author).
64. See Robert P. Burns, The Enforceability of Mediated Agreements: An Essay
on Legitimation and Process Integrity, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 93, 94-95 (1986)
(noting that unlike confidentiality, enforceability of mediation is not amenable to uni-
versal legislation because the contexts vary widely and must be separately analyzed
under contract and procedure law).
65. Evaluative mediation is non-binding dispute resolution in which "a neutral
expresses an opinion as to the likely outcome or value of a legal claim or defense were
it to be adjudicated." Dwight Golann & Marjorie Corman Aaron, Using Evaluations
in Mediation, 52 Disp. RESOL. J. 26, 28-30 (1997) (noting evaluative mediation's simi-
larities to other non-binding procedures that go further than facilitating negotiation
to providing a solution, and emphasizing that such mediation may satisfy some psy-
chological needs for "a day in court" but can also impede settlement goals). See also
Kimberly K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, "Evaluative" Mediation is an Oxymoron, 14 AL-
TERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 31, 31-32 (1996) (viewing evaluative mediation as
more akin to "case evaluation, neutral expert opinion and non-binding arbitration,"
that "require different skills and processes").
66. See, e.g., Better Business Bureau ("BBB"), BBB Auto Line, available at http://
www.lemonlaw.bbb.org (last visited Oct. 2003) (providing information regarding the
BBB's program for resolving consumers' Lemon Law warranty disputes against car
manufacturers through conditionally binding arbitration, which produces awards
consumers may accept or reject); BBB, Conditionally Binding Arbitration, available
at http://www.dr.bbb.org/ComSenseAlt/CondBindRules.asp (last visited Aug. 15,
2002) (detailing the procedures and rules for BBB's conditionally binding arbitration
program); Harrison v. Nissan Motor Corp., 111 F.3d 343, 349 (3d Cir. 1997) (refusing
to apply the FAA to the BBB's Auto Line conditionally binding arbitration procedure).
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Some courts nonetheless have applied the FAA and UAA outside
of the acts' purview to summarily enforce ADR agreements. 67 This
has allowed courts to stay litigation and/or compel parties' participa-
tion in an ADR procedure without tackling common law contract rem-
edy analysis. Other courts seemingly confused about the acts'
applicability have used a vague mix of statutory and contract law.
They have failed to articulate coherent analysis or enforcement stan-
dards. 68 They also have neglected to assess facts and equities in de-
termining whether to order parties to participate in an agreed ADR
process under contract law. 69 Contract and FAA/UAA principles may
lead to opposite results, for example, where parties' relations are so
67. United States v. Bankers Ins. Co., 245 F.3d 315, 322 (4th Cir. 2001) (staying
litigation to enforce a non-binding dispute resolution agreement under the FAA; but
nonetheless recognizing that the issue is "not well-settled in the federal courts"); Wol-
sey, Ltd v. Foodmaker, Inc., 144 F.3d 1205, 1208-09 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that the
FAA governed enforcement of a non-binding arbitration); Russell County Sch. Board
v. Conseco Life Ins. Co., No. 1:01CV00131, 2001 WL 1593233, at *1-5 (W.D. Va. Dec.
12, 2001) (unpublished opinion) (holding a non-binding arbitration agreement en-
forceable under the FAA, but seeming to also apply common law equity factors by
noting that non-binding procedures are not futile in light of process and relational
benefits); CB Richard Ellis, Inc. v. American Envtl. Waste Mgmt., No. 98-CV-
4183(JG), 1998 WL 903495, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 1998) (concluding without analy-
sis that the parties' mediation agreement was governed by the FAA because it
"manifests the parties' intent to provide an alternative method to 'settle' controver-
sies" arising under their contract); Cecala v. Moore, 982 F. Supp. 609, 612-615 (N.D.
Ill. 1997) (enforcing a mediation agreement under the Illinois UAA, but also noting
that the court could use "inherent power" to stay litigation pending the "arbitration");
AMF Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 621 F. Supp. 460, 461 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (applying arbi-
tration law to a non-binding procedure for resolving advertising disputes); Homes of
Legend, Inc. v. McCollough, 776 So. 2d 741, 746-748 (Ala. 2000) (stretching to inter-
pret an agreement to require non-binding arbitration of Magnuson-Moss Act claims in
light of FTC regulations blessing non-binding ADR, but nonetheless applying the FAA
to order that the parties participate in the procedure). But see Brennan v. King, 139
F.3d 258, 266 n.7 (1st Cir. 1998) (finding a dispute resolution procedure in an employ-
ment contract was not arbitration governed by the FAA because it constrained the
scope of the arbitrator's authority and limited the effect of the arbitral decision, leav-
ing "little ground for a 'reasonable expectation' that the procedure will resolve the
dispute") (citing Harrison); Harrison v. Nissan Motor Corp., 111 F.3d 343, 349 (3d Cir.
1997) (refusing to apply the FAA to non-binding arbitration pursuant to state Lemon
Law procedures that allowed parties to pursue litigation if the arbitration was
delayed for more than forty days).
68. See Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 868-69 (noting courts' "mixed reactions" to
agreements to negotiate or mediate and discussing the varied analyses courts apply to
determine enforceability of these agreements).
69. See supra p. 1 (discussing Vicky's hypothetical case). See also Stipanowich,
supra note 2, at 863, 868-69 (warning against application of arbitration statutes to
mediation and other non-binding ADR, and discussing difficulties of compelling par-
ticipation in such processes that generally require parties' cooperation).
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strained that participation in an ADR process that calls for coopera-
tion could further damage the relationship. In addition, misapplica-
tion of the acts defies legislative constraints on statutory remedies
and procedures, and causes "considerable confusion, not to mention
bad precedents." 70 The result is a lingering lack of standards gov-
erning enforcement of ADR agreements.
1. The Neglect of Common Law Remedies in Reliance on
Statutory Enforcement of ADR Processes
The case often cited as supporting application of the FAA and
UAA to enforcement of non-binding procedures is AMF Inc. v. Bruns-
wick Corp.71 In that case, the court found that a non-binding ADR
procedure was "arbitration" within the FAA in order to require the
parties to submit an advertising dispute to the National Advertising
Division ("NAD") of the Council of Better Business Bureaus for a non-
binding advisory determination under the parties' agreement. 72 The
court seemed to ignore fundamental distinctions between binding
and non-binding dispute resolution procedures. It simply applied the
FAA to the non-binding procedure based on an assumption that arbi-
tration has become "synonymous with 'mediation' and
'conciliation.' "73
The court's misapplication of the FAA, however, was likely un-
necessary. It could have ordered the parties' participation in the
NAD procedure under contract law.74 The court may have stretched
70. Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 863.
71. AMF, Inc., 621 F. Supp. at 460. See also United States v. Bankers Ins. Co.,
245 F.3d 315, 322 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing AMF and Wolsey for the general proposition
that non-binding dispute resolution agreements may be enforceable under the FAA).
72. AMF Inc., 621 F. Supp. at 458-60 (defining arbitration loosely to include any
submission of a dispute to a third party).
73. Id. at 459 (citing G. Taylor, Preface to EDWIN E. WITTE, HISTORICAL SURVEY
OF LABOR ARBITRATION vi, vi (Univ. of PA. Press 1952)). See also Katz, supra note 19,
at 589-91 (discussing AMFs reliance on the FAA and emphasizing that "to conclude
for this reason that all ADR clauses are enforceable as arbitration agreements
stretches the concept of arbitration too far" and instead proposing that courts should
enforce non-arbitral ADR through a decree of specific performance).
74. AMF, Inc., 621 F. Supp. at 461 (finding that even if the FAA did not apply to
require enforcement of the ADR procedure, the court could order the parties' partici-
pation in the procedure under contract and equitable powers). See also Parisi v.
Netlearning, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 745, 750 n.10 (2001) (noting that the AMF court
relied in part on its "inherent equitable power" to stay litigation and compel the par-
ties' participation in the non-binding procedure); Tim K. Klintworth, The Enforceabil-
ity of an Agreement to Submit to a Non-Arbitral Form of Dispute Resolution: The Rise
of Mediation and Neutral Fact-Finding, 1995 J. DIsP. RESOL. 181, 189 (describing the
court's enforcement of the ADR agreement as based on its "power to grant specific
performance of the contract" in light of the non-binding agreement's purpose "to keep
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to apply the FAA, however, to avoid traditional judicial doctrines
against specific enforcement of private ADR.7 5 This may have been
particularly concerning for the AMF, Inc. court sitting in New York
because these doctrines ambiguously survive in New York case law.7 6
It seems these doctrines should not have been a concern because the
NAD procedure would not have displaced the courts.77 Nonetheless,
the AMF court dodged the issue of the agreement's enforceability
under New York law because its application of the FAA presumably
preempted any state law precluding enforcement of arbitration or
ADR agreements. 78
Similarly, some courts have assumed that the FAA and UAA ap-
ply to agreements requiring non-binding arbitration procedures that
are subject to trial de novo if the award exceeds a certain amount.79
In applying the acts to these agreements, some courts have ignored
the trial de novo provisions. These courts have treated the arbitra-
tion determinations as final and subject only to limited review.80
future disputes out of court" and resulting inadequacy of ordering damages for
breach).
75. See infra Part II (explaining traditional "ouster" and "revocability" doctrines,
and "public policy" rationales for courts' blanket refusal to enforce private dispute
resolution in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries).
76. See Meacham v. Jamestown, Franklin & Clearfield R.R., 211 N.Y. 346 (N.Y.
1914) (refusing to specifically enforce an arbitration agreement because it "ousted"
courts of their jurisdiction).
77. See infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text (discussing traditional hostil-
ity to arbitration that gave rise to ouster and revocability doctrines).
78. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (holding FAA preempts
state law inhibiting arbitration).
79. See, e.g., Schaefer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 590 N.E.2d 1242, 1244-51 (Ohio 1992)
(assuming the FAA/UAA remedial scheme must apply to non-binding arbitration, fail-
ing to even consider that such private dispute resolution procedures may be governed
by contract law); Parker v. American Family Ins. Co., 734 N.E.2d 83, 84-86 (Ill. App.
Ct.), cert. denied, 738 N.E.2d 928 (2000) (explaining the dissension among courts that
have considered the enforceability of provisions in uninsured motorist policies that
allow trial de novo review after arbitration if the arbitration award exceeds a certain
amount). See also Jennifer L. Shaw, Note, The Tie that Binds: Arbitration in Ohio
After Schaefer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 779, 779-81, 795-97 (1993) (em-
phasizing the negative practical effect on non-binding dispute resolution of the Schae-
fer court's failure to acknowledge the enforceability of trial de novo provisions).
80. Field v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 769 F. Supp. 1135, 1140-42 (D. Haw. 1991)
(finding trial de novo would destroy arbitration's value, and thus striking the provi-
sion and requiring limited judicial review under Hawaii's arbitration statute); God-
frey v. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co., 16 P.3d 617, 621-23 (Wash. 2001) (en banc)
(holding trial de novo provision unenforceable because parties "cannot submit a dis-
pute to arbitration only to see if it goes well for their position before invoking the
court's jurisdiction"; further explaining that it would ignore the trial de novo provi-
sion because arbitration law "does not contemplate non-binding arbitration" and
courts will not "condone what amounts to a waste of judicial resources"); Huizar v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 952 P.2d 342, 346-49 (Colo. 1998) (en banc) (holding that insurance
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Other courts have applied the acts to allow for post-arbitration trial
of cases on the merits.8 Meanwhile, some courts have recognized
that these ADR agreements are outside the FAA/UAA purview, but
have failed to provide clear and coherent common law enforcement
analysis.8 2
agreement allowing either party to request trial de novo if the award exceeded
$25,000 was against public policy); Schaefer, 590 N.E.2d at 1244-51 (holding non-
binding "arbitration" is not enforceable as true arbitration because arbitration's core
purpose is to finally determine disputes without court involvement); Slaiman v. All-
state Ins. Co., 617 A.2d 873 (R.I. 1992) (holding trial de novo provision violates public
policy); Parker, 734 N.E.2d at 84-86 (holding trial de novo clause in uninsured motor-
ist policy violated public policy because it harmed arbitration's value and unfairly
favored insurers); Spalsbury v. Hunter Realty, Inc., No. 76874, 2000 WL 1753436 at
*3 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2000) (unpublished opinion) (concluding that even if
Hunter had been party to the arbitration agreement, the non-binding clause was void
as against public policy); Petersen v. United Services Auto. Assoc., 955 P.2d 852, 854-
56 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (voiding trial de novo provision because "[t]he purpose of
arbitration is to avoid the courts to resolve a dispute"); Saika v. Gold, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d
922, 923-27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (voiding trial de novo provision in physician's con-
tract with his patient); Goulart v. Crum & Forster Personal Ins. Co., 271 Cal. Rptr.
627, 627-28 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (holding insurance code arbitration provision pre-
vented either party from seeking trial de novo); Zook v. Allstate Ins. Co., 503 A.2d 24,
25-27 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (finding trial de novo provision ambiguous and thus unen-
forceable, especially because "a court of competent jurisdiction is only empowered to
disturb the arbitration award if there is evidence of fraud, misconduct, corruption or
some other irregularity which caused the rendition of an unjust, inequitable or uncon-
scionable award").
81. See Hayden v. Allstate Ins. Co., 5 F. Supp. 2d 649, 651-53 (N.D. Ind. 1998)
(refusing to enforce insurance contract provision allowing either party to request trial
de novo if the award exceeded Indiana financial responsibility limits); Bruch v. CAN
Ins. Co., 870 P.2d 749, 751-52 (N.M. 1994) (enforcing trial de novo clause in insurance
arbitration provision although the courts "strongly encourage final settlement by
arbitration").
82. See Roe v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 533 So. 2d 279, 281 (Fla. 1988) (finding Flor-
ida's enactment of the UAA in the Florida Arbitration Code did not apply to a non-
binding arbitration award rendered pursuant to an arbitration agreement allowing
either party to seek trial de novo); Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Mandile, 963 P.2d 295,
296-300 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) (allowing appeal of arbitration award under contract
incorporating an appeal provision because it found that the proceeding properly could
be part of contractual arbitration procedures); Cohen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 555 A.2d 21,
23 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989), cert. denied, 563 A.2d 846 (N.J. 1989) (finding
trial de novo clause in uninsured motorist contract was enforceable in order to effectu-
ate the contractual intent of the parties). See also Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365,
366-68 (3d. Cir. 2003) (holding UDRP is not arbitration subject to arbitration law);
Parisi, 139 F. Supp. at 749-53 (correctly concluding that a UDRP determination is not
an arbitration award governed by the FAA's review and enforcement provisions); Ste-
phen J. Ware, Domain-Name Arbitration in the Arbitration-Law Context: Consent To,
and Fairness of the UDRP, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 129, 149 (2002) ("Cer-
tainly, the UDRP does not fit easily into the framework of arbitration law found in the
FAA and the many cases applying it.").
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Courts also have applied arbitration law to mediation they admit
is not "arbitration." These courts simply assume arbitration and non-
binding ADR processes are functionally and legally equivalent.8 3
One court, for example, summarily applied arbitration law to specifi-
cally enforce an agreement to mediate after declaring that arbitration
and mediation are "both accepted methods utilized for dispute resolu-
tion" and are in contract clauses that are "generally similar."8 4 The
court ignored fundamental differences between arbitration and medi-
ation, and said nothing regarding their divergent rules, procedures,
and outcomes.8 5
Still another court effectually rewrote medical managed care
agreements requiring non-binding ADR by glossing over the agree-
ments' language to order binding arbitration. The court seemed to
assume that the FAA was its only enforcement tool. The contracts at
issue required the parties to participate in various ADR processes.8 6
The court summarily declared, however, that the subscribers' and
physicians' managed care claims were within FAA purview merely
because they affected interstate commerce. 87 The court glossed over
its finding that the individual agreements required negotiation, "a
meet and confer process," and other non-binding procedures.88 The
court also seemed to ignore its finding that one contract required "ne-
gotiation, mediation and/or arbitration" initiated by either party and
did not provide a unilateral power to compel arbitration.8 9 The
83. Coburn v. Grabowski, No. CV 960134935, 1997 WL 309572, at *1 (May 29,
1997) (unpublished opinion) (applying arbitration law to require that the parties sub-
mit disputes to mediation in accordance with their agreement before bringing claims
in court).
84. Id.
85. Id. It likely was appropriate for the court to require the parties' participation
in the agreed mediation. The court, however, could have applied the proper contract
analysis to accomplish that result instead of ignoring fundamental distinctions be-
tween mediation and arbitration. See Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 863 (emphasizing
"significant differences among ADR processes").
86. In re Managed Care Litig., 132 F. Supp. 2d 989, 992 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
87. Id. at 992-1007. The court does not quote or analyze the language of many of
the individual agreements although it acknowledges that the agreements require va-
rious procedures. Id. at 1000-07. This does not figure in the court's conclusion that
the FAA applies to all of the agreements.
88. Id. at 1002, 1004-05, 1007-08 (noting WellPoint Health Network, Inc. con-
tract required "meet-and-confer process" and a CIGNA Health Corp. contract re-
quired negotiation as preconditions to arbitration, but ignoring these provisions and
simply ordering arbitration under these contracts).
89. In re Managed Care Litig., 132 F. Supp. 2d at 1003-04. The court found that
the agreement only gave Prudential, the proponent of arbitration, power to compel
mediation after negotiation failed. Id. at 1004.
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contract expressly gave parties the option to mediate and "only per-
mit[ed] arbitration at this stage of the dispute resolution process by
mutual agreement."90 Despite these findings, however, the court or-
dered the parties to arbitrate under the FAA. 91
Courts also have applied an interpretation presumption for bind-
ing arbitration in order to apply FAA/UAA provisions to an ADR
agreement. In Porter & Clements, L.L.P. v. Stone, the court applied
this presumption in finding that a legal fee agreement requiring a
third party to "set fair value" for assets received in settlement called
for binding arbitration governed by the state's UAA. 92 The court pre-
sumed the procedure was binding arbitration because "the Texas Ar-
bitration Act necessarily contemplates that the arbitration award
will be binding," and "makes no provision for a non-binding proce-
dure."93 The court seemed to assume that the FAA/UAA scheme was
its only means for enforcing private dispute resolution contracts. In
doing so, it overlooked common law enforcement tools and the FAA/
UAA's limited application to awards on which the parties have
agreed that judgment may be entered.94
90. Id. at 1004.
91. Id. at 1007. The opinion is confusing because it states that Dr. Porth had the
option to compel mediation or arbitration, and makes clear that the agreement did not
give Prudential the unilateral power to compel arbitration. Yet, the order simply
granted Prudential's motion to compel arbitration. In re Managed Care Litig., 132 F.
Supp. 2d at 1007.
92. Porter & Clements, L.L.P. v. Stone, 935 S.W.2d 217, 220-24 (Tex. Ct. App.
1996). The contract provided that any dispute regarding the fee arrangement:
shall be referred to arbitration by an arbitrator appointed by the senior
United States District Judge for the Southern District of Texas. For exam-
ple, if you receive intangible or illiquid assets such as contract or lease provi-
sions by way of settlement, and if we are unable to agree on their fair value,
an arbitrator will set fair value for division purposes.
Id. at 220.
93. Id. at 221. The court found the decision in McKee v. Home Buyers Warranty
Corp. 11, 45 F.3d 981, 983-85 (5th Cir. 1995), persuasive. Id. at 220-21. The McKee
court construed a clause to necessarily provide for binding arbitration because appli-
cable Louisiana law contemplated binding arbitration, although the clause's language
required "conciliation and/or arbitration" which was to "precede any litigation at-
tempted by either party." Porter & Clements, L.L.P., 935 S.W.2d at 221 n.5 (citing and
quoting McKee, 45 F.3d at 983). The McKee court focused on the clause's provision
that the procedure be conducted pursuant to "regulations of the AAA or other mutu-
ally agreeable arbitration service," and the AAA's rules providing for binding arbitra-
tion - ignoring that the AAA also has rules for mediation. Id. The clause also
required that a dispute "be resolved or an award rendered by the arbitrator within 40
days" from filing, which could be interpreted to allow for a non-binding award. Id.
94. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text (discussing the FAA scheme).
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It may seem reasonable to summarily enforce all dispute resolu-
tion agreements under the FAA and UAA. 95 Indeed, "some courts
have eschewed functional analysis in favor of broader interpretation
of federal or state arbitration law to underpin the enforceability of
[mediation and other non-binding dispute resolution] agreements."96
Enforcement under the FAA and UAA, however, eschews the flexibil-
ity of contract law remedies. This flexibility was important to policy-
makers' conclusion that the FAAJUAA scheme is "wholly
inappropriate" for enforcing non-binding procedures such as media-
tion.97 Furthermore, courts should not hinder and confuse develop-
ment of contract remedy analysis of ADR agreements by misapplying
the FAA and UAA to these agreements.98
2. The Vague Application of the FAA and UAA by Analogy
Some courts seem to apply the FAA and UAA by analogy in en-
forcing ADR agreements. 9 9 This may be appropriate in some cases.
95. See supra note 8 (noting some commentators' approval for courts' application
of the FAA to non-binding arbitration). But see Edward Wood Dunham, Enforcing
Contract Terms Designed to Manage Franchisor Risk, 19 FRANCHIsE L.J. 91, 92 (2000)
(noting that courts have enforced mediation under FAA § 3, but emphasizing that it
"is far from clear whether that is correct and there is likely to be further litigation on
this issue").
96. Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 860-61 (citing and emphasizing some court's
broad application of FAA to any agreement evidencing parties' intent to "settle" a
dispute out of court "-a rationale that would extend the purview of the FAA to virtu-
ally any ADR process!").
97. Id. at 862-64 (further emphasizing that the FAAIUAA scheme was intended
to govern only binding arbitration that serves as "an all-purpose substitute for litiga-
tion"). Not only is the scheme inappropriate for mediation enforcement, but also it
has led to confusion and bad legal precedents. Id.
98. See Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 863 (stating that courts may apply arbitra-
tion acts, if at all, only by analogy "with great caution, and with a clear appreciation
of the significant differences among ADR processes and the danger of misapplying
specific provisions of arbitration statues and associated case law").
99. See e.g., Centr. Fla. Invs., Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs., 40 P.3d 599, 605-07 (Utah
2002) (compelling arbitration without explaining whether or why the acts would ap-
ply to the contract's requirement that the parties submit disputes to a hybrid arbitra-
tion that left parties free to void the agreement if "agreement cannot be reached
within 60 days from the beginning of an arbitration process"); Marshall v. U.S. Home
Corp., No. 20573, 2002 WL 274457, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2002) (remanding for
specific enforcement of agreement requiring parties to mediate or arbitrate claims
concerning construction of a new home, but failing to provide analysis or even state
whether it was applying the FAA or contract law); Robbins-Hutchens, Liberty Hard-
ware Mfg. Corp., No. 101CV0046, 2001 WL 823495, at *4 (M.D.N.C. June 14, 2001)
(unpublished opinion) (holding that an employee's claims "are subject to mediation
and binding arbitration," but leaving it ambiguous whether the parties must submit
disputes to mediation before arbitration by ambiguously staying litigation "pending
binding arbitration").
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However, courts should analogize to the acts with great caution and
appreciation for differences among ADR processes' and parties' bar-
gaining contexts.100 Courts also should be careful not to assume that
if the acts do not require enforcement of an ADR agreement, then the
agreement is unenforceable. 10 1
Courts' treatment of appraisal agreements exemplifies how
courts' preoccupation with applying the FAA and UAA has led to ap-
plication of confused hybrids of statutory and contract law. ' 0 2 An ap-
praisal agreement generally requires parties to submit particular
issues, such as valuation and loss under an insurance contract, to a
100. See Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 863 (proposing cautioned use of arbitration
acts by analogy). See also infra p. 61-62 (discussing flexible, process-oriented enforce-
ment of ADR agreements).
101. See Cumberland and York Distribs. v. Coors Brewing Co., No. 01-244-P-H,
2002 WL 193323 (D. Me. Feb. 7, 2002) (assuming the FAA provides the only means for
enforcing ADR); HIM Portland, LLC v. Devito Builders, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 230,
232-33 (D. Me. 2002) (finding the FAA did not apply to require enforcement of agree-
ment to arbitrate because parties had not triggered the arbitration requirement by
first seeking mediation as required by the parties' agreement; further assuming that
the parties were free to litigate "because the Court cannot order parties to mediate");
Solomon v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 685 A.2d 1073 (R.I. 1996) (affirming without
analysis summary dismissal of an action for breach of a mediation agreement); Kir-
shenmen v. Super. Ct., 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 166 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (finding there was no
statutory authority to compel compliance with an oral agreement to mediate and,
even if there was, it would not compel mediation because defendant sought timely
withdrawal from the process). See also UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 5(i) (Annual Meeting
Draft, Jul. 23-30, 1999) (stating courts' reluctance to enforce mediation agreements
because unlike arbitration, mediation may not end the controversy); Stipanowich,
supra note 2, at 868-69 (discussing debate over futility versus utility of specifically
enforcing ADR agreements that arguably require parties' cooperation to be success-
ful); Thompson, supra note 21, at 11 (suggesting a significant drawback to pre-dispute
mediation agreements is courts' reluctance to enforce such agreements because a non-
binding procedure is a "somewhat nebulous form of dispute resolution that some
courts feel is too indefinite," and concluding that "the law is not settled as to the
enforceability of mediation clauses"). But see County of Jefferson v. Barton-Douglas
Contractors, Inc., 282 N.W.2d 155, 158 (Iowa 1979) (applying common law principles
to conclude that enforcing a non-statutory arbitration agreement would defeat ADR
goals by increasing expense and delay, and creating potential for inconsistent
results).
102. 15 LEE R. Russ & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 209:16, 27-28
(3d ed. 1999) (discussing courts' disagreement regarding whether appraisal provisions
are "arbitration agreements" under arbitration laws and compiling cases supporting
contradictory conclusions; and further explaining that some courts seem to apply only
certain provisions of arbitration acts to appraisal issues). See also Wesley A. Sturges
& William M. Sturges, Appraisals of Loss and Damage Under Insurance Policies, 13
U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1958) (discussing and critiquing courts' ambiguous application of
common and statutory law to enforcement of agreements to submit disputes to
appraisal).
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third party for a binding or non-binding determination. 0 3 Tradition-
ally, some courts would order parties' compliance with appraisal
agreements under common law. This was because, unlike arbitra-
tion, an appraisal generally did not "oust[ ] the courts of jurisdiction,
but [left] the general question of liability to be judicially deter-
mined."'01 4 Modern contract law also provides courts with the power
to enforce agreements to participate in appraisal processes.10 5
Nonetheless, some courts have been quick to classify appraisals
as arbitration in order to enforce them under the FAA/UAA statutory
scheme. 10 6 Some of these courts have focused unduly on the arbitra-
tion label, although they could have analyzed an agreement under
103. See Russ & Segalla, supra note 102, at § 209:16, 27-28 (discussing varied
appraisals).
104. Sec. Printing Co. v. Conn. Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, 240 S.W. 263, 268 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1922) (finding plaintiff was required to comply with an appraisal require-
ment before bringing action on an insurance policy). Indeed, modem courts have con-
tinued to rely on this "ouster" rationale in order to justify enforcement of appraisal
agreements. See Garretson v. Mountain W. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 761 P.2d
1288, 1290 (Mont. 1988) (finding common law barring specific enforcement of arbitra-
tion provisions did not apply to an appraisal agreement because appraisal "does not
oust the jurisdiction of the courts, but only requires a certain character of evidence of
a fact in controversy").
105. See Wailua Assocs. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 904 F. Supp. 1142, 1147-49 (D.
Haw. 1995) (unnecessarily labeling insurance appraisal arbitration in enforcing the
procedure). In Wailua Assocs., the court's classification of an insurance valuation pro-
cedure as arbitration was not necessary to the court's conclusion that the appraisal's
scope and procedures were determined by the parties' agreement. Nonetheless, the
court's labeling the procedure arbitration may matter in dictating its enforcement and
review of appraisal determinations. Id.
106. Childs v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 899 F. Supp. 613, 615 (S.D. Fla. 1995)
(granting a "Motion to Compel Arbitration" under the state's UAA to enforce an insur-
ance contract provision requiring the parties to submit valuation and loss determina-
tions to appraisal "provided the appraisal can be completed within thirty (30) days");
Wailua Assoc., 904 F. Supp. at 1147-49 (finding an appraisal was "arbitration" under
the FAA); Christiansen v. First Ins. Co. of Haw., Ltd., 967 P.2d 639, 649-56 (Ct. App.
1998) (holding an appraisal may "imply an agreement between the parties to arbi-
trate" governed by the state's UAA, and finding that although bad faith claims arising
out of an insurance contract were outside of the scope of the appraisal provision, other
contract issues were "referable" to the process under Hawaii's arbitration act), rev'd
on discrete equitable tolling issue but aff'd in all other respects, 963 P.2d 345, 349, n.7
(Haw. 1998) (only discussing equitable tolling and noting that it could not consider
the Court of Appeals recent Amendment vacating discussion regarding the doctrine
because the petition for certiorari had already been granted); Meineke v. Twin City
Fire Ins. Co., 892 P.2d 1365, 1369 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (concluding quickly that "ap-
praisal is analogous to arbitration" and therefore applying arbitration law to a dis-
pute regarding an insurance policy appraisal clause; but affirming the trial court's
refusal to compel appraisal because the insurance company unreasonably delayed de-
manding the appraisal).
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contract law.10 7 In one case, the court needlessly focused on whether
the FAA applied to an appraisal provision in an insurance contract
although the insured could not compel the appraisal under arbitra-
tion or contract law. The insured's coverage claim was outside the
scope of the appraisal provision that applied to disputes regarding
the amount of loss.' 08 Under both arbitration and contract law, the
arbitrator had no power to decide the coverage issue.109
Some courts appropriately refrain from labeling appraisal
processes arbitration under the FAA or UAA." 0 Many of these
courts, however, analogize to the acts without providing analysis or
guidance for legal development. In a recent Utah case, for example,
the court declared without analysis that appraisals are specifically
enforceable."' The court generalized: "Appraisal clauses, like other
contractual clauses requiring alternative dispute resolution, are
strictly enforceable. Therefore, a court must compel compliance with
a valid appraisal clause if one party demands appraisal."1" 2 To be
sure, this declaration was overbroad. Furthermore, it was largely un-
necessary. The court based its denial of preclusive effect to an order
dismissing claims outside an appraisal provision on contract scope
and interpretation." 3
107. See Rastelli Bros., Inc., v. Netherlands Ins. Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 440, 443-47
(D.N.J. 1999) (focusing the entire legal analysis on whether the agreement requires
"arbitration" under the FAA).
108. Id. at 442-43.
109. Id. at 446-47. See also Cap City Prods. Co., Inc. v. Louriero, 753 A.2d 1205,
1210 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (refusing to review a third-party valuation for
legal error regardless of whether the procedure was labeled arbitration or appraisal,
where the parties had agreed the valuation would be "binding"). But see Elberon
Bathing Co., Inc. v. Ambassador Ins. Co., Inc., 389 A.2d 439, 445-47 (N.J. 1978) (find-
ing third party valuation of fire damage under an insurance agreement was an ap-
praisal not subject to New Jersey's Arbitration Act, and therefore rejecting
defendant's argument that formalities of the Act applied).
110. See Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 44 P.3d 663,673-79 (Utah 2002) (finding an
appraisal was not arbitration governed by the state's adoption of the UAA).
111. Id. at 674-75.
112. Id. at 675. The court provides no specific performance analysis. It is curious
that the court emphasizes the inapplicability of arbitration law to non-binding dis-
pute resolution procedures, although the same court had just summarily applied arbi-
tration analysis to enforce a conditionally binding process that only became binding if
the parties reached agreement within 60 days from inception of the process (i.e., me-
diation). See Central Florida Invs., Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs., 40 P.3d 599, 603 (Utah
2002).
113. See USAA Causalty Ins. Co., 44 P.3d at 676-79. The court interprets cover-
age of the appraisal clause more narrowly because it is not an arbitration agreement.
Id. at 675-78. Perhaps the court would find the claims outside of an agreement it
labeled arbitration, but that is unclear from the court's opinion, especially in light of
its reversal of the district court and emphasis of the distinctions between arbitration
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Some courts have appropriately looked to contract language in
refusing to apply the FAA and UAA to appraisal determinations. For
example, courts have found that the acts do not apply to enforcement
of appraisal determinations that are not expressly final or will not
end the parties' liability disputes. 114 These courts appropriately ana-
lyze whether a procedure is sufficiently final to be arbitration gov-
erned by the acts. 11 5 They nonetheless seem to abandon this analysis
and assume the FAA and UAA apply when ordering parties' initial
participation in a process. 1 6 This results-oriented and disjointed ap-
plication of the acts to appraisals distorts the law.
It is true that the results in some appraisal cases may be the
same under contract and arbitration law. However, that is not al-
ways true and the FAA and UAA prescribe procedures and remedies
that are not applicable under common law. 1 7 For example, a court's
application of the FAA to a non-binding determination may allow the
court to apply the Act's §10 review to the determination.",, Further-
more, the courts' varied and contradictory approaches confuse the
law. This leaves parties to draft agreements at their peril. It is time
and appraisal. Furthermore, it seems that the court's determination that the proce-
dure was not subject to the state's UAA drives its conclusion that a dismissal based on
an appraisal cannot be given preclusive effect. Id. at 678-79.
114. See Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. U.S. Bank Tr. Nat'l Assoc., 218 F.3d 1085, 1090
(9th Cir. 2000) (finding that state contact law, and not the FAA or other arbitration
law, governed confirmation of an appraiser's determination of the fair market value of
two turbine generators under a lease agreement); Hartford Lloyd's Ins. Co. v.
Teachworth, 898 F.2d 1058, 1061 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding that an insurance appraisal
was not arbitration governed by the FAA and therefore remanding to the district
court to review an appraisal determination under state law, which may require a jury
trial and application of different standards than those required under the FAA); Kel-
ley v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 155, 163-64 (Cl. Ct. 1989) (holding that the FAA provi-
sions and policies did not apply to enforcement of an appraisal provision in an option
contract because the parties did not consider the appraiser's decision binding and fi-
nal, but instead treated the procedure as a condition precedent to exercise of the op-
tion that failed).
115. See e.g., Schmitz, supra note 3, at 166-69 (discussing when appraisal proce-
dures are classified as arbitration).
116. See Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 218 F.3d at 1090 (refusing to apply FAA to re-
view and confirm appraiser's determination); Hartford Lloyd's Ins. Co., 898 F.2d at
1061 (same). At least one court, however, has determined an award to be non-bind-
ing, but nonetheless subject to FAA limited review. See Dow Corning Corp. v. Safety
Nat'l Cas. Corp., 335 F.3d 742, 746-52 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding third party determina-
tion pursuant to insurance policy requiring parties to submit disputes to a "board of
arbitration" as a "condition precedent to any right of action" was non-binding, but
nonetheless subject to FAA § 10 review).
117. See Harrison v. Nissan Motor Corp., 111 F.3d 343, 345-52 (3d. Cir. 1997) (re-
fusing to apply FAA interlocutory appeal provisions to non-binding arbitration).
118. See Dow Corning Corp. v. Safety Nat'l Cas. Corp., 335 F.3d at 746-52 (apply-
ing FAA § 10 review to a non-binding third-party determination).
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to clear this confusion in order to foster efficient and creative con-
tracting based on a cohesive and equitable approach for enforcing
ADR agreements.
II. LEGAL CLUTTER CREATED BY FAULTY TRADITIONAL DOCTRINES
PRECLUDING ENFORCEMENT OF PRIVATE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION CONTRACTS
Why have courts been eager to apply the FAA/UAA scheme to
summarily order parties to participate in ADR procedures? It may be
that courts view the acts' scheme as an easy avenue to clear court
dockets. 119 Applying the FAA and UAA allows courts to hurry par-
ties out of court without first tackling difficult common law contract
remedy analysis. Courts also may seek refuge in the relative clarity
of the FAAIUAA scheme in an effort to avoid traditional judicial doc-
trines and attitudes that precluded, or unduly limited, specific en-
forcement of agreements to submit disputes to private dispute
resolution processes. 120 Traditional judicial jealousies of arbitration
led courts to create the "ouster" and "revocability" doctrines. 121 The
revocability doctrine stated that arbitration agreements were freely
revocable by any disputant, while the ouster doctrine precluded en-
forcement of arbitration agreements because they "oust the courts of
119. It is unclear precisely what drives judicial decision-making, and why courts
have over-applied arbitration statutes to ADR agreements. See Chris Guthrie et al.,
Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 829-30 (2001) (concluding that
"judges rely on the same cognitive decision-making process as laypersons and other
experts, which leaves them vulnerable to cognitive illusions that can produce poor
judgments," and that regardless of whether judges fully understand the law, "they
might still make systematically erroneous decisions under some circumstances simply
because of how they - like all human beings - think"). However, ADR has been
seen as a means for easing judicial workloads. See, e.g., IDS Life Ins. Co. v. SunAmer-
ica, Inc., 103 F.3d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, J.) (noting "Congress's emphati-
cally expressed support for facilitating arbitration in order to effectuate private
ordering and lighten the caseload of the federal courts"). Still, some judges lament
the loss of interesting cases to private processes.
120. Sturges & Reckson, supra note 21, at 822-25, 831-41 (noting development of
common law refusal to specifically enforce agreements to arbitrate "c[a] me down from
quite ancient times as some original and fundamental tenet of equity jurisprudence"
but that "the general tenor of the statements is more by way of report than by reason
and adjudication").
121. See CLARENCE F. BIRDSEYE, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GENERAL BUSINESS AND LEGAL
FORMs 205 (1924) (emphasizing common law courts' jealousy and opposition to arbi-
tration, despite their enforcement of other contracts); Charles Newton Hulvey, Arbi-
tration of Commercial Disputes, 15 VA. L. REV. 238, 239 (1929) (stating reasons courts
did not enforce arbitration agreements).
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jurisdiction," or displace judicial power to resolve disputes. 122 Al-
though these doctrines originally targeted binding arbitration, they
have contributed to an overly narrow analysis of ADR agreements. 123
Remnants of these doctrines seem to drive some courts and commen-
tators to assume mediation and other ADR agreements are not spe-
cifically enforceable under common law. 124 This assumption is not
true. Accordingly, it is time to let go of these doctrines and narrow
assumptions in order to clear the way for modern contract enforce-
ment of ADR agreements. 125
A. Traditional Anti-Enforcement Doctrines Based on Judicial
Jealousy and Distrust of Private Dispute Resolution
Today, the FAA preempts application of state law that hinders
enforcement of arbitration in transactions affecting interstate
commerce. 126  Arbitration and ADR agreements not governed
122. See Hulvey, supra note 121, at 239-41 (discussing doctrine refusing to compel
performance of an agreement "intended to oust the courts of their jurisdiction").
123. See Katz, supra note 19, at 583-87 (critiquing courts' refusal to specifically
enforce non-binding dispute resolution agreements based on common law principles
that "equity will not enforce a 'vain order,' or require litigants to do something that
would be ineffectual or futile," and breach of such agreements causes no harm be-
cause when "one party is determined not to settle, the other party is not harmed by
the refusal to engage in ADR); Klintworth, supra note 74, at 184-89 (explaining that
one reason modern courts have been reluctant to enforce non-arbitral dispute resolu-
tion agreements without statutory backing is because they view these agreements as
"[taking] away some of the courts [sic] power," and further emphasizing that "many
courts have worried that alternative dispute resolution processes are robbing them of
their power and jurisdiction to deal with cases that they would normally have a right
to govern"). Cf Phillips, supra note 32, at 1259-61 (emphasizing that courts' blanket
refusal to specifically enforce executory arbitration agreements was based on flawed
judicial doctrine reflecting courts' hostility to private dispute resolution, but that
courts continued to blindly apply the doctrine even when they admitted its complete
lack of logic).
124. See Thompson, supra note 21, at 31 (assuming that agreements to mediate or
"negotiate-in-good-faith" are generally not specifically enforceable under common
law).
125. See BIRDSEYE, supra note 121, at 205-07 (discussing enactment of arbitration
laws to combat judicial opposition to arbitration and common law courts' eventual
disapproval of non-enforcement doctrines and adoption of "a much more liberal atti-
tude because they came to realize that arbitration might be their handmaiden rather
than their enemy; and also that the very strictness, rigidity and diffuseness of court
practice are a hindrance to the speedy determination of trade and other disputes
which are largely questions of technical fact").
126. See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996); Allied-Bruce
Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492
(1987); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (all confirming the FAA's appli-
cation in federal and state courts to all contracts within the vast preemptive power of
the Commerce Clause).
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by the FAA, however, have continued to fall victim to state
law incorporating anti-arbitration doctrines. 127 There are valid
reasons to question federal pro-arbitration policy, especially in
uneven bargaining contexts and cases involving public statu-
tory rights. 128 Courts should not, however, mask their concerns
in espousals of antiquated ouster and revocability doctrines. 129
These doctrines are based on faulty legal assumptions and mis-
127. See State of Nebraska v. Nebraska Ass'n of Pub. Employees et al., 477
N.W.2d 577, 581-83 (Neb. 1991) (finding that the state's adoption of the UAA violates
Nebraska's constitutional requirement that "[aill courts shall be open, and every per-
son, for any injury done him . . . shall have a remedy by due course of law" to the
extent the UAA ousts courts of jurisdiction by providing for private determination of
future disputes); Huntington Corp. v. Inwood Constr. Co., 348 S.W.2d 442, 444-46
(Tex. Civ. App. 1961) (holding that Texas law voids pre-dispute arbitration agree-
ments because they attempt to oust the courts of jurisdiction).
128. Fairness concerns have been prevalent where a party with superior bargain-
ing power arguably imposes arbitration on "little guy" consumers or employees. See
Sarah Rudolph Cole, Uniform Arbitration: "One Size Fits All" Does Not Fit, 16 OHIo
ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 759, 769 (2001) (critiquing fairness of binding arbitration of
employment claims); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the
Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U.L.Q. 637, 637 (1996)
(critiquing binding arbitration of consumer and employment claims where there is
unequal bargaining power); Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1170-81
(9th Cir. 2003) (refusing to compel employee to arbitrate discrimination claims where
"the stark inequality of bargaining power" between employer and employees allowed
employer to impose one-sided arbitration provisions on employees). Furthermore, se-
rious concerns arise regarding the appropriate arbitrability of statutory claims and
arbitrations' constitutional fairness. See Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity:
A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA
L. REV. 949, 1054-90 (2000) (discussing constitutional implications of arbitrations
conducted under the FAA). In addition, some have questioned arbitration's impact on
the judiciary's role in developing law and ensuring proper resolution of disputes. See,
e.g., Jackson Williams, What the Growing Use of Pre-dispute Binding Arbitration
Means for the Judiciary, 85 JUDICATURE 266, 266-67 (2002) (warning that arbitration
poses a threat "to a vital, independent judiciary" and its growth will result in "a rever-
sal of the traditional roles of courts and private arbitration").
129. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-1-41 (2003) (prohibiting specific enforcement of agree-
ments "to submit a controversy to arbitration"); Lee v. YES of Russellville, Inc., 784
So. 2d 1022, 1025 (Ala. 2000) (recognizing that "it is well settled that Alabama law
disfavors pre-dispute agreements to submit disputes to binding arbitration," but ap-
plying the FAA to an agreement requiring the parties to submit their disputes to
mediation followed by arbitration). See also Kelley v. Benchmark Homes, Inc., 550
N.W.2d 640 (Neb. 1996) (applying the FAA to compel non-binding arbitration, per-
haps in light of the Nebraska Supreme Court's strong denouncement of arbitration
five years earlier in Nebraska Ass'n of Pub. Employees, 477 N.W.2d at 581-83); Pa.
Life Ins. Co. v. Simoni, 641 N.W.2d 807, 812 (Iowa 2002) (finding arbitration agree-
ment could be specifically enforced in that case because the state's UAA applied in-
stead of Iowa common law that continued to apply the "principle that an agreement to
arbitrate is revocable at any time").
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guided jealousies of private processes that threatened courts' do-
main. 130
1. Legacy of Lord Coke's Remarks
Arbitration and ADR pre-date litigation. Courts traditionally
viewed these processes as threats to courts' law-making and dispute
resolution business - and dollars. 131 This judicial fear and hostility
to private dispute resolution manifested itself through courts' crea-
tion of the revocability and ouster doctrines. These doctrines gutted
the functionality of pre-dispute arbitration agreements by precluding
their specific enforcement and leaving parties with the empty remedy
of seeking nominal damages. 132 The business community therefore
prompted the adoption of the FAA and UAA to stop application of
these erroneous doctrines to arbitration. Business leaders focused on
arbitration due to its popularity and binding effect, which made it a
greater threat to the courts than conciliation and other non-binding
procedures. 133
130. See, e.g., Nebraska Ass'n of Pub. Employees, 477 N.W.2d at 581-83 (basing
refusal to enforce pre-dispute arbitration agreements on Nebraska cases decided in
the 1800s, and relying on pre-FAA cases in warning that arbitration will "open a leak
in the dyke of constitutional guarantees which might some day carry all away") (quot-
ing Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Zlotky, 92 N.W. 736 (Neb. 1902)).
131. See ALAN SCOTT RAU, ARBITRATION 57 (2d ed. 2002) (noting the courts' tradi-
tional hostility to arbitration may have been due in part to courts' concern that pri-
vate tribunals would not properly apply the law, but that "more cynically, one might
also suppose that it originated in considerations of competition for business, at a time
when judges' salaries still depended on fees paid by litigants"); JULIUS HENRY COHEN,
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW 83 (1918) (noting judicial competition with
private tribunals and fear that arbitration threatened a significant source of judicial
business, as well as judicial jobs linked to the courts' caseloads).
132. See COHEN, supra note 131, at 150-52. Courts refused to quantify damages in
reference to an award one might have received in arbitration because such amount
likely would have been void as a penalty. Therefore, damages were limited to nomi-
nal expenses incurred preparing for the arbitration. Id. at 151. In contrast to execu-
tory agreements, however, final arbitration awards were enforceable through
damages or specific performance. WESLEY A. STURGES, A TREATISE ON COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION AND AWARDS, 679-80, 701-02 (1930).
133. See infra notes 304-12 and accompanying text (discussing prevalence of arbi-
tration among trade and merchant groups). Even before the enactment of the FAA,
public policy supported voluntary settlement of legal controversies, especially when
they were for small dollar amounts and therefore "of little importance" to the courts.
See Conciliation Law Held Valid, 6 J. AM. JUD. Soc. 133, 136-43 (1923) (discussing
the North Dakota Supreme Court's approval of the state's conciliation statute requir-
ing parties to submit claims for under $200 to non-binding conciliation procedures,
emphasizing that the statute only applies to minor disputes and "the spirit of the law
favors voluntary adjustments of legal controversies"). Furthermore, non-binding pro-
cedures posed less threat to courts' power to decide disputes and parties' right to a
"day in court." Id. at 138-50. See also Herbert Harley, Justice or Litigation?, 6 VA. L.
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The revocability doctrine grew from dicta in Lord Coke's 1609
opinion in Vynior's Case.'34 In that a case, the plaintiff recovered on
a bond securing an agreement that required the parties to arbitrate
any dispute arising out of a contract to perform repair work on cer-
tain buildings. 135 The defendant had refused to honor the arbitra-
tor's decision on the plaintiffs contract claims or to pay the amount
due on the bond for failure to comply with the arbitration agree-
ment.136 The court ordered the defendant to pay 100 pounds due on
the bond for breach of the condition to arbitrate and 20 pounds in
damages due to the breach.' 37
At first glance, Vynior's Case appears to be a victory for arbitra-
tion. In holding the defendant liable on the bond, however, Lord
Coke announced what later was dubbed the "revocability doctrine."
Coke's needless announcement was that the defendant was free to
"countermand [the arbitration agreement], for one cannot by his act
make such authority, power or warrant not countermandable which
is by law or of its own nature countermandable." 13 s
This statement was merely dicta. Moreover, it seems inconsis-
tent with the court's conclusion that the plaintiff was entitled to re-
cover on the bond.' 39 Why was the defendant liable on a bond that
secured a revoked or void agreement? This meant that the obligation
to arbitrate was inherently revocable, but nonetheless enforceable
when stated as the condition for payment on a bond. It seems, how-
ever, that if the bond's condition (i.e., submit disputes to arbitration)
was revocable, then any revocation would have nullified liability on
the bond. In addition, Coke provided no legal basis for revocability of
arbitration agreements. 140 Nonetheless, Vynior's Case has gained
REV. 143, 147 (1919) (emphasizing that conciliation was less of a threat to courts'
power because parties remained free to seek trial if the conciliation did not end in
settlement).
134. Vynior's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 595, 599-600 (IKB. 1609).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. See also Paul L. Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37
YALE L.J. 595, 598-604 (1928) (discussing facts of Vynior's Case, and noting that the
plaintiff actually recovered more than he likely would have recovered on the underly-
ing claim). Years later, England adopted the Statute of Fines and Penalties which
precluded recovery on arbitration bonds unless justified by actual damages. Id.
138. See id. at 601 (quoting Vynior's Case, 8 Co. at 81b, 82a).
139. Lord Coke's dicta is now widely known among arbitration students and schol-
ars despite its "unsoundness." COHEN, supra note 131, at 126-27.
140. See Sayre, supra note 137, at 602, n.25 (noting that Coke merely cited cases
that provided questionable support, and deemed revocability "the rule").
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recognition as "the leading case" establishing the revocability
doctrine.1 4 1
The revocability doctrine seemed to reflect a traditional notion
that arbitrators were merely agents at the will of the parties who
appointed them. 142 Under this notion, any party to an arbitration
agreement could revoke an arbitrator's authority at any time before
the arbitrator rendered an award, even if the parties had agreed the
delegation was irrevocable.' 43 This meant that parties to an arbitra-
tion agreement faced continual risk that a party fearing defeat could
freely denounce the arbitration. 4 4 Furthermore, courts would order
only nominal damages due to breach of an arbitration agreement be-
cause they refused to measure damages with reference to an award
one might obtain in arbitration. x45
Despite the weak underpinnings of revocability, it became the
common law rule.' 46 It was accepted by the United States Supreme
Court, 147 and incorporated in the first Restatement of Contracts.148
141. Baum & Pressman, supra note 27, at 240, n.7; Sayre, supra note 137, at 602
(also lamenting limits of Vynior's Case because "the decision covers only recovery on
the bond").
142. Sayre, supra note 137, at 598-99 (explaining that revocability was based upon
agency principles regarding "the authority given to the arbitrators and the conse-
quent power to withdraw that authority").
143. Tobey v. County of Bristol et al., 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1321 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845)
(citing Vynior's Case as authority that arbitration submissions are revocable regard-
less of stipulation to the contrary because one "cannot alter the judgment of law, to
make that irrevocable, which is of its own nature revocable").
144. J.P. Chamberlain, The Commercial Arbitration Law, 9 A.B.A. J. 523, 523
(1923); Baum & Pressman, supra note 27, at 240.
145. Sayre, supra note 137, at 604 (noting that one could not suffer injury from
having to seek redress in the courts instead of arbitration). But see J.P. Chamberlain,
supra note 144, at 523 (emphasizing that any action for damages did not compensate
for "the social advantages of prompt settlement and of relieving the strain upon the
courts . . .").
146. See, e.g., Tobey, 23 F. Cas. at 1321 (accepting revocability as law); Elberton
Hardware Co. v. Hawes, 50 S.E. 964, 965-66 (Ga. 1905) (applying revocability to an
appraisal contract in concluding that appraisers had no power to choose replacements
without the parties' consent); Ferrell v. Ferrell, 161 S.W. 719, 721 (Mo. 1913) (refus-
ing to specifically enforce an agreement to select appraisers to determine property
value).
147. See, e.g., Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 121 (1924) ('The
federal courts - like those of the states and of England - have, both in equity and at
law, denied in large measure, the aid of their processes to those seeking to en force
(sic) executory agreement to arbitrate disputes."); see also Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red
Cross Line, 276 F. 319, 322-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (noting the morass of federal and state
actions on the parties' claim and declining to express an opinion on the validity of a
New York court's specific enforcement of the arbitration submission).
148. "The authority of the arbitrator is revocable by either [party] at any time
before an award is made, and though the revocation is a violation of the agreement,
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Nonetheless, courts and commentators qualified the doctrine and
stated exceptions. For example, they enforced provisions that re-
quired third party determination of isolated issues as a pre-condition
to litigation of underlying liability claims. 14 9 The Supreme Court
also hedged its acceptance of the doctrine by indicating that a court
could enforce an arbitration agreement made a rule of the court. i50
2. Birth of Ouster Doctrine Precluding Enforcement of
Agreements That Threatened Judicial Power
The revocability doctrine was paired with the "ouster" doctrine.
The ouster doctrine precluded specific enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate on the theory parties cannot by contract "oust" a court's ju-
risdiction or power to decide a legal dispute.15 1 Although the doctrine
first appeared in English law, it gained acceptance in American
courts and has continued to survive in some courts despite constant
criticism.152
the injured party is without substantial redress." RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 550,
cmt. A (Proposed Final Draft No. 11, 1932) (providing in the rule that an agreement to
arbitrate future disputes "is not illegal" but "will not be specifically enforced, and only
nominal damages are recoverable for its breach").
149. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 551 (Proposed Final Draft No. 11, 1932) (pro-
viding illustrations preserving specific enforcement of appraisal as a condition prece-
dent to litigation). See also 3 AM. JuR., Arbitration & Award § 74 (1936) (stating
same general rule precluding specific performance of agreements to submit future
disputes to arbitration, as well as the exception for "arbitration or appraisal made a
valid condition precedent to suit upon a contract"; and further qualifying non-enforce-
ment by stating that a court may stay an action then pending and treat the arbitra-
tion "as a mode of trial under authority of the court").
150. Red Cross Line, 264 U.S. at 122-25 (finding New York courts could equitably
enforce arbitration agreements in their own courts under New York's arbitration stat-
ute, and therefore the Court did not have occasion "to consider whether the unwilling-
ness of the federal courts to give full effect to executory agreements for arbitration can
be justified"). See also Hamilton v. Liverpool, London & Globe Ins. Co., 136 U.S. 242,
255 (1890) (holding that an appraisal provision stated as a condition precedent to
litigation is enforceable because, unlike arbitration, it leaves general questions of lia-
bility to the courts).
151. Kill v. Hollister, 1 Wils. 129, 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (1746). See also Sayre, supra
note 137, at 604 (noting that the ouster theory is not even mentioned in the early
cases "and certainly has no conscious bearing upon Vynior's Case"); Hulvey, supra
note 121, at 239-41 (describing the policy of the revocability doctrine as refusing to
compel performance of an agreement "intended to oust the courts of their
jurisdiction").
152. See Chamberlain, supra note 144, at 523 (criticizing the ouster doctrine and
advocating arbitration legislation in the early 1900s); Park Constr. Co. v. Indep. Sch.
Dist. No. 32, 296 N.W. 475, 477 (Minn. 1941) (rejecting the rule because it "was the
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The doctrine arose from Kill v. Hollister, in which the King's
Bench held an arbitration agreement unenforceable because "the par-
ties cannot oust this court."'1 53 This declaration grew to represent a
general rule precluding courts from enforcing various contract provi-
sions that limited redress in the courts of law. 154 This ouster reason-
ing, therefore, initially supported common law courts' refusal to
enforce anti-suit covenants, pre-dispute waivers of liability, and fo-
rum selection clauses. 155 The prevailing judicial attitude was that
only courts of law possessed jurisdiction and power to resolve legal
disputes. 156 Courts reasoned that only they possessed the ability to
"protect rights and to redress wrongs" because private tribunals were
prone to "become the instrument of injustice, or to deprive parties of
rights which they are otherwise fairly entitled to have protected."1 57
Like the revocability doctrine, the ouster theory appeared to be a
pretext for judicial hostility to private dispute resolution proceedings
that threatened courts' power. 158 This seemed particularly apparent
product of judicial jealousy rather than judicial reasoning"). But see State v. Ne-
braska Ass'n of Pub. Employees, 477 N.W.2d 577, 581-83 (Neb. 1991) (refusing spe-
cific enforcement of executory arbitration agreements because they oust courts of
their jurisdiction and thus defy public policy).
153. Kill, 95 Eng. Rep. at 532.
154. See Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1320-23 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845)
(providing Justice Story's often cited explanation and application of the ouster doc-
trine in American law); see also Meacham v. Jamestown Franklin & Clearfield R.R.
Co., 105 N.E. 653, 655 (1914) (refusing to apply Pennsylvania's law enforcing arbitra-
tion agreements even though the arbitration contract was to be performed in that
state and instead declaring the contract invalid as "contrary to a declared policy of
[New York] courts" that would not heed to considerations of judicial comity).
155. See Mut. Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Cleveland Woolen Mills, 82 F. 508, 510
(6th Cir. 1897) (declaring that a contract stipulation that suit may only be brought in
federal court was void because it "intended to oust the jurisdiction of all state courts");
Knorr v. Bates et al., 35 N.Y.S. 1060, 1062 (N.Y. Gen. Term. 1895) (holding that a
contractual limitation on the right to sue underwriters on an insurance policy was
unenforceable because "a provision in a contract that the party breaking it shall not
be answerable in an action is a stipulation for ousting the courts of jurisdiction, and
as such, is void, upon grounds of public policy"); Meacham, 105 N.E. at 656 (Cardozo,
J. concurring) (emphasizing that an arbitration contract is an invalid attempt to oust
the jurisdiction of the courts because its purpose is the same as agreements requiring
litigants to submit their case to a foreign court, but noting that there may be excep-
tional circumstances warranting enforcement of such forum selection clauses).
156. See Meacham, 105 N.E. at 656. See also Tobey, 23 F. Cas. at 1320-21 (de-
nouncing criticisms that the ouster doctrine was based on judicial hostility to arbitra-
tion, but then focusing its analysis on fears regarding the skill and judgment of
arbitrators to fairly and correctly decide disputes).
157. Tobey, 23 F. Cas. at 1320-21, See also Mitchell v. Harris, 2 Vessey 129, 133,
30 Eng. Rep. 557, 559 ("Arbitrators cannot do justice; for they cannot make the par-
ties produce the evidence.").
158. See Chamberlain, supra note 144, at 523 (attributing ouster to "hostility of
English-speaking courts to arbitration contracts") (quoting Judge Hough's remarks);
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as courts refused to enforce arbitration agreements, although they
would enforce settlement agreements and final arbitration
awards. 159
Indeed, the ouster and revocability doctrines are remnants from
ancient dicta that are contrary to both Supreme Court and legislative
pronouncements. 160 They defy contract and equity principles. 16 1
Nonetheless, these doctrines have continued to hinder courts' devel-
opment and application of common contract remedy principles to
ADR agreements.
3. Limited Enforcement and Narrow Perceptions of Private
Resolution Processes
Some nineteenth century courts nominally analyzed arbitration
agreements under equitable contract principles. Even these courts,
COHEN, supra note 131, at 165-69 (discussing criticisms of ouster and revocability
doctrines); Glenda Burke Slaymaker, The Legality of Contracts Affecting the Jurisdic-
tion of Courts, 58 CENT. 64, 64 (1904) (attributing the ouster doctrine to the "jealousy
of the courts in preserving the integrity of their jurisdiction" combined with the public
interest in "permitting every citizen to resort to the courts to obtain the protection of
the law to which he is entitled"). Cf, Sayre, supra note 137, at 610-12. Sayre ques-
tioned the perceived judicial jealousy and proposed that courts merely were protecting
common law rights by refusing to enforce arbitration agreements where they were not
assured due notice and fair hearing in arbitration. Id.
159. See Slaymaker, supra note 158, at 64-66. In the early common law, courts
refused to enforce various contracts as against public policy due to their perceived
infringement on courts' jurisdiction, including arbitration agreements, anti-suit cove-
nants, and forum selection clauses. Id. See also Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co.,
264 U.S. 109, 121 (1924) (recognizing the confused state of the law before the enact-
ment of the FAA: "If executory, a breach will support an action for damages. If exe-
cuted-that is, if the award has been made-effect will be given to the award in any
appropriate proceeding at law, or in equity.") (citations omitted).
160. Sturges & Reckson, supra note 21, at 842. Even in 1962, before the Supreme
Court's "pro-arbitration" pronouncements in Prima Paint and Southland, prominent
arbitration scholars noted Supreme Court cases such as Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S.
(17 How.) 344, 349 (1854), in which the Court seemed to admonish courts' refusal to
enforce arbitration agreements. Id. at 840, 823-25, 831-43 (emphasizing lack of basis
for common law refusal to specifically enforce agreements to arbitrate).
161. See 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 359-65 (stating requirements
for ordering specific performance or injunctive relief); see also, e.g., Valdez Fisheries
Dev. Ass'n, Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 45 P.3d 657, 667 (Alaska 2002) (dis-
missing a claim for breach of an agreement to negotiate where the alleged agreement
was based on a vague exchange of letters that did not provide any standards or meth-
ods for resolving differences); see also RANDY E. BARNETT, PERSPECTIVES ON CONTRACT
LAW 59-89 (2d ed. 2001) (discussing ongoing debate regarding proper application of
specific performance relief).
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however, generally refused to order parties' compliance with con-
tracts to participate in arbitration or other private ADR processes. 16 2
They assumed that courts lacked power "to fully execute any decree"
for specific performance of an arbitration agreement. 16 3 This nomi-
nally equitable assumption, however, incorporated ouster ratio-
nale. 16 4 For example, some courts would order parties to submit a
fair price determination to an appraiser under a sales contract or at
least would enforce the contract at a judicially determined price in
order to protect the parties from injustice.165 However, most courts
ignored this insistence on preventing injustice when they refused to
compel performance of broad agreements to arbitrate that appeared
to displace courts' power. 16 6 In refusing to enforce an arbitration
promise, a court would allow a recalcitrant party to "take advantage
of his own misconduct."' 67
Courts also incorporated ouster rationale in their unfavorable
perceptions of arbitration. In Tobey v. County of Bristol, for example,
Justice Story denied that judicial hostility drove the court's refusal to
compel the plaintiff to submit his claims to arbitration. 168 Justice
162. Alfred Hayes, Specific Performance of Contracts for Arbitration or Valuation,
1 Cornell L.Q. 225, 225 (1916).
163. Id. at 225-37 (stating grounds for courts' refusal to specifically enforce arbi-
tration agreements, but also discussing exceptions for enforcement of appraisals
while subtly criticizing the ouster doctrine as it had skewed specific performance of
agreements to arbitrate).
164. In addition, courts of equity may have refused to condone a private proce-
dure's substitution for courts of law because equity courts themselves were barred
from exercising jurisdiction over matters entrusted to courts of law. 30A C.J.S. Eq-
uity § 17 (updated 2002) (stating general rule that a court of equity will only exercise
its power where there is no adequate legal remedy).
165. Hayes, supra note 162, at 228-34 (indicating that courts of equity would en-
force valuation agreements by ordering the parties to proceed with valuation or
"ignor[ing] the provision as to mode of valuation, the court itself fixing value" in order
to protect the parties from injustice). See also SIR EDWARD FRY, SPECIFIC PERFORM.
ANCE OF CONTRACTS, § 359 (2d ed. 1861) (stating that incomplete contracts cannot be
specifically enforced, including contracts that leave terms to be supplied in the future
- a principal stated for not enforcing agreements that leave terms to be supplied by a
private procedure).
166. Sayre, supra note 137, at 235-37 (explaining further that some commenta-
tors, including Lord Pomeroy, suggested that the rule may be doubted in light of cases
in which breaching parties were permitted to benefit from their breach of arbitration
agreements); see also Milnes v. Gery, 33 Eng. Rep. 574 (Ch. 1807) (refusing to appoint
a special master to value real estate or order parties' compliance with their agreed
mode for fixing the price, regardless of whether the contract failed "from bad faith on
the one side, or the other," and warning that "[plersons, entering into such an agree-
ment, must be aware, that by possibility it may never be carried into execution").
167. Sayre, supra note 137, at 235-37.
168. Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1321 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No.
14,065).
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Story framed his analysis in contract remedy terms in finding that
the court could not exercise its equitable discretion to order arbitra-
tion because "the merits and circumstances of the particular case"
made it futile to order arbitration.169 In reality, this conclusion was
based on negative views of arbitration. 170 Justice Story opined that
arbitrators had the propensity to become instruments of injustice, to
misunderstand the principles of law and equity, and to render judg-
ments that are "but rusticum judicum.'1 7
Although the ouster and revocability doctrines targeted binding
arbitration, their effects were far-reaching. They infected enforce-
ment of all private dispute resolution agreements. The doctrines fu-
eled a legal presumption that private procedures were too uncertain
or futile to be worthy of judicial compulsion.172 For example, courts
assumed they lacked power to order parties' compliance with agree-
ments requiring appraisal of land because they could not appoint ap-
praisers. 17 3 Similarly, these traditional attitudes have continued to
hinder enforcement of ADR agreements under contract law. 1 74
169. Id. at 1319-23 ("Courts of equity do not refuse to interfere to compel a party
specifically to perform an agreement to refer to arbitration, because they wish to dis-
courage arbitrations, as against public policy. On the contrary, they have and can
have no just objection to these domestic forums, and will enforce, and promptly inter-
fere to enforce their awards when fairly and lawfully made, without hesitation or
question.").
170. Sturges & Reckson, supra note 21, at 838-39. See also Tobey, 23 F. Cas. at
1321-23.
171. Tobey, 23 F. Cas. at 1320-23 (stating specific relief would be improper be-
cause parties' compliance involved their good faith, and the court would not have
power to force parties' selection of arbitrators, or to supervise and ensure performance
of such agreement). See also Sturges & Reckson, supra note 21, at 837-39 (discussing
Story's reasoning in Tobey as a "refinement in the paternalism of the courts").
172. See Dave Greytak Enters. v. Mazda Motors of Am., Inc., 622 A.2d 14, 22-24
(Del. Ch. Ct. 1992) (finding parties had no duty to negotiate in good faith pursuant to
their contract because any such obligation would only provide "the first step of a more
comprehensive procedural scheme" that would stir litigation and "possible contempt
decree"); Pillow v. Pillow's Heirs et al., 1842 WL 2018 at *1-2 (Tenn., Dec. 1842) (re-
fusing to specifically enforce an appraisal contract because the court had no power to
"make a new contract" by selecting substitute appraisers).
173. Pillow, 1842 WL 2018 at *1-2. The opinion's murky facts indicated that the
appraisal procedure had been initiated, but that it "proved an entire failure" likely
after a party refused to comply. Id. See also Robinson v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co.,
168 A. 321, 398-401 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1933) (finding appraisal was not arbitration gov-
erned by Pennsylvania's Arbitration Act, and therefore was revocable by either party
at any time before an award was made).
174. See, e.g., Dave Greytak Enters., 622 A.2d at 22-24 (declining to order negotia-
tions based on an assumption that the order would be futile).
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B. Modern Courts' Reluctance to Order Compliance With
Arbitration and ADR Agreements Based on Traditional
Doctrines and Perceptions
Why rehash old ouster and revocability doctrines? One would as-
sume that courts have erased them from common law in light of cur-
rent policies encouraging ADR. 175 Some courts seem over-eager to
compel arbitration and ADR using the FAA and UAA. 176 Other
courts, however, cling to anti-enforcement doctrines despite the
FAA's pro-enforcement mandate. 177 Courts also incorporate these
anti-enforcement principles and attitudes in narrow perceptions of
ADR agreements.17 This bipolar jurisprudence has led some courts
to assume they lack power to order participation in contractual ADR
processes not governed by statute. 79 Vestiges of ouster rationale
also have contributed to some courts' rejection or limitation of the
175. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280 (1995) (ex-
plaining federal policy endorsing arbitration and private resolution because it gener-
ally is considered cheaper, faster, and more flexible than litigation, and it minimizes
hostility and is less disruptive of ongoing relations).
176. See Inland Group of Cos., Inc. v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 985 P.2d
674, 678-80 & n.1 (Idaho 1999) (assuming in a footnote without discussion that the
state's UAA applied to an insurance policy requiring appraisal of losses covered by the
policy, and therefore determining enforcement and waiver issues under the Act's pro-
arbitration law and procedures); Meineke v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 892 P.2d 1365,
1369-70 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (applying the state UAA's pro-arbitration "policy" to
appraisal in determining whether a party had waived its right to demand appraisal of
losses under an insurance policy). See also supra Part I (discussing courts' over-appli-
cation of the FAA and UAA to mediation and other procedures outside the acts'
purview).
177. See In re Am. Ins. Co., 203 N.Y.S. 206, 206 (N.Y. App. Div. 1924) (finding an
appraisal was not "arbitration" governed by the state's Arbitration Law and therefore
reversing an order compelling the parties to submit damage disputes to the appraisal
process). See also Robinson v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 168 A. 321, 321-23 (Penn.
1933) (finding that an appraisal clause in a fire insurance policy did not call for "arbi-
tration" governed by the state's newly adopted Arbitration Act because it would not
finally determine the parties' entire controversy and therefore holding that the ap-
praisal clause was revocable by either party prior to an award by the appraisers).
178. See ALAN Scorr RAU ET AL., ARBITRATION 58-59 (2d ed. 2002) (explaining con-
tinued survival of "common law arbitration" that generally ensures enforcement of an
agreement to arbitrate only "as long as consent to arbitrate has not been revoked and
the parties have proceeded without objection to an award" (citations omitted)). See
also, e.g., Little v. Allstate Ins. Co., 705 A.2d 538, 540 (Va. 1997) (finding that Vir-
ginia's adoption of the UAA excluded insurance contracts and thus enforceability of
arbitration agreements fell under the common law "which allows revocation of such
an agreement at any time up to the publication of an award").
179. See HIM Portland, LLC v. Devito Builders, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 230, 233 n.5
(D. Me. 2002) (finding parties' failure to trigger an arbitration requirement by seeking
mediation under the contract precluded application of the FAA, and thus allowing the
parties to litigate under the assumption that "the Court cannot order the parties to
mediate").
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separability principle that precludes courts from considering contract
defenses other than those aimed at an agreement to arbitrate.'8 0 It
is time for courts to clear these vestiges from common law in order to
equitably enforce ADR agreements in appropriate contexts.' 8 '
1. Modern Application of Ouster and Revocability Rationale
The Nebraska Supreme Court demonstrated reliance on tradi-
tional anti-enforcement of private dispute resolution in the 1991 case,
State v. Nebraska Ass'n of Public Employees. 1 8 2 In that case, the Ne-
braska Attorney General sought a declaratory judgment that Ne-
braska's UAA violated the state constitution by requiring specific
enforcement of binding arbitration contracts.' 8 3 Nebraska had
waited until 1987, many years after most other states, 8 4 to enact the
UAA.' 8 5 The Nebraska Supreme Court, however, quashed the Act
under a Nebraska constitutional requirement that "[a]ll courts shall
be open, and every person, for any injury done him.., shall have a
remedy by due course of law, and justice administered without denial
or delay." s8 6 Most states have denied these challenges of arbitration
statutes under such "open courts" provisions.' 8 7 Nonetheless, the
180. See Richard C. Reuben, First Options, Consent to Arbitration, and the Demise
of Separability: Restoring Access to Justice for Contracts with Arbitration Provisions,
56 SMU L. REV. 819, 852-55 (2003) (citing cases rejecting or narrowing separability
due to legacy of confusion regarding the survival of ouster rationale).
181. See infra Part IV and accompanying text (proposing refreshed common law
enforcement approach).
182. 477 N.W.2d 577 (1991).
183. Id. at 577-79. The action named the Nebraska Association of Public Employ-
ees, Local 61 of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees
("NAPE"), and the Nebraska Association of Correctional Employees/American Feder-
ation of State, County, and Municipal Employees ("NACE") as defendants, seeking to
invalidate clauses in two labor contracts which required the unions, their members,
and the employer involved to submit future disputes to binding arbitration. Although
the case apparently involved arbitration clauses in labor agreements, the court's anal-
ysis was based on the constitutionality of the state's adoption of the UAA, Neb. Rev.
Stat. §§ 25-2601 et. seq. (Reissue 1989). Id.
184. Nebraska was the 35th state to approve the 1955 UAA. 7 UNIFORM LAWS
ANNOTATED (U.L.A.) PART I, Uniform Arbitration Act, 1 (1997).
185. Nebraska Ass'n of Pub. Employees, 477 N.W.2d at 580 (citing and quoting
Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-2601 et seq. (Reissue 1989)).
186. Id. at 580 (quoting Neb. Const. Art. I, § 13). The court's analysis of the UAA's
constitutionality was based solely on cases applying ouster doctrine to arbitration in
the 1800s and early 1900s. Id. at 581-82 (quoting various pronouncements of the
ouster doctrine from 1889, 1895, 1901 and 1902, and later citing a few more modem
cases as restating the ouster policy). The court provided no interpretative analysis of
the constitutional "open courts" requirement upon which it relied.
187. See Rollings v. Thermodyne Indus.., Inc., 910 P.2d 1030, 1031-36 (Okla. 1996)
(finding Oklahoma constitutional provision requiring that state courts "shall be open
to every person, and speedy and certain remedy provided for every wrong and for
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Nebraska Court relied on century-old cases applying ouster rationale
to conclude that pre-dispute arbitration agreements "oust the courts
of jurisdiction and are thus against public policy and therefore void
and unenforceable."'u 8 The court equated Nebraska's "open courts"
provision with the ouster doctrine and rejected as "irrelevant" strong
contentions that the legislature's adoption of the UAA was a declara-
tion of public policy in favor of arbitration.' 8 9
Is Nebraska's view an anomaly in this "pro-ADR" period? Not
entirely. Other courts have restated or refused to overrule the ouster
and revocability doctrines, or have otherwise indicated continued
hostilities and narrow perceptions of arbitration and ADR.190 In ad-
dition, some states allowed contradictory opinions to fester by failing
every injury . . .and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, delay or
prejudice" did not bar enforcement of arbitration agreements and that the majority of
states have upheld arbitration statutes under "access to the courts" constitutional
provisions); State Farm v. Broadnax, 827 P.2d 531, 533-39 (Colo. 1992) (finding that
state constitutional "open courts" requirement did not bar binding arbitration under
state's No Fault Act requiring parties to agree to binding arbitration of claims arising
out of insurance contracts). See also Mark Arthur Saltzman, Recent Development,
Reed v. Farmers Insurance Group, 15 OHIO ST. J. Disp. RESOL. 895, 900-03 (2000)
(noting Illinois Supreme Court's finding that insurance arbitration statute did not
violate any federal or state constitutional provisions); John Tutterow, Note, The Con-
stitution v. Arbitration: Rollings v. Thermodyne and a Proposal for a New Alternative
to Arbitration, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 697, 697-700 (1997) (discussing the Rollings
decision and Oklahoma's validation of arbitration provisions in the face of challenges
based on state constitutional "open courts" provisions).
188. Nebraska Ass'n of Pub. Employees, 477 N.W.2d at 582.
189. Id. at 582. After quickly declaring the unconstitutionality of the UAA, the
court rejected an argument that the state's authorization of arbitration clauses in
state employment contracts should equitably estop the state from challenging the va-
lidity of these arbitration clauses. Id. at 582-83.
190. See, e.g., Garretson v. Mountain W. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 761 P.2d
1288, 1290 (Mont. 1988) (acknowledging the continued vitality of the ouster rationale
in finding an appraisal clause in an insurance contract was not arbitration controlled
by the UAA and specifically enforcing the clause because it fit an exception to the
ouster rule for appraisals that would not "oust the jurisdiction of the courts, but only
require [ed] a certain character of evidence of a fact in controversy," citing and quoting
Randall v. Am. Fire Ins. Co., 25 P. 953, 956-57 (1891)); Spinsky v. Kay, 550 N.E.2d
349, 351 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (declaring without question the "Well-established" com-
mon law rule that a court will not order specific performance of an agreement to sub-
mit a controversy to arbitration, but finding the appraisal clause at issue could be
specifically enforced because it fit the exception for appraisal of "non-essential" issues
such as property value, citing and quoting Coles v. Peck, 96 Ind. 333 (1884)); Hunting-
ton Corp. v. Inwood Constr. Co., 348 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) (applying
the ouster rationale as Texas "public policy" to refuse specific enforcement of an exec-
utory arbitration agreement, while stating that a party may recover damages for
breach of the agreement "for the law favors arbitration").
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to clarify rejection or acceptance of the ouster doctrine. 19 1 For exam-
ple, in Huntington Corp. v. Inwood Constr. Co., the Texas Court of
Appeals accepted and applied the ouster doctrine. 19 2 In that case,
Inwood moved to compel arbitration of claims arising from a con-
struction contract incorporating an arbitration clause that is common
in the construction community.19 3 The court did not question ouster
rationale, but instead assumed any attempt to specifically enforce an
agreement to arbitrate "amounts to nothing.' 9 4 The court, therefore,
licensed the commercial parties' defiance of their arbitration
promises. 195 It merely left Inwood free to seek nominal damages for
breach of the arbitration contract. 196
After Huntington, the Texas Supreme Court created an ambigu-
ity in Texas law by criticizing the ouster doctrine without clearly de-
nouncing it.19 The Texas Court of Appeals, therefore, struggled to
decipher Texas common law in Wylie Indep. Sch. Dist. v. TMC
191. Compare Wylie Indep. Sch. Dist. v. TMC Founds., Inc., 770 S.W.2d 19, 22-23
(Tex. App. 1989) (finding an arbitration agreement may be specifically enforceable
under common law) with Huntington Corp., 348 S.W.2d at 445 (applying the ouster
and revocability doctrines to deny specific enforcement of an arbitration agreement).
Compare also Meacham v. Jamestown, Franklin & Clearfield R.R. Co., 211 N.Y. 346,
351 (N.Y. 1914) (applying ouster doctrine to refuse specific enforcement of an arbitra-
tion agreement) with AMF Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 621 F. Supp. 456, 462-63
(E.D.N.Y. 1985) (specifically enforcing an agreement to submit disputes to non-bind-
ing arbitration under the FAA).
192. 348 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Tex. Ct. App. 1961).
193. Huntington Corp., 348 S.W.2d at 444. See also Thomas J. Stipanowich, The
Multi-Door Contract and Other Possibilities, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 303
(1998); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Beyond Arbitration: Innovation and Evolution in the
United States Construction Industry, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 65, 139 (1996); Thomas
J. Stipanowich, Of "Procedural Arbitrability: The Effect of Noncompliance with Con-
tract Claims Procedures, 40 S.C. L. REV. 847, 848 (1989) (all discussing arbitration
under the standard American Institute of Architects ("AIA") contract provisions and
its acceptance in the construction industry).
194. Huntington Corp., 348 S.W.2d at 445.
195. Huntington Corp., 348 S.W.2d 804, 805-06 (Tex. App. 1971) (addressing the
case for the third time, after initially reversing an order enforcing the arbitration
agreement and remanding for trial). This is the type of arbitration agreement that
should be enforced due to the construction communities' creation and acceptance of
reasonable arbitration procedures. However, the courts' reactionary reliance on
ouster rationale led to years of litigation, and consequent delay and expense.
196. Huntington Corp., 348 S.W.2d at 445 (declaring that the arbitration agree-
ment was "not wholly void as contrary to public policy, for the law favors arbitra-
tions," but failing to explain what damages would have been appropriate).
197. See L.H. Lacy Co. v. City of Lubbock, 559 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1977) (con-
cluding that it was "unnecessary to alter common law arbitration rules" in that case,
but finding that ouster was "not justifiable when the case fits within the common
mold," leaving it unclear which cases fit the "common mold").
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Founds., Inc.x9 s In that case, a divided panel of the court of appeals
found that an arbitration agreement in a construction contract was
not governed by the state's arbitration statute because it did not con-
tain statutory notice. A majority of the court concluded, however,
that the agreement was specifically enforceable "under such common
law rules as may be relevant."19 9 The majority did not discuss or
even cite Huntington. The dissent protested that the intermediate
court "is neither the Supreme Court nor is it the Legislature," and
therefore it was not the court's province to ignore ouster doctrine that
had "served [the] state and nation from the beginning."20 0
Similarly, New York courts have produced contradictory opinions
regarding their acceptance of the ouster doctrine. New York's high-
est court has never overruled its application of the doctrine in
Meacham v. Jamestown, Franklin & Clearfield R.R. Co., a leading
case supporting ouster rationale. 20 1 Despite Meacham's survival,
however, some courts in New York have endorsed state public policy
favoring specific enforcement of arbitration and other ADR proce-
dures where they "reflect the informed negotiation and endorsement
of [the] parties."20 2 Furthermore, federal courts in New York have
indicated willingness to specifically enforce agreements to submit
disputes to ADR under the state's common law. 20 3 These courts have
198. 770 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. App. 1989) (specifically enforcing an arbitration agree-
ment under the clear language of the contract).
199. Id. at 21 (quoting L.H. Lacy Co., 559 S.W.2d at 352).
200. Id. at 23 (Howell J., dissenting).
201. 211 N.Y. 346 (N.Y. 1914) (refusing to specifically enforce an agreement to
submit disputes to arbitration under the ouster doctrine and exemplifying judicial
distrust of private dispute resolution prevalent at the time).
202. Citibank N.A. v. Bankers Trust Co., 633 N.Y.S.2d 314, 314 (N.Y. App. Div.
1995) (citing Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. New York City Transit Auth., 623 N.E.2d
531, 534 (N.Y. 1993), but seemingly applying the state's UAA instead of common law,
to enforce an agreement to submit disputes to a non-binding "ADR agreement").
203. See AMF Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 621 F. Supp. 456, 461 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (ap-
plying the FAA to specifically enforce an agreement to submit disputes to non-binding
arbitration but also finding that the same relief would be appropriate under New
York common law); Thompson v. Liquichimica of Am., Inc., 481 F. Supp. 365, 366
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (specifically enforcing an agreement "to use best efforts to reach an
agreement" without mentioning that the agreement could "oust" a court's resolution
of the parties' dispute by resulting in private settlement), questioned by, Jillcy Film
Enter., Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 515, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). See also
CB Richard Ellis, Inc. v. Am. Envtl. Waste Mgmt., No. 98-CV-4183(JG), 1998 WL
903495, at *3-4 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (applying the FAA instead of common law to specifi-
cally enforce an agreement to submit disputes to clearly non-binding mediation); Peck
v. Planet Ins. Co., No. 93 Civ. 4961, 1994 WL 381544, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (conclud-
ing that the parties must "proceed in good faith through the appraisal process" under
an insurance contract but failing to specify its application of common or statutory
law).
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dodged Meacham, however, by clinging to the FAA or the state's UAA
as providing a basis for specific enforcement. 20 4 Indeed, these courts
may have misapplied the acts to non-binding ADR procedures due, in
part, to their confusion or frustration with the state's common law.
Application of the FAA provides an easy enforcement avenue because
the Act preempts state law incorporating ouster or revocability
doctrine. 20 5
2. Narrow Remedy Analysis Premised on Limited Perceptions
of Private Dispute Resolution Processes
Most states have denounced the ouster and revocability doc-
trines. Furthermore, some states have embraced FAA "pro-arbitra-
tion" policy, and even have surpassed federal law in advancing
arbitration and ADR. 20 6 Still, some courts seem to discount the
breadth of values and functions dispute resolution processes pro-
vide.20 7 These courts base enforceability of an ADR agreement solely
on the specificity of the ADR process or on whether the process will
end the dispute. Such factors are important in determining applica-
tion of specific relief, but courts should not cast aside careful consid-
eration of other facts, circumstances, and equities of each particular
case.
20 8
204. AMF, Inc., 621 F. Supp. at 456; CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 1998 WL 903495, at
*3-4; Citibank N.A., 633 N.Y.S.2d at 315 (all applying the FAA or UAA to non-binding
procedures).
205. Id. See also Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 (1991)
(emphasizing that the FAA's "purpose was to reverse the longstanding judicial hostil-
ity to arbitration agreements that has existed at English common law and had been
adopted by American courts"); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984)
(stressing the FAA's national policy that preempts contrary state policy).
206. See RAu, ARBITRATION, supra note 8, at 59 (noting that in some states, com-
mon law has developed beyond the FAA and UAA to further the growth of arbitration
and advance "the 'pro-arbitration' policy of the state statute to enforce an arbitration
agreement outside the statute's substantive scope, and despite one party's prior at-
tempt to 'revoke"') (emphasis in original). Some states also have created offices to
encourage mediation. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-7-101, et seq. (1995); HAw. REV.
STAT. § 613-1, et seq. (1989); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 5-501, et seq. (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 52:27E-73 (1994).
207. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie & James Levin, A "Party Satisfaction" Perspective on
a Comprehensive Mediation Statute, 13 OHIO ST. J. Disp. RESOL. 885, 887-91 (1998)
(noting values of arbitration and party satisfaction due to personal participation and
control in the process). See also infra notes 302-14 and accompanying text (discussing
relational and process-orientated enforcement of such procedures).
208. See infra Part IV.A. (discussing courts' equitable considerations in determin-
ing the applicability of specific performance and proposing a more relational analysis
of application of specific performance remedies to dispute resolution contracts).
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For example, in Jillcy Film Enterprises, Inc. v. Home Box Office,
Inc., the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York held unenforceable under New York common law, a fairly
specific agreement to negotiate because the agreement did not set
forth sufficiently "objective standards" or "a clear set of guidelines"
for measuring compliance with the process. 20 9 Jillcy claimed that
HBO breached its express contract to "negotiate exclusively in good
faith with respect to the terms and provisions relating to the distribu-
tion, exhibition or other exploitation" of a documentary of the filming
of "The Terry Fox Story. '2 10 In dismissing Jillcy's claim, the court
critiqued an earlier case in which the same federal court enforced an
agreement "to use best efforts to settle disputes." The court con-
cluded with little analysis that such "good faith" standards do not
provide sufficiently "definite, objective criteria or standards" to be en-
forceable. 2 1 1 Although it was appropriate for the court to consider
the specificity of the agreement, the court discounted possible equi-
ties by automatically dismissing the claim without even considering
contextual issues. 212
Similarly, some courts undervalue process and relational values
of non-binding dispute resolution procedures by refusing to enforce
participation in such procedures because they cannot force the par-
ties to settle their dispute.21 3 It is true that courts should respect
209. 593 F. Supp. 515, 520-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (quoting and discussing Pinnacle
Books, Inc. v. Harlequin Enterprises, Ltd., 519 F. Supp. 118, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) and
Mocca Lounge, Inc. v. Misak, 462 N.Y.S.2d 704, 706 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983)).
210. Jillcy Film Enters., Inc., 593 F. Supp. at 516-21 & n.1. The parties executed
the negotiation agreement on July 21, 1982, and had ongoing discussions regarding
production and licensing for the documentary until January 19, 1983, when an HBO
employee called and told Jillcy's attorney that there would be no deal. Id. at 517-518.
Jillcy claimed, however, that the parties had reached an oral agreement on January 7,
that was embodied in the Production and License Agreement HBO sent to another
counsel for Jillcy on January 18. Id.
211. Id. at 520-21 (questioning and seemingly denouncing its earlier decision in
Thompson v. Liquichimica of America, Inc.).
212. See infra notes 329-37 and accompanying text (discussing enforcement of pri-
vate dispute resolution agreements with consideration of facts and equities). In this
case, it does not appear that Jillcy was seeking to compel HBO's participation in good
faith negotiations, but instead was bringing its claim after negotiations had failed.
Nonetheless, the court's narrow remedy analysis could impact future requests for spe-
cific relief.
213. See, e.g., Jillcy Film Enters., Inc., 593 F. Supp. at 520-21 (finding an agree-
ment to negotiate is not enforceable because it is even more vague than an agreement
to agree); Griffin v. Griffin, 699 P.2d 407, 409-10 (Colo. 1985) (premising analysis of
an agreement requiring parents to negotiate and jointly select their child's school on
the assumption "the parties merely 'agreed to agree,'" and "such agreements are un-
enforceable because the court has no power to force the parties to reach agreement
and cannot grant a remedy"); Coldmatic Refrigeration of Canada, Ltd. v. Hess, Nos.
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parties' "freedom from contract."214 However, some courts mis-
perceive ADR as merely a means to end disputes. They assume that
contracts contemplating future negotiations are unenforceable
"agreements to agree."215 This overlooks the relational benefits par-
ties may derive from engaging in negotiations. Courts should appre-
ciate that not all agreements to negotiate are too "open-ended and
amorphous" to be specifically enforceable. 216
The purpose of enforcing an ADR agreement may be to provide
"breathing space" or foster discussions, which eventually may or may
not produce a mutually acceptable and durable resolution. 217 Re-
gardless of whether a process leads to settlement, it may aid in pro-
viding supervised exchange of information, preserving party
satisfaction, calming or improving relations, and opening lines of
communication. 21 8 Moreover, parties report that they benefit simply
A02A1611, A02A1815, 2002 WL 31085964, at *2-3 (Ga. App. Sept. 19, 2002) (finding
no breach or fraud claims could be predicated on agreement to sell stock because it
left important terms to be negotiated in the future, and thus "Was nothing more than
an agreement to agree"); Dave Greytak Enters., Inc. v. Mazda Motors of Am., Inc., 622
A.2d 14, 22-23 (Del. Cg. 1992) (finding contract did not provide for specific perform-
ance of a duty to negotiate, and emphasizing that the court will not order such relief
because it lacks power to force parties to reach an agreement); see also 1 WILLISTON, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 45, at 149-52 (Jaeger 3d ed. 1957) (stating
generally agreements to negotiate are not enforceable).
214. See BARNETT, supra note 161, at 11 (discussing courts' reluctance to enforce
preliminary agreements that are contingent on the parties' further negotiations of
final terms). See also Dep't of Transp. v. City of Atlanta, 380 S.E.2d 265, 268 (Ga.
1989) (finding court should not impose contempt penalty on parties if mediation fails
because "[tihat would amount to an order to settle the case which requires power the
court does not have"); Ohio Council 8 v. Ohio Dep't of Mental Retardation & Dev.
Disabilities, 459 N.E.2d 220, 223 (Ohio 1984) (emphasizing that "'mediation' and 'ar-
bitration' are not functionally equivalent" in refusing to enforce mediator's non-bind-
ing settlement recommendation).
215. Id. See also Coldmatic Refrigeration of Canada, Ltd. v. Hess, Nos. A02A1611,
A02A1815, 2002 WL 31085964, at *2-3 (Ga. App. Sept. 19, 2002).
216. See Thompson, supra note 21, at 31 (assuming that agreements to mediate or
"negotiate-in-good-faith" are generally not specifically enforceable under common
law).
217. See Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 856-57 (discussing reasons for enforcing
promises to participate in non-binding processes such as mediation and negotiation).
"Breathing space" is sometimes precisely what parties need to regain perspective, and
objectively assess their case prior to launching litigation. See id. (discussing "breath-
ing space").
218. See id. (discussing collateral benefits of non-binding processes); Ian R. Mac-
neil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 483, 483-
525 (emphasizing the importance of relational thinking in understanding exchange in
our world of complex human interactions); Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of
Long-term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical and Relational Contract
Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 854, 887 (1978) [hereinafter Contracts] (discussing dispute
resolution in relational contracts as means to retain status quo, create harmony, and
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from having the opportunity to control a dispute resolution process
and outcome, even if the process does not result in settlement.
2 19
That is not to say courts should coerce parties' compliance with
all ADR agreements. For example, a court should not aid a party's
strategic use of an ADR process to "tax the will or resources of an
opponent" or to otherwise intimidate and exhaust an opposing
party.220 Likewise, a court generally should not order participation
in a process when participation in the process would cause a party to
suffer undue trauma, as likely would be true in Vicky's fictional har-
assment case proposed in the Introduction. 2 2 1 In addition, some ADR
processes should be enforced through informal means rather than ju-
dicial compulsion. This may be true with respect to some processes
developed within close-knit communities.222
The problem is when courts take a bipolar "all-or-nothing" ap-
proach to enforcement of ADR agreements by either ordering partici-
pation in ADR under the FAA/UAA, or automatically refusing to
order such participation under common law.2 23 In this way, courts
fail to give due regard to the parties' contractual promises and in-
tent.2 24 They also ignore modem contract and remedy principles,
foster communications, and not to create great change or quickly "fix" relationships);
see also Dep't of Transp. v. City of Atlanta, 380 S.E.2d 265, 268 (Ga. 1989) (finding it
would be proper to refer a case to mediation not for the purpose of forcing settlement,
but to help parties delineate issues in controversy and examine their needs or
interests).
219. See Nancy H. Rogers & Craig A. McEwen, Employing the Law to Increase the
Use of Mediation and to Encourage Direct and Early Negotiations, 13 OHIO ST. J.
Disp. RESOL. 831, 836 (1998) (discussing benefits of mediation, and laws encouraging
or mandating mediation as a precursor to judicial action).
220. Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 856.
221. See p. 1 (providing example of ADR agreement).
222. See Lisa Berstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MicH. L. REV. 1724, 1745-87
(2001) (discussing the cotton industry's Private Legal System ("PLS") and the indus-
try's enforcement of the PLS through "reputation-based nonlegal sanctions" that fos-
ter cooperative behavior).
223. See Kelley v. Benchmark Homes, Inc., 550 N.W.2d 640, 643-45 (Neb. 1996)
(stretching the FAA to require enforcement of an agreement to submit disputes to
non-binding arbitration under the assumption the agreement would be void under
state law).
224. See BARNETT, supra note 161, at 112 (describing the traditional refusal to
enforce preliminary agreements as "all-or-nothing"). Preliminary agreements are dis-
tinguishable from agreements to submit disputes to resolution procedures, but some
courts apply the same non-enforcement rules to both without analyzing auxiliary val-
ues of ordering parties' participation in a procedure. See Griffin v. Griffim, 699 P.2d
407, 409-10 (Colo. 1985) (immediately assuming an agreement requiring parents to
negotiate was unenforceable).
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and the functions of agreements that incorporate flexibility by leav-
ing issues for later negotiation. 225 This Article proposes that where
parties have promised to abide by an ADR agreement, a court should
determine enforceability of that agreement under refreshed contract
and equity principles that recognize process values and are not
tainted by the traditional ouster and revocability doctrines or a pre-
sumptive refusal to enforce "agreements to agree."
III. EVOLUTION OF CONTRACT AND REMEDY PRINCIPLES DIRECTING
COURTS TO ELIMINATE ANTIQUATED DOCTRINES AND REFRESH
COMMON LAW ANALYSIS OF ADR AGREEMENTS
Although courts appropriately may analogize to the FAA and
UAA in enforcing ADR agreements, courts should not blindly misap-
ply the acts' statutory remedies and procedures to their enforcement.
Such misapplication avoids the development of common law and con-
fuses the enforceability of these agreements. This is especially true
when courts assume that ADR agreements not governed by the acts
are not specifically enforceable due to survival of anti-enforcement
doctrines and narrow perceptions of private ADR. It is time to clarify
and refresh the law applicable to ADR agreements. The first step is
to reject anti-enforcement doctrines and narrow contract remedy the-
ory. Indeed, traditional ouster and revocability doctrines lack basis,
the law and equity courts have been unified, and rigid classical the-
ory has given way to more contextual and relational enforcement of
contracts.
A. Legal Developments Denouncing Ouster and Revocability
Doctrines and Attitudes
1. Basis for "Revocation" of the Revocability Doctrine
Since the time of Vynior's Case, maturing contract and agency
principles have sparked criticisms that the revocability doctrine is
"fallacious" and "unsound."226 Lord Coke's revocability dicta in
Vynior's Case did not even comport with the court's award for the
plaintiff in that case. Accordingly, some have viewed the doctrine as
225. See Charles L. Knapp, Enforcing the Contract to Bargain, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV.
673, 673-88 (1969) (discussing common law's rigid all-or-nothing approach to obliga-
tion enforcement, and proposing an alternative middle ground for enforcement of con-
tracts to bargain that arise where parties' preliminary negotiations lead to mutual
commitment to bargain in good faith).
226. Sayre, supra note 137, at 599 (also noting that Lord Coke does not use the
term "agency" in his opinion, and that agency as a separate branch of law was still
developing in the early 1900s).
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merely the courts' ploy for refusing to enforce arbitration due to judi-
cial hostility to private dispute resolution. 22 7 Others have empha-
sized that the doctrine ignores "the contract feature" of an arbitration
agreement.2 2s Even traditional courts that refused to specifically en-
force arbitration agreements under the revocability doctrine gener-
ally declined to declare the agreements illegal. Instead, courts
remained willing to enforce these agreements by ordering damages
for breach of the arbitration contract. 22 9
Furthermore, the revocability doctrine defies the agency princi-
ples some advanced as the doctrine's justification. Agency principles
do not support revocability's assumption that arbitrators are agents
of the participating parties who remain free to revoke the arbitrators'
powers at any time. 230 Agency has long been a distinct "consensual
relationship in which one (the agent) holds in trust for and subject to
the control of another (the principal) a power to affect certain legal
relations of that other."23 1 An agent also owes its principal fiduciary
duties of disclosure and loyalty and is liable to its principal for any
misconduct in performing agency duties.23 2
227. Baum & Pressman, supra note 27, at 240 ("The real explanation of these deci-
sions is probably to be found in Lord Campbell's oft-quoted remark that the doctrine
originated 'in the contests of the courts of ancient times for extension of jurisdiction -
all of them being opposed to anything that would altogether deprive every one of them
of jurisdiction.") (citations omitted).
228. Id. (further explaining that courts seemed to realize "the unsatisfactoriness of
the reasoning in Vynior's" and therefore turned to the ouster theory as support for
refusal to enforce arbitration agreements).
229. In 1609 when Lord Coke decided Vynior's Case, courts would award damages
for breach of the arbitration agreement, or of a supporting bond obligation. Id. Ac-
cordingly, the revocability doctrine had less impact because an action on the bond
would compensate parties injured by breach. The doctrine gained force, however,
when bonds became unenforceable under the Statute of Fines and Penalties. Id. See
also Sayre, supra note 137, at 599-603 (discussing same and opining that the doctrine
originally seemed rational because actions on bonds provided recoveries "sufficient to
insure arbitration").
230. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text (discussing assertion of
agency principles to support revocability).
231. Warren A. Seavey, The Rationale of Agency, 29 YALE L.J. 859, 868 (1920).
232. Id. at 869-870 ("Unless the power holder is also a fiduciary there is no
agency."). See also J. DENNIS HYNES, PARTNERSHIP AND THE LLC 101-40 (5th ed. 1998)
(discussing duties of an agent to the principal, including fiduciary duties, as well as
duties to obey and to indemnify the principal for loss caused by misconduct); J. Dennis
Hynes, Freedom of Contract, Fiduciary Duties, and Partnerships: The Bargain Prin-
ciple and the Law of Agency, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 439,444-45 (1997) (noting law of
agency's "elaborate treatment of fiduciary duties based on the trust a principal places
in its agency, who acts on the principal's behalf').
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In contrast, an arbitrator is not the fiduciary of any one party.
Nor is an arbitrator subject to one party's control. Instead, an arbi-
trator generally must remain neutral and render independent deci-
sions. 23 3 Arbitrators are "authorized in their own right to judge the
dispute impartially and not as agents of either or both parties
thereto."2 34 Furthermore, arbitrators generally may invoke arbitral
immunity to quickly rebuff parties' lawsuits against them for alleg-
edly deciding unfairly or violating procedural rules.23 5
Indeed, agency and contract principles negate the revocability
doctrine. Contract and agency principles dictate that an arbitrator's
duties remain intact unless all parties agree to revoke their arbitra-
tion agreement. 2 36 Still, the revocability doctrine has continued to
survive under the guise of public policy or as part of the ouster
doctrine. 23 7
233. See RAU, ARBITRATION, supra note 8, at 215-16, 247-58 (discussing arbitra-
tors' duty to render independent judgment, and rules regarding arbitral impartiality);
See also Bernard Dobranski, The Arbitrator as a Fiduciary Under the Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act of 1974: A Misguided Approach, 32 Am. U. L. REV. 65,
69-82 (1982) (proposing that arbitrators should not be considered fiduciaries under
ERISA, especially because arbitrators enjoy immunity from civil suit, and generally
do not owe fiduciary duties to disputants or perform duties of trustees in other cases);
Sayre, supra note 137, at 599-600 (explaining why agency law did not support Lord
Coke's reasoning in Vynior's Case, and concluding that it is "unfortunate" that agency
is discussed in connection with the revocability doctrine).
234. Sayre, supra note 137, at 599. Early common law recognized revocability of
powers voluntarily granted, and even allowed one accused of a crime to avoid jury
trial unless he or she elected to accept such trial. Id. at 600.
235. See RAU, ARBITRATION, supra note 8, at 257 (noting common application of
arbitral immunity to protect the independence of arbitrators).
236. An otherwise binding contract cannot be abandoned absent breach unless the
parties mutually agree to such rescission or abandonment. See 2 SAMUEL WILLISTON,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 6:10, at 81-82 (Lord 4th ed. 1991) (stating
rule that a contract's binding force cannot be affected by subsequent communications
"unless they amount to a mutual agreement to rescind or abandon the contract, a
binding modification of the contract, or, of course, a repudiation or other breach of the
contract"). See also RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 73 & 89 (1981) (stating
the "pre-existing duty rule" requiring consideration for enforcement of any contract
modification, and provisos for enforcement of modifications based on changed circum-
stances, estoppel, or valid novation).
237. See Bonk v. New Castle County, Civ. A. No. 5196, 1978 WL 4644, at *3-5 (Del.
Ch. 1978) (applying the common law rule that "an agreement to arbitrate is revocable
prior to the return of an award" to a labor agreement not governed by Delaware's
UAA, although the rule is based on "outmoded" policy flowing from "the courts' abhor-
rence at having their jurisdiction ousted by private agreement"); County of Jefferson
v. Barton-Douglas Contractors, Inc., 282 N.W.2d 155, 157-58 (Iowa 1979) (refusing to
enforce arbitration agreement that did not comply with the state's arbitration act in
part because the court had "consistently followed the general common-law rule that
an executory arbitration agreement is revocable at any time"). See also supra pp. 32-
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2. Basis for Ousting the Ouster Doctrine
Like the revocability doctrine, the ouster theory also defies con-
tract principles. Even some traditional courts rejected the ouster ra-
tionale. 238 For example, Lord Campbell in the 1857 case of Scott v.
Avery opined that public policy required enforcement of dispute reso-
lution contracts. He questioned the ouster doctrine as a product of
"the contests of the courts of ancient times for extension of jurisdic-
tion-all of them being opposed to anything that would altogether
deprive every one of them of jurisdiction."23 9 Nonetheless, the Scott
court avoided the ouster doctrine's conitnued vitality by refusing to
order arbitration because the clause in question made arbitration an
express condition precedent to the court having jurisdiction over the
action.240 The court reasoned that "ouster" was not applicable be-
cause no action could lie "in any [c] ourt whatsoever" until the arbitra-
tors had determined the underwriters' liability on the contract. 241
In an effort to combat such tortured analysis, policymakers en-
acted the FAA to clearly quash the ouster doctrine. Accordingly, it
seems courts that criticized ouster would have employed the Act as
license to cleanse the doctrine from all common law. Some courts,
however, continued to criticize the ouster doctrine without overruling
36 (discussing modem courts' application of "ouster" doctrine as basis for refusal to
enforce common law arbitration).
238. See Thompson v. Turney, 89 S.W. 897, 897 (Ct. App. Mo. 1905) (dismissing
litigation to allow arbitration to proceed pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court prece-
dent); Lowengrub v. Meislin, 103 A.2d 405, 468-69 (Penn. 1954) (ordering participa-
tion in an arbitration pursuant to a partnership contract under common law);
Monogahela Navigation Co. v. Fenlon, 1842 WL 4821, *5-8 (Pa. Sept. 1842) (holding
an engineer's third party determination of the plaintiffs compensation may be en-
forced despite the ouster rule where parties waive this "first principle of natural jus-
tice" by agreeing to submit a dispute to arbitration).
239. Scott v. Avery, 5 H.L. Cas. 811, 853, 10 Eng. Rep. 1121, 1138 (1856). In the
same case, Justice Coleridge also urged that the ouster doctrine should be limited
because it "[had] been founded on very narrow grounds, directly contrary to the spirit
of later times, which leaves parties at full liberty to refer their disputes at pleasure to
public or private tribunals." Id. at 1134.
240. Id. at 850-53.
241. Id. at 851-53 (final opinion of the court announced by Lord Campbell) ("Here
the plea is, that the arbitrators have not decided as to the liability of the underwrit-
ers, or the amount to be recovered, and therefore an action will not lie."). See also
Tscheider v. Biddle, 24 F. Cas. 253, 255-57 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1877) (stating there was no
reason to deny enforcement of a valuation procedure, especially when denial would
"reward the party who fraudulently seeks to evade his obligation," and therefore stay-
ing action to prompt the parties' participation in the procedure; but nonetheless fail-
ing to reject ouster and thus emphasizing that agreements to arbitrate should be
specifically enforced only where an action at law for damages cannot restore status
quo).
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it.242 One court, for example, declared in 1946, "The rule that such
agreements oust the courts of jurisdiction has an unworthy genesis,
is fallacious in reasoning and has been followed merely because of
ancient precedent. ' 243 That same court, however, declined to over-
rule ouster as applied to executory arbitration agreements. Instead,
the court limited its holding to confirming the enforceability of exe-
cuted awards, a principle courts embracing ouster also accepted. 244
In addition, some courts wrongly justified ouster doctrine under
the so-called "jurisdictional" precept that private procedures may not
displace courts' jurisdiction over private disputes. This precept was
flawed, however, because even courts that accepted the ouster doc-
trine agreed that appraisal and arbitration agreements were not ille-
gal. Revocation of these contracts constituted breach. 245 In addition,
20th Century courts began enforcing forum selection clauses and
carving exceptions to the ouster doctrine in recognition of a policy "to
discourage litigation and to encourage the settlement of disputes
out of court."2 46 For example, some courts enforced appraisal pro-
visions they interpreted to require a third party determination as
a condition precedent to bringing a lawsuit or as only encompass-
ing collateral matters. 247 Indeed, some modern courts continue
242. See, e.g., Rueda v. Union Pac. RR. Co., 175 P.2d 778, 790-94 (Or. 1946)
(strongly denouncing the rule but nonetheless failing to overrule it).
243. Id. at 790 (also noting that other "ousters" such as accord and satisfaction
agreements were enforceable).
244. Id. at 792 (further qualifying enforcement of executed awards rendered pur-
suant to agreements that are not "essentially unfair" and comply with general rules
concerning impeachment of awards).
245. See Chamberlain, supra note 144, at 523 (explaining such agreements were
not illegal per se and therefore, theoretically, one could sue for any nominal damages
due to breach). See also supra note 229 and accompanying text (discussing acknowl-
edged legality of arbitration agreements under traditional law).
246. Slaymaker, supra note 158, at 65. By the early twentieth century, some
courts began to enforce forum selection limitations and the majority of American
courts enforced limitations on the time period in which parties could bring action on a
contract, as well as agreements for estate settlements and covenants precluding ap-
peal from a trial judgment. Id. at 65-66.
247. Id. (explaining such agreements were enforceable because they do not wholly
replace the courts' power or so-called "jurisdiction" over the parties' disputes). See
also Tsheider v. Biddle, 24 F. Cas. 253, 255-57 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1877) (staying litigation
to require arbitration of valuation for a lease renewal pursuant to the parties' agree-
ment, emphasizing that damages would be an inadequate remedy for breach and the
lessor should not benefit from "fraudulently thwart[ing] the appraisal"); Bauer v.
Samson Lodge, No. 32, 1 N.E. 571, 574-76 (Ind. 1885) (discussing conflicts resulting
from some courts holding that parties "may prohibit actions at law altogether" and
others holding they "may not materially restrict the right to sue"); Pacaud v. Waite,
75 N.E. 779, 781-83 (Ill. 1905) (enforcing Board of Trade members' agreements to
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to avoid ouster by ordering appraisals under condition precedent
analysis. 248
In addition, modern contract law provides for enforcement of
agreements that arguably oust a court's determination of disputes.
Courts uniformly enforce valid settlement agreements, forum selec-
tion clauses, waivers of damages, and limitations of liability although
these agreements intrude on courts' authority to decide claims or is-
sues. 249 Furthermore, the Supreme Court denounced the ouster doc-
trine as "hardly more than a vestigial legal fiction" in condoning
forum selection clauses on the basis that they merely reflect parties'
agreement to have their disputes resolved in a chosen forum.250 The
submit disputes to arbitration as a condition precedent to litigation where enforce-
ment would "relieve the members of the board from the expense and delay of a deter-
mination of that question in the courts"); Del. & Hudson Canal Co. v. Pa. Coal Co., 50
N.Y. 250, 266-74 (N.Y. 1872) (finding ouster would not bar specific enforcement of
agreements that "merely" required arbitration of value issues as "a condition prece-
dent either in terms or by necessary implication" to litigation).
248. See Bd. of Educ. of County of Berkeley v. W. Harley Miller, Inc., 221 S.E.2d
882, 884-89 (W. Va. 1975) (urging state legislature to revise state's arbitration law to
clearly replace state's adoption of the "frankly archaic" ouster doctrine, but nonethe-
less failing to reverse the common law and instead using the "common-law exception"
to specifically enforce an agreement to arbitrate where "it has been made a condition
precedent to a right of action") (Justice Neely concurring to lament majority's failure
to "clearly abolish[ I archaic rules regarding arbitration which are pass6 and ineffec-
tive"); Lynch v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 473 N.W.2d 515, 517-19 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1991) (finding appraisal was not arbitration enforceable under the FAA or UAA,
and therefore reversing the lower court's order to stay litigation pending an appraisal
where the contract did not clearly require appraisal as a precondition to litigation).
249. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 587-95 (1991) (em-
phasizing that a forum selection clause is enforceable unless the challenging party
satisfies the "heavy burden of proof' required to show that a clause is fundamentally
unfair, and quoting The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12-15 (1972));
McDermott, Inc. v. Clyde Iron, 979 F.2d 1068, 1076 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that
"[clontractual provisions waiving negligence and strict liability claims are enforceable
under New York law"), rev'd sub nom; McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202
(1994); Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Suwannee River Spa Lines, Inc., 866 F.2d 752,
776 (5th Cir. 1989) (supporting enforcement of contractual remedy limitations); Wor-
thy v. McKesson Corp., 756 F.2d 1370, 1373 (8th Cir. 1985) (emphasizing that "par-
ties to a voluntary settlement agreement cannot avoid the agreement simply because
the agreement ultimately proves to be disadvantageous"); Rutter v. Arlington Park
Jockey Club, 510 F.2d 1065, 1067-69 (7th Cir. 1975) (enforcing disclaimer of liability
for one's own negligence). See also ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
§ 1472, 525 (Interim ed. 2002) (stating general rules that courts enforce consensual
waivers of negligence liability in non-public service contracts).
250. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12-15 (1972) (concluding
that a "forum clause should control absent a strong showing that it should be set
aside").
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Court recognized that the ouster doctrine was the product of "histori-
cal judicial resistance to any attempt to reduce the power and busi-
ness of a particular court" and reflected a "provincial attitude
regarding the fairness of other tribunals. ' '251
The Supreme Court has applied this reasoning to support en-
forcement of arbitration and ADR agreements. The Court has em-
phasized that parties do not forfeit claims by submitting them to a
private resolution process. 252 Instead, arbitration agreements reflect
parties' contracts to have their disputes decided in a non-judicial fo-
rum. In addition, parties to such agreements direct their own private
conduct and not the courts' jurisdiction or authority. In this way,
parties agree to contractually constrain their assertion of claims as
they similarly do through waiver, release, and limitation of liability
agreements.2 53 Accordingly, enforceability of such agreements is not
a jurisdictional issue. Enforcement instead depends on an agree-
ment's validity under contract law. 25 4
Many courts reject the ouster and revocability doctrines because
of their flawed bases.255 Indeed, legal logic rejects the assertion that
251. Id. at 12.
252. The Supreme Court has emphasized that a forum selection clause is an en-
forceable agreement to have disputes decided in a chosen forum, even where the
clause was not negotiated, but instead was contained in a form contract between a
consumer and large company. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 499 U.S. at 587-95 (enforc-
ing a forum selection clause pre-printed on the last page of passengers' tickets for a 7-
day cruise). Similarly, the Court held ADEA claims arbitrable in the often uneven
bargaining context of employment. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lance Corp., 500
U.S. 20, 25-26 (1991).
253. See supra note 249 (citing cases enforcing such agreements).
254. Agreements waiving claims and damages, as well as settlement and forum-
selection contracts, may be unenforceable under contract law. See Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 & n.14 (1974) (describing an arbitration agreement as
"a specialized kind of forum-selection clause" and finding that like such clauses, an
arbitration agreement is enforceable unless it otherwise is unenforceable under con-
tract principles such as fraud or coercion); Bank of Montreal v. Signet Bank, 193 F.3d
818, 828-29 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding Signet could not rely on a contract provision bar-
ring liability based on negligent or reckless conduct where the disclaimer provision
itself was induced by fraud and thus voidable under contract law); Davies v. Gross-
mont Union High Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 1390, 1394-1400 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding settle-
ment agreement unenforceable under public policy insofar as it barred Davies from
ever seeking or holding public office). However, courts base their holdings on con-
tract, not jurisdictional, principles. See id.
255. Park Constr. Co. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 32, Carver County, 296 N.W. 475,
477-91 (Minn. 1941) (expressly rejecting the ouster doctrine as contrary to reason and
public policy, despite strenuous dissent); IP Timberlands Operating Co. v. Denmiss
Corp., 726 So. 2d 96, 103-05 (Miss. 1998) (rejecting the ouster doctrine although "it
has been so long settled that the courts are unwilling to disturb it" and expressly
overturning "the former line of case law that jealously guarded the court's jurisdic-
tion"); Wylie Indep. Sch. Dist. v. TMC Founds., 770 S.W.2d 19, 23 (Tex. App. 1989)
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arbitration agreements are inherently revocable or they "oust" the
courts of jurisdiction. The ouster and revocability doctrines, there-
fore, should no longer clutter the common law applicable to enforce-
ment of arbitration and ADR agreements.
B. Broadened Remedy Analysis Flowing From Consolidation of
Law and Equity Courts
Historically, the divide between courts of "equity" and courts of
"law" hindered legal enforcement of arbitration and ADR agree-
ments. Only equity courts generally would order specific perform-
ance remedies, such as injunctions and orders compelling conduct
other than payment of money.25 6 For example, Justice Story relied in
part on this divide between equity and law in refusing to specifically
enforce the arbitration agreement in Tobey v. County of Bristol.2 57
He premised his analysis on a general rule that law courts would not
order specific performance of arbitration agreements. He also as-
sumed courts of equity naturally would refuse to use their equitable
power to essentially override a law courts' refusal to enforce such
agreements. 258 Justice Story further concluded that equity should
(holding that based on policy supporting "ADR," agreements to arbitrate future dis-
putes are specifically enforceable). See also Hoboken Mfrs. R.R. Co. v. Hoboken R.R.
Warehouse & S.S. Connecting Co., 27 A.2d 150, 154 (N.J. Ch. 1942) (finding New
Jersey had not adopted the ouster doctrine and therefore enforcing the arbitrator's
decision); Eagle Laundry v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 46 P.3d 1276, 1278 (N.M. Ct.
App. 2002) (finding arbitration agreements enforceable under common law, and find-
ing award could be confirmed without a jury trial); Kaiser Found. Health Plan of the
Northwest v. Doe, 903 P.2d 375, 383 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that agreements to
arbitrate may be specifically enforceable under common law and thus directing that
judgment on an oral settlement incorporate the parties' agreement to arbitrate any
remaining issues).
256. Courts of equity developed as separate courts that supplemented courts of
law in order to provide remedies and privileges generally not available in the law
courts. CORBIN, supra note 249, § 1139 at 187 ("The chief reason that induced the
court of Chancery to decree the specific performance of a contract was the supposed
inadequacy of the available common law remedies to do full and complete justice.").
See also JOHN NORTON POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 1400-01 (4th ed. 1919)
(emphasizing that specific performance developed as a "purely equitable" remedy be-
longing to the exclusive jurisdiction of the equity courts, and that its application must
be based on equitable considerations).
257. 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1321 (No. 14065) (C.C. Mass. 1845). See also Sturges &
Reckson, supra note 21, at 836 & n.35 (noting Story's emphasis on the "subservience"
of equity to law, but questioning its accuracy in light of equity's historic "triumph of
equitable principles over technical rules"); supra notes 170-71 (discussing Story's
opinion in Tobey accepting into American law common law refusal to specifically en-
force arbitration agreements).
258. Tobey, 23 F. Cas. at 1320-21 ("So that we abundantly see, that the very im-
practicability of compelling the parties to name arbitrators, or upon their default, for
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not support enforcement of arbitration agreements due to the "rule
that equity cannot make a decree requiring the performance of per-
sonal acts calling for the exercise of skill or discretion."25 9
Nonetheless, it would have been within an equity court's domain
to compel participation in arbitration. Courts of equity had authority
to craft "coercive" orders that directed or precluded action, whereas
law courts generally declared money obligations and entered judg-
ments.260 Unlike a judge, a chancellor in equity court "actually con-
cerned himself with the evidence of witnesses" and fashioned rules to
fit the facts of the case. 261 Equity courts were free to order whatever
remedies they deemed appropriate to enforce equitable rules. 262 Fur-
thermore, while a law court would emphasize legal entitlements
under preexisting rules, an equity court generally would treat access
to its remedies as a privilege ordered in a court's discretion to do "jus-
tice apart from law."26 3 "[Elquity would not grant a remedy for a le-
gal right unless, without the equitable remedy, the plaintiff would
the court to appoint them, constitutes, and must forever constitute, a complete bar to
any attempt on the part of a court of equity to compel the specific performance of any
agreement to refer to arbitration.").
259. Id. at 1320-22 (emphasizing that even with the parties' "express stipulation,
that the submission shall be irrevocable," arbitrators lacked authority because "[tihey
are not ordinarily well enough acquainted with the principles of law or equity" to
properly decide disputes). See also Sturges & Sturges, supra note 102, at 3, n.6 (dis-
cussing Justice Story's application of the "doctrine of subservience of 'equity' to 'law,"'
and some academics' acceptance of this rationale for equity courts' refusal to specifi-
cally enforce agreements to arbitrate). Further explanation of the development of eq-
uity courts is beyond the scope of this Article. For a more comprehensive discussion,
see E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV.
1145, 1149-56 (1970).
260. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.1(1), at 48-49 (2d ed. 1993). Equity
courts ordered a variety of remedies that included not only "coercive remedies," such
as injunctions, but also restitutionary and declaratory remedies that more closely re-
sembled relief provided in courts of law. Id. at 49. In addition, equitable remedies
were distinctive in that they could be enforced by fine or imprisonment for failure to
comply, whereas "law courts did not seek to enforce their orders by contempt powers,
but by seizure of property." Id.
261. See id. at 49 (also explaining that the Chancellor tried both facts and law, and
therefore there was no jury trial).
262. Id. at 50. Equity's jurisdiction was primary with respect to matters such as
fraud, mistake, and bankruptcy, because these historically had been created and
heard in equity. JAMES M. FISHER, UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES, § 21(a), at 148 (2001).
In these areas, a party would not have to show the inadequacy of its legal remedy. Id.
at 149.
263. DOBBS, supra note 260, at 50. Equity courts' high degree of discretion was
one of its "striking characteristic [s]" that pertained to its remedies, as well as its rec-
ognition of defenses based on hardship of the defendant and its power to shape relief
to fit particular facts. Id. Indeed, equity courts' discretion caused law courts to some-
times view their flexibility "as a kind of lawlessness." Id.
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suffer irreparable harm."26 4 Plaintiffs in equity, therefore, would
have to show injury that was "irreparable not in terms of severity but
in terms of the injury's remediability at law."26 5 This gave rise to the
"irreparable harm" requirement that courts continue to recognize. 266
The "legal" remedy of damages generally is inadequate to redress
breach of an ADR agreement. Money damages usually will not com-
pensate an injured party for loss of opportunity to discuss disputes,
seek resolution, or obtain dispute evaluation through a private pro-
cess. 267 The only real remedy for such breach is often specific per-
formance. Indeed, some traditional common law courts recognized
the inadequacy of damages as a remedy for breach of ADR agree-
ments in ordering parties' to submit isolated issues, such as property
value, to contractual appraisal procedures. 268 Some early courts also
ordered specific performance of contracts for the sale of land even if
they left a court to supply a missing price term.269
264. DOBBS, supra note 260, at 50. See also FISHER, supra note 262, at 149 (ex-
plaining equitable enforcement of legal rights as a second category of equity jurisdic-
tion and noting that here there was competition between the parallel systems, akin to
that between state and federal courts, and judicial and private dispute resolution
processes).
265. FISHER, supra note 262, at 149 ("Hence to say the remedy at law is inade-
quate (or perhaps more accurately "insufficiently adequate") was to say that the in-
jury was irreparable at law." (emphasis in original)).
266. See DOBBS, supra note 260, at 50 ("One of the chief remedial doctrines of eq-
uity is called the adequacy test or the irreparable harm rule."). See also FISHER, supra
note 262, at 149 (discussing the development and survival of the irreparable injury
requirement despite the merger of law and equity systems accomplished in the Amer-
ican colonies during the first half of the twentieth century).
267. See Joy v. City of St. Louis, 138 U.S. 1, 46-49 (1891) (finding equitable relief
appropriate to enforce a right of way agreement where the remedy at law would be
repeated actions for damages and therefore "wholly inadequate"). Interestingly, the
Supreme Court cited as support Tscheider v. Biddle, 4 Dillon 58, 63 (C.C.E.D. Mo.
1877), which endorsed specific enforcement of executory agreements to arbitrate. Id.
268. See Van Bueren v. Wotherspoon, 164 N.Y. 368, 377-379 (N.Y. 1900) (finding
parties had a duty "to act in good faith to accomplish the appraisement in the manner
specified" in the parties' contract); Sec. Printing Co. v. Conn. Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford,
240 S.W. 263, 268 (Mo. Ct. App. 1922) (finding plaintiff was required to comply with
an appraisal requirement before bringing action on an insurance policy). See also
Garretson v. Mountain West Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 761 P.2d 1288, 1290-91
(Mont. 1998) (finding common law barring specific enforcement of arbitration provi-
sions did not apply to an appraisal agreement because appraisal "does not oust the
jurisdiction of the courts, but only requires a certain character of evidence of a fact in
controversy").
269. Spinsky v. Kay, 550 N.E.2d 349, 351 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (affirming court's
grant of specific performance of a land lease where price was to be determined by
appraisal, but providing that a court, and not appraisers, would ultimately set the
price). See also Coles v. Peck, No. 11,489, 1884 WL 5361 (Ind. 1884) (finding appel-
lants had properly attempted to have land appraised per their land sale contract, and
therefore were entitled to equitable relief).
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Other common law courts, however, viewed such pro-active judi-
cial enforcement of private procedures as a threat to judicial busi-
ness, and the preemineance of law courts. Courts of law and equity
that already vied for power in commercial dispute resolution were not
eager to enable private competitors. 270 Furthermore, courts of law
and equity played a game of "hot potato." Law courts would refuse to
direct performance of arbitration agreements because ordering such
specific relief would violate "the policy of the law," while many equity
courts would toss requests for such specific relief because ordering
this relief in equity would "belie the equity 'doctrine"' of obedience to
law courts. 271
The divide between courts of law and equity, however, has been
abolished and has given way to increased judicial freedom in choosing
and applying remedies.27 2 All courts now have power to order histor-
ically "equitable" remedies such as specific performance. Courts also
may consider both legal and equitable claims and defenses. Judges
may make certain determinations without the aid of a jury.2 73
Courts therefore possess the full panapoloy of tools they need to ana-
lyze and enforce contracts in whatever manner is "most effective to do
full justice."274 Accordingly, courts are free under modern common
law to enforce promises to participate in ADR processes in light of
legal and equitable considerations.27 5 The equity/law divide should
270. See FISHER, supra note 262, § 21(a), at 148, n.1 (noting competition between
courts of law and courts of equity, and comparing that competition to that "in the
relationships between state and federal courts, judicial and administrative decision
making, and judicial and private alternative dispute resolution processes"); Merit Ins.
Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 681 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.) (explaining
"the American Arbitration Association is in competition not only with other private
arbitration services but with the courts in providing ... an attractive form of dispute
settlement").
271. Sturges & Reckson, supra note 21, at 841-43 (further noting "a medley of
views which are in the earlier decisions in American equity courts, not very reliable as
a whole" either supporting or ignoring the revocability rule).
272. Id. See JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 127, at 838 (4th
ed. 2001) ("There are no longer any separate courts of equity. Law courts now sit as
courts of equity where the relief sought in a given case is specific performance, an
injunction, or other form of equitable relief.").
273. MURRAY, supra note 272, at 729 (also noting that a court determining and
granting equitable relief without a jury is free to "mold a decision to fit the case pre-
cisely, i.e., it need not be concerned with all-or-nothing remedies").
274. CORBIN, supra note 249, § 1136, at 175 (also questioning any limitation on
equitable remedies to cases where damages would be inadequate in light of the unifi-
cation of law and equity courts, and courts' duty to grant relief that will best compen-
sate an injured party).
275. Nonetheless, courts continue to adhere to rules reserving specific perform-
ance remedies for cases in which damages are inadequate to compensate the injured
party. See MURRAY, supra note 272, § 127, at 729-80. However, as the Supreme
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no longer hinder or complicate courts' specific enforcement of ADR
agreements.
C. Flexible Contract and Remedy Analysis Under Neoclassical and
Relational Approaches That Have Eclipsed Classical
Contract Law
As courts' remedial powers expanded, their enforcement of
promises also became more flexible. Courts moved away from the
traditionally narrow classical contract doctrine reflected in Professor
Williston's original Restatement of Contracts. Classical doctrine
strictly focuses contract analysis on the time of contract formation.
276
In this way, it effectively limits the sources and factors that may be
considered in determining meaning and substantive content of trans-
actions. 277 In Professor Ian Macneil's terms, classical doctrine em-
braces a confined "presentiation," meaning that it perceives exchange
as bound by present events, namely offer and acceptance. 278 Classi-
cal law fixates "almost exclusively on a single instant in time - the
instant of contract formation - rather than on dynamic processes
such as the course of negotiation and the evolution, or changing
needs, of a contractual relationship."2 79
Court has acknowledged in ordering specific performance of agreements to arbitrate
grievance disputes, damages generally will not adequately compensate a party for
breach of an ADR agreement. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S.
448, 452-56 (1957) (also noting that the Labor Management Relations Act indicated
federal policy favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements).
276. Macneil, Contracts, supra note 218, at 863-64. Classical contract doctrine in
American law developed in the nineteenth century, and became the backbone of the
1932 Restatement of Contracts. Id. at 855 n.2. Neoclassical contract law emerged as
a modified legal regime within the classical structure, and provided the underlying
principles for the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the U.C.C. Art. 2. Id. These
labels raise varied dimensions and understandings. Therefore, comprehensive dis-
cussion of classical, neo-classical and other contract doctrine is beyond the scope of
this Article.
277. Id. For example, classical doctrine directed courts to interpret contracts
based on writings and formal contract communications, and not parties' identity or
other circumstances outside of the formal "agreement." Id.
278. Ian R. Macneil, Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Presentiation, 60
VA.L. REV. 589, 592-93 (1974) (explaining "presentiation" as "recognition that the
course of the future is bound by present events, and by those events the future has for
many purposes been brought effectively into the present," and proposing that tradi-
tional contract theory's usefulness is limited because it requires "total presentiation of
each contract relation at the time of its formation").
279. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Why There is No Law of Relational Contracts, 94 Nw. U.
L. REV. 805, 807 (2000) (discussing the static, objective, and standardized nature of
classical theory along with the theory's perfect-market bargain paradigm, and ra-
tional-actor assumptions).
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This classical presentiation assumes transactions are products of
fully informed strangers' economically rational bargaining in a per-
fect market. It also expects that these bargains involve clear quanti-
ties, little complexity, and limited party interaction. 280 Classical
doctrine, therefore, prescribes strict ground rules for contract en-
forcement that uniformly apply to all transactions, regardless of a
transaction's context or its moral, political, or social effects. 28s Under
these rules, the doctrine prescribes rigid objective standards that pre-
clude enforcement of offers to be accepted by later acts. 28 2 These
standards also may bar enforcement of agreements that require par-
ties to negotiate open terms in the future. 283 In this way, classical
contract doctrine ignores that economic exchange does not operate in
a vacuum, but instead transpires in varied contexts, circumstances,
and relations.28 4 It also discourages the application of equitable,
open-ended remedies and the introduction of third parties into con-
tractual relations. 28 5 Therefore, classical doctrine seems inherently
hostile to enforcement of ADR agreements.
As complexities of contracting became evident, neoclassical con-
tract principles emerged as a partial escape from the rigidity of class-
ical law. Neoclassical principles soon eclipsed classical doctrine to
become "the law of the Uniform Commercial Code, the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, and today."28 6 Policymakers recognized that
280. Macneil, supra note 278, at 589-94. See also Eisenberg, supra note 279, at
808 (emphasizing that classical contract law was based on "a paradigm of bargains
made between strangers transacting in a perfect market" and a "rational-actor model
of psychology"). "Although rational-actor psychology is the foundation of the standard
economic model of choice, the empirical evidence shows that this model often diverges
from the actual psychology of choice, because it fails to take into account the limits of
cognition" - thereby ignoring behavior of real people. Id. at 810-11.
281. Eisenberg, supra note 279, at 805-11 (noting classical law left "no room for
justifying doctrinal propositions on the basis of social propositions"); Jay M. Feinman,
Relational Contract Theory in Context, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 737, 738 (2000) (emphasiz-
ing classical method's application of "clear rules of legal doctrine" to all "consensual
relations," without "contextualization").
282. Macneil, supra note 278, at 592-93 (describing the "objective theory of con-
tracts, reinforced by such doctrines as the parol evidence rule"); Eisenberg, supra note
279, at 806-07 (describing classical method as "objective and standardized").
283. See Knapp, supra note 225, at 673-77 (discussing common law's rigid all-or-
nothing approach to obligation enforcement).
284. Macneil, supra note 278, at 595 (emphasizing how real-life exchange "no
longer stands alone as in the discrete transaction, but is part of a relational web").
285. Id. at 863-64 (discussing long-term contracts).
286. Feinman, supra note 281, at 738-39 (also noting that neoclassical law was the
product of criticism of the classical law).
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classical law's presentiation paradigm did not comport with the real-
ity of transactions. 287 The surviving neoclassical system, therefore,
broadens classical analysis by allowing for contextual contract inter-
pretation, and consideration of applicable trade custom and social
values. 2s8 It also eases classical rules by providing standards that
allow for more flexibility and permit some gap-filling. 28 9 For exam-
ple, neoclassical law allows for enforcement of an offer that does not
specify price where one performs definite services that have a reason-
ably ascertainable market value. 290
Nonetheless, neoclassical law continues to embrace classical bed-
rock principles such as offer, acceptance, consideration, and general
performance duties.291 Neoclassical law also remains reluctant to
condone enforcement of offers that leave parties to set a price through
future negotiations. 292 This law continues the classical focus on en-
hancement of individuals' present utilities.293 The neoclassical sys-
tem, therefore, discourages courts from enforcing agreements that
expect cooperation to the possible detriment of individual utilities
and self-interests. 294 Nonetheless, neoclassical law allows for greater
flexibility and "has a tremendous capacity to deal with new theories
and developments."2 95
One theory pushing traditional limits of neoclassical law is rela-
tional contract theory.296 Professor Ian Macneil proposed the theory
287. See Macneil, supra note 278, at 870-71 (noting that neoclassical system
emerged in part to relax "rigorous presentiation").
288. Feinman, supra note 281, at 739-41.
289. See id. (discussing increased flexibility of neoclassical law); Feinman, supra
note 281, at 739-40 (noting that the neoclassical method is a mix of standards and
rules and is a "much softer" doctrine than classical law).
290. Macneil, supra note 278, at 871.
291. Id. (explaining that neoclassical law does not offer a "wholly different concep-
tion of the law," but instead is built on classical principles, such as "the rules of forma-
tion, validation, performance, and remedies"). See also Macneil, supra note 278, at
870-71 (emphasizing that neoclassical law "may be seen as an effort to escape par-
tially from such rigorous presentation [of the classical system], but since its overall
structure is essentially the same as the classical system, it may be ill-designed to
raise and deal with the issues").
292. Id. at 871-72 (using examples from Professor Murray's contract treatise).
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Macneil, Contracts, supra note 218, at 873 (acknowledging that neoclassical
law eases classical rules and "can go much further than the classical system," but
nonetheless emphasizing its limits); see also Feinman, supra note 281, at 739-41 (dis-
cussing neoclassical doctrine's capacity to accommodate relational contract theory).
296. See Eisenberg, supra note 279, at 821 (concluding that relational contract
theory has helped to illuminate weaknesses of traditional contract doctrine and bring
about awareness of the economics and sociology of contracting, but that it has not
created a "law of relational contracts," in that relational contracts, like contracts as a
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as an open, inductive, and individualized approach for analyzing and
enforcing relations that do not fit classical, and even neoclassical,
paradigms. 297 His proposal sparked consideration of transactions'
"relational webs." These webs include contract durations, compli-
cated personal relations, unclear quantities and qualities, anticipa-
tion of future disputes, expectation of cooperative behaviors, and
interwoven strings of friendship, reputation, interdependence, moral-
ity, and altruistic desires. 298 Such factors drive a transaction in ac-
cordance with its placement on a spectrum ranging from "highly
transactional horse selling epitome" to a "highly relational nuclear
family or commune."299
Using this model, Macneil proposed that the presentiation of
traditional contract doctrines becomes less useful, or applicable, the
more relational a contract is on this spectrum. 300 For example, long-
term contracts and other transactions that involve dynamic relation-
ships are highly relational. They therefore should be analyzed with
less emphasis on presentiation (time and place of contracting) and
more awareness of evolving party needs. 30 1 Such contracts should be
enforced with an eye toward continuing relations among the parties,
even in the face of conflict.30 2 Accordingly, arbitration and ADR
agreements often are especially appropriate in relational contracts
because these processes may promote continued cooperation, or, at
class, "must be governed by the general principles of contract law, whatever those
should be"); Feinman, supra note 281, at 746-48 (proposing that instead of providing a
"more general theory of contract," relational method can be used in fragmented, inde-
pendent contexts, and "can have real influence as a counterweight to the still-power-
ful discrete, maximizing tendencies of neoclassical contract law"). See also Richard E.
Speidel, supra note 26, at 823-46 (discussing characteristics, importance, and chal-
lenges of relational contracts).
297. Macneil, supra note 278, at 589-610 (also noting Professor Macneil's commen-
tary was presented as part of a panel discussing the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts during its drafting stage); Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S.
CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974) (explaining this relational understanding of economic ex-
change); see also Eisenberg, supra note 279, at 812-14 (discussing relational contract
theory as "fathered by Ian Macneil," and contrasting relational theory with classical
contract law).
298. Macneil, supra note 278, at 594-96.
299. Id. at 596.
300. Id.
301. Macneil, Contracts, supra note 218, at 873-80 (discussing conflict between the
flexibility in approaching relational contracts and neoclassical law's enforcement of
terms set at the time of contracting in spite of later changes making those terms
undesirable).
302. Id. (concluding that parties' planning and the neoclassical system "can pro-
vide extensively for the continuance of relations even in the face of serious disputes,"
but not when "self-interest or other motives of the parties are inadequate to accom-
plish continuation").
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least, allocation of losses in a manner suited to particular
relationships. 303
A prime example of such relational transacting is in the cotton
industry.30 4 Professor Lisa Bernstein found in her study of the cotton
industry that cotton merchants maximized efficiencies through a pri-
vate legal system ("PLS") by minimizing transaction, legal system,
and collection costs. 30 5 A key feature of this PLS was private tribu-
nals that determined disputes in accordance with industry rules and
norms.30 6 Dispute resolution through these tribunals promoted coop-
eration, even when one party would not necessarily benefit from par-
ticipation in a process. This was because parties feared non-legal
reputation-based sanctions within the cotton community. 30 7 This
was especially true when the parties planned to transact with each
other or others within the merchant community in the future. Par-
ties did not want to earn reputations as "deal-breakers."308
Influenced by relational concepts, modern neoclassical contract
law has evolved to provide analytical and remedial tools for assisting
dispute resolution processes. Indeed, modern contract law is poised
to promote ADR processes in relational contracts, such as those in-
volving dynamic or long-term exchanges. 30 9 Modern law recognizes
that specific performance often "is the most obvious means" for en-
forcing an ADR agreement when participation in ADR will serve par-
ties' goals and needs.310 Furthermore, the evolution of contract law
may provide for increased enforcement of agreements once deemed
303. Id. (noting arbitration agreements as an example of parties planning for reso-
lution of future disputes, but acknowledging that arbitration will not necessarily
translate into continued relations).
304. Berstein, supra note 222, at 1724.
305. Id. at 1724-45.
306. Id. at 1745-86. Due to the success of the private tribunals, "[o]ne of the most
striking aspects of the cotton industry's PLS is the small number of disputes requiring
third-party adjudication." Id. at 1762.
307. Berstein, supra note 222, at 1756. Parties often benefit from participation in
ADR in many relational contexts, even when they are not eager to participate, be-
cause their compliance with the process may earn them the return favor in the future.
Id.
308. Id. at 1756
309. Macneil, Contracts, supra note 218, at 878-79. Commentators have advo-
cated more contextual and relational analysis of dispute resolution agreements that
foster ongoing relations. Katherine R. Guerin, Clash of the Federal Titans: The Fed-
eral Arbitration Act v. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act: Will the Consumer Win or
Lose?, 13 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 4, 5-6, 16-18 (2001) (proposing that enforceability of
arbitration agreements should be analyzed in terms of their benefits within the par-
ticular relationship, thereby making enforcement more stringent in ongoing relation-
ships and less stringent in discrete relationships (i.e., consumer contracts)).
310. Macneil, Contracts, supra note 218, at 879.
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too "indefinite," such as agreements to negotiate.311 Some courts now
are willing to enforce sufficiently definite agreements that impose
"discernable standards" by requiring the parties to negotiate in good
faith.312
This more flexible and contextual analysis should drive courts'
application of contract and remedy principles to ADR agreements. 313
Such analysis is especially appropriate when parties promise to pur-
sue ADR in the context of a relationship that may continue despite
disputes. In dynamic relationships, parties may plan to negotiate or
mediate disputes in order to avoid a court's or an arbitrator's applica-
tion of rules and remedies that may not comport with parties' chang-
ing needs. 314 Accordingly, it is time to clear the way for this
contextual and relational enforcement of ADR agreements.
IV. MODERN COMMON LAW TOOLS FOR
ENFORCING ADR AGREEMENTS
The FAA and UAA do not apply to non-binding and other ADR
processes that do not qualify as arbitration under the acts. In addi-
tion, revocability and ouster principles precluding enforcement of ar-
bitration and ADR agreements lack legal basis and, to a large degree,
public policy support. Furthermore, courts enjoy liberal remedial
powers under our unified judicial system and may exercise those
powers in an equitable and flexible manner in light of modern con-
tract law's evolution away from rigid classical rules. Courts therefore
have the common law remedial tools they need to enforce ADR agree-
ments in appropriate cases. These tools include specific enforcement
remedies, condition and exhaustion principles, and inherent judicial
powers to control court dockets. 315 This Article invites courts to
311. See, e.g., Howtek, Inc. v. Relisys, 958 F. Supp. 46, 49 (D.N.H. 1997) (finding
agreement to negotiate was sufficiently definite to be enforceable).
312. Id. at 48-49 (enforcing agreement to negotiate the manufacture of additional
products in good faith).
313. See Macneil, Contracts, supra note 218, at 876-80, 891-97 (discussing plan-
ning for dispute resolution in relational contracts). The relational model calls for dis-
pute resolution planning because the function of classical and neoclassical litigation,
and some binding arbitration, is simply to end a dispute. Id. at 891. In these cases,
the process "is rather like the discrete transaction itself: sharp in (by commencing
suit) and sharp out (by judgment for defendant or collection of a money judgment by
plaintiff)." Id. See also Speidel, supra note 26, at 30 (noting that in extended-duration
or dynamic contract relations, "the parties might agree in the contract to negotiate in
good faith and, if that fails to produce agreement, to submit the problem to mediation
or arbitration while continuing to perform").
314. Macneil, Contracts, supra note 218, at 892-97.
315. See infra notes 320-69 and accompanying text (discussing these means for
analyzing enforcement of agreements to submit disputes to private resolution).
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cleanse common law of ouster and revocability residue and employ
these contract and remedy tools in analyzing and enforcing ADR
agreements. It also proposes that courts apply these tools with clear
appreciation of parties' transaction goals in order to ensure parties'
participation in ADR processes when appropriate in light of contex-
tual and relational factors.
A. Specific Enforcement Remedies
The tools most appropriate for enforcing agreements to partici-
pate in ADR processes often are coercive remedies, such as specific
performance and injunctive relief. Specific performance is an appro-
priate remedy for breach of contract where damages would not ade-
quately compensate the loss, the court will not be overburdened with
enforcing its order, and such relief is otherwise appropriate in light of
the facts, circumstances, and equities of the particular case.3 16
Stated more simply, courts should apply this remedy when the bene-
fits of ordering specific relief outweigh the detriments that would re-
sult from the order. Courts have the power to award any remedy
"that seems most effective to do full justice, if it is sought by the in-
jured party."317 Accordingly, our unified system of law and equity
supports application of coercive or equitable remedies when it is ap-
propriate.318 These remedies should not be at the bottom of the judi-
cial toolbox, strictly reserved for rare cases.3 19
Many courts and commentators have begun to embrace this egal-
itarian view of remedies. Scholars question the so-called "inadequacy
of damages" or "irreparable harm" limitations on equitable relief.3 20
Nonetheless, a review of modern cases evidences "not infrequent
316. See CORBIN, supra note 249, at §§ 1139, 1171 (discussing courts' application of
specific performance remedies in light of adequacy of damages and difficulty of
enforcement).
317. Id. § 1136, at 175 (also questioning any limitation on equitable remedies to
cases where damages would be inadequate in light of the unification of law and equity
courts, and courts' duty to grant relief that will best compensate an injured party).
318. See David Frisch, Commercial Common Law, The United Nations Convention
On the International Sale of Goods, and the Inertia of Habit, 74 TuL. L. REV. 495, 541-
46 (1999) (discussing the equity/law jurisdictional genesis of limitations on availabil-
ity of specific relief, but explaining that as early as 1855, British law began liberaliz-
ing remedies, and that drafters of UCC Article 2 also hoped to liberalize application of
specific relief).
319. CORBIN, supra note 249, § 1136, at 175.
320. FISHER, supra note 262, at 149; DOBBS, supra note 260, at 50-51; Douglas
Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARv. L. REV. 687 (1990) (ar-
guing that the irreparable injury rule should not, and does not, exist in any substan-
tial way).
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harsh applications" of these limitations.321 Many courts continue to
consider specific performance extraordinary, and limit its application
mainly to cases involving real estate or other unique property.322 Al-
though the merger of law and equity makes the "equitable" label
anomalous, the term lives on in the parlance of most courts and prac-
titioners.323 Furthermore, it continues to matter whether a claim is
labeled "equitable" or "legal" because a plaintiffs claim for a coercive
remedy deemed "equitable" (i.e., injunction or order to compel con-
duct) will be tried without a jury.324
This traditional reluctance to order specific remedies should not
stymie courts' specific enforcement of ADR agreements. Indeed,
damages often are inappropriate and inadequate to remedy breach of
ADR agreements. Furthermore, it is inappropriate to assume ADR
agreements are not specifically enforceable because they are merely
futile "agreements to agree."3 2 5 This is why courts have become more
321. Scholars, including James Fisher and Gene Sheve, have questioned Laycock's
premise and have recognized that regardless of any exaggeration of the irreparable
harm rule, the cases reveal that it is not dead. FISHER, supra note 262, at 149-50
(recognizing its continued application); Gene Sheve, The Premature Burial of the Ir-
reparable Injury Rule, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1063 (1992) (proposing that the rule survives).
See also Citibank, N.A. v. Citytrust, 756 F.2d 273, 275 (2d Cir. 1985) (emphasizing
that demonstration that "the applicant is likely to suffer irreparable harm" if an in-
junction is not granted is "the single most important prerequisite for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction"). See also Frisch, supra note 318, at 544 (noting that despite
some commentators' pronouncement of a trend toward expansive application of spe-
cific relief under the UCC, "the majority of courts continue to couch their opinions in
the traditional orthodoxy of uniqueness or peculiarity").
322. See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 1139-43 (revised ed. 2002)
(explaining the genesis of specific performance as an equitable remedy and its limited
application to cases in which damages are deemed inadequate); see also supra notes
256-75 and accompanying text (discussing distinctions between legal and equitable
remedies). But see JOHN D. CA! MRI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 16 (3d ed.
1987) (explaining courts' pro-specific enforcement attitude in ordering remedies for
breach of contracts for sale of real property, and sale of unique goods under the UCC);
Frisch, supra note 318, at 543-46 (proposing that incorporation of the civil law's lib-
eral application of specific relief in The United Nations Convention on the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods ("CISG") will spark expanded availability of specific relief in U.S.
courts, thereby breaking "old habits of restraint").
323. See PERILLO, supra note 322 (recognizing that the term is "anomalous" and
that so-called "equitable" remedies can usually be labeled "coercive," but nonetheless
using the "equitable" label in his well known treatise). See also POMEROY, supra note
256 (dedicating an entire treatise to "Equity Jurisprudence" in 1919, after the merger
of law and equity).
324. See DOBBS, supra note 260, at 51 (also noting that the issue is more compli-
cated when a plaintiff seeks both damages and coercive remedies). Whether courts'
exercise of discretion is appropriate remains a question for debate. Id.
325. See Jillcy Film Enters., Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 515, 520
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (refusing to enforce an agreement to negotiate in good faith as such
an agreement is even more vague than an agreement to agree); PERILLO, supra note
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open to ordering parties to negotiate or mediate in good faith.326 This
is especially true where it appears negotiation or mediation would be
fruitful and could possibly produce a settlement or otherwise benefit
ongoing or interdependent relations. 327
In addition, courts may become more willing to enforce promises
to participate in ADR processes as they expand their appreciation of
ADR functions.328 Even the aging Restatement (Second) of Contracts
directs courts to liberally apply equitable remedies. 329 Some have
noted a trend toward liberalized application of specific relief since
adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC").3 30 Such
increased flexibility in ordering remedies coincides with Llewellyn's
and the Restatement drafters' decision to step away from rigid classi-
cal contract theory and adopt a more flexible neoclassical approach to
contract enforcement.331 Furthermore, the neoclassical system has
322, at §§ 2.8(a)-(b) (stating the general rule that an agreement will be an unenforce-
able "agreement to agree" where terms are left for further negotiation, and noting
courts' application of this rule in refusing to enforce agreements to negotiate). Some
courts seem to ignore contractual obligations to mediate, perhaps viewing such agree-
ments as futile because they do not guarantee an end to the parties' dispute. See
Cumberland & York Distribs. v. Coors Brewing Co., No. 01-244-P-H, 2002 WL
193323, at *4 (D. Me. 2002) (failing to enforce an agreement to mediate as a condition
precedent to binding arbitration). Of course, it is no simple matter to break jurispru-
dential habits rooted in seventeenth century Anglo-American law that required ex-
ceptionality as a strict pre-condition to awarding specific performance. FRIEDRICH
KESSLER ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 1069-1108 (3d ed. 1986.)
326. See Fluor Enters., Inc. v. Solutia Inc., 147 F. Supp. 2d 648 (S.D. Tex. 2001)
(compelling mediation as prescribed in the parties' contract); Marshall v. U.S. Home
Corp., 2002 WL 274457 (Ohio App. 9 Dist. Feb. 27 2002) (staying proceeding to en-
force mediation and arbitration provisions).
327. See supra notes 217-22, 302-14, and accompanying text (discussing relational
enforcement of dispute resolution process).
328. See PERILLO, supra note 322, § 2.8(b), at 142-44 (discussing some modern
courts' willingness to enforce a contractual duty to negotiate in good faith). See also
id., § 1142, at 196-201 (concluding that "the impression plainly left by the sum-total of
reported cases is that the remedy of specific enforcement is as available as are other
remedies" under our unified system of law and equity). Still, defendants seeking a
jury trial may continue to insist on the adequacy of legal remedies. Id. at 201.
329. See id. See also Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE
L.J. 271, 277 (1979) (proposing that "the compensation goal implies that specific per-
formance should be routinely available").
330. Harold Greenberg, Specific Performance Under Section 2-716 of the Uniform
Commercial Code: "A More Liberal Attitude" in the "Grand Style," 17 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 321, 344-45 (1982).
331. See Feinman, supra note 281, at 738-39 (noting adoption of a more flexible
neoclassical approach in the UCC and Restatement (Second) of Contracts). See also
supra notes 276-314 and accompanying text (discussing progression from classical
contract theory).
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continued to "evolve in relational directions."332 This allows courts to
expand enforcement of private processes well suited for resolving dis-
putes arising out of long-term, complex or otherwise relational
contexts.3
33
Modern contract theory promotes proper application of specific
performance. Courts, therefore, should use this remedial tool to en-
force ADR agreements when benefits of ordering parties to partici-
pate in ADR outweigh detriment caused by coercing party conduct or
requiring courts to supervise ADR. In this way, courts may escape
bipolar enforcement of ADR agreements that is dependent on
whether the FAA or UAA applies.
B. Condition and Exhaustion Principles
If parties agree that they must submit disputes to an ADR pro-
cess as a condition precedent to seeking judicial relief, then common
contract law may allow a court to enforce the agreement under a con-
dition or exhaustion rationale. Under such rationale, a court may
stay or dismiss litigation until the parties complete the ADR pro-
cess. 33 4 "Condition" analysis generally asks what facts are necessary
to invoke a contract duty or to "justify putting court machinery in
332. Macneil, Relational Contract, supra note 218, at 498 ("The largest single re-
cent body of promise-centered relational work consists of Restatement (Second) of
Contracts and the secondary work it has stimulated."); Macneil, Contracts, supra note
218, at 886 (explaining that the growing significance of ongoing economic relations
would continue to push the law in relational directions and perhaps prompt "spin-
offs" from classical and neoclassical systems).
333. See Sid L. Moller, Birth of Contract: Arbitration in the Non-Union Workplace,
50 S. CAROLINA L. REV. 183, 204-11 (1998) (discussing applicability of relational con-
tract principles in employment contexts, and emphasizing that arbitration and pri-
vate dispute resolution processes are suited to employment because it is "a highly
relational activity that naturally fosters the development of some kind of process for
resolving disagreements among its participants"); Katz, supra note 19, at 575-77, 584-
95 (critiquing objections to enforcement of private dispute resolution procedures and
advocating a process-oriented definition that acknowledges benefits of ordering par-
ties' participation in a dispute resolution process). See also Macneil, Contracts, supra
note 218, at 879, 891-901 (discussing suitability of dispute resolution mechanisms to
ongoing and dynamic economic relations).
334. See Kemiron Atlantic, Inc. v. Aguakem Int'l, Inc., 290 F.3d 1287, 1291-92
(11th Cir. 2002) (holding mediation was a condition precedent to arbitration under
the parties' agreement, and therefore the arbitration provision had not been activated
and the FAA did not apply); Brennan v. King, 139 F.3d 258, 269-70 (1st Cir. 1998)
(holding under Massachusetts contract law that Brennan was required to pursue the
grievance dispute procedure before filing suit on his employment claims); Bill Call
Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 830 F. Supp. 1045, 1053 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (dismissing
franchisee's claim for failure to seek mediation of covered disputes as a contractual
condition precedent to filing litigation under the franchise agreement).
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motion in favor of A against B." 3 35 A condition may be any event or
performance that must occur before one may bring an action or seek
other judicial relief for breach of an agreement. 336 If the condition
does not occur as required, then there may be no further action or
recourse on the contract until the condition is satisfied or excused. 337
Courts may supply constructive conditions, while parties may
create conditions implicitly through their conduct or explicitly by ex-
pressly stating conditions in their contracts. An event or perform-
ance, therefore, may be a condition to contract rights and duties. 338
Parties may make participation in ADR a condition precedent to fil-
ing suit through express contract language or a court may create
such a condition "by necessary implication" under the facts and cir-
cumstances of the agreement.339 This type of pre-condition to filing a
lawsuit is sometimes viewed as an exhaustion requirement because it
is akin to a statutory requirement to exhaust administrative reme-
dies before filing suit. This is exemplified in some employee benefit
cases under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA").340
When parties agree that each must submit disputes to an ADR
process as a condition precedent to filing suit in court, they make that
process a condition to obtaining judicial recovery.341 If the condition
335. ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, 3A CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 628 (1960) (discussing
conditions precedent to contract performance, breach of duty, or remedial action by a
court).
336. See id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 224 (1981) ("A condi-
tion is an event, not certain to occur, which must occur, unless its non-occurrence is
excused, before performance under a contract becomes due."); 17A Am. JuR. 2D CON-
TRACTS § 34 (2002) ("a promise, or the making of a promise, may be conditioned on the
act or will of a third person").
337. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 225 (1981).
338. Id. at § 226 & cmts. No particular language is necessary to create a condi-
tion, but some courts look for terms such as "on condition that," "provided that," or "if
... then." Id. at cmt. a. Furthermore, a court may supply a condition by finding it is
implied under the circumstances of the parties' agreement. Id. at cmt. c.
339. 4 Am. JuR. 2D ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOL. § 81 (2002). Indeed, arbitration
was an enforceable condition on the bond in Vynior's Case, giving rise to recovery on
the bond. See supra notes 134-50 and accompanying text (discussing the case).
340. See Watts v. BellSouth Telecomm. Inc., No. 02-13230, 2003 WL 23394, at *3
(11th Cir. Jan. 3, 2003) (discussing and applying the court-created administrative ex-
haustion requirement in ERISA cases, and refusing to apply it in this case because
the employer's benefits plan did not clearly require that a claimant must pursue ad-
ministrative remedies prior to filing suit in court).
341. See 6 C.J.S. ARBITRATION § 28 (2002) (discussing how arbitration may be
made a condition precedent to recovery in an action on a contract); 4 AM. JUR. 2D
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOL. § 81 (2002) ("Where a contract contains a stipulation
that the decision of the arbitrators on certain questions shall be a condition precedent
to the right of action on the contract itself, such stipulation will be enforced and until
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(the process) does not occur, then the conditioned performance (litiga-
tion) is excused until the condition occurs or is waived. 342 This condi-
tion also may be a promise when contracting parties each assume a
duty to submit disputes to the ADR process or forego filing suit.343
Accordingly, a party's failure to comply with the condition not only
prevents litigation, but also may constitute breach of the parties'
agreement.344 Because damages for such breach generally are nomi-
nal and do not adequately remedy the injury suffered (i.e., loss of op-
portunity to explore settlement, discuss their cases, facilitate
amicable relations, etc.), the only adequate remedy for the breach
often is to dismiss or stay litigation until the process occurs. 345 In
these cases, both condition and breach of contract remedy analyses
support a court's stay of litigation pending the parties' participation
in an ADR process.346
An ADR process that may be enforceable through condition anal-
ysis is the Better Business Bureau's ("BBB") "Auto Line" process for
resolving "Lemon Law" warranty disputes between automobile man-
ufacturers and consumers. 347 The Auto Line program calls for non-
binding arbitration, which produces awards consumers may accept or
the method adopted has been pursued, or some sufficient reason given for not pursu-
ing it, no action can be brought on the contract.").
342. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 225. A condition must occur unless
it is excused. Id.
343. See id. at § 225(3) (indicating non-occurrence of a condition is also a breach
when a party "is under a duty that the condition occur"); § 235 (stating any failure to
fully perform according to a contract is a breach).
344. 4 AM. JUR. 2D ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOL. § 111 (2002). Even at common
law, failure to comply with an arbitration agreement constituted breach of the agree-
ment, and gave rise to an action for "whatever actual loss" the non-breaching party
may prove. Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 225 (indicating non-
occurrence of a condition may constitute breach of the contract where the condition is
also a promise).
345. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 225 (1981). See also Hetrick v.
Friedman, 602 N.W.2d 603, 607-10 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (holding arbitration agree-
ment specifically enforceable per Michigan common law).
346. Hetrick, 602 N.W.2d at 605-10 (explaining that agreements to arbitrate
should be irrevocable under common law of Michigan). See also 4 AM. JUR. 2D ALTER-
NATIVE DISPUTE RESOL. § 81 (2002) (stating general rule that where participation in
ADR is a condition precedent to litigation, "no action can be brought on the contract"
until the parties pursue the process, or provide "some sufficient reason" for not pursu-
ing it).
347. BBB, BBB AUTO LINE, (providing information regarding the BBB's program
for resolving consumers' Lemon Law warranty disputes against car manufacturers
through non-binding arbitration), at http://www.dr.bbb.org/autoline/index.asp (last
visited Oct. 14, 2003); BBB, CONDITIONALLY BINDING ARBITRATION, (detailing the pro-
cedures and rules for BBB's conditionally binding arbitration program), at http:l/
www.bbb.org/complaints/condbind.asp (last visited Oct. 14, 2003).
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reject.348 Under the program, if a warranty clearly provides that a
consumer must submit disputes t the Auto Line process as a condi-
tion precedent to recovering on a warranty claim, then a court may
apply condition analysis to order parties to participate in the process
or refuse to hear any of the parties' claims until after they have com-
pleted the process.349 The court in AMF Inc. v. Brunswick Corp. re-
lied in part on this analysis in specifically enforcing a duty to comply
with a similar BBB advisory opinion process for resolving false adver-
tising claims.350 Nonetheless, the court mistakenly concluded that
the non-binding process was arbitration governed by the FAA, per-
haps because the court feared survival of ouster doctrine in New York
law. 351
Armed with condition analysis, courts need not cling to the FAA
and UAA to enforce ADR agreements regardless of their reluctance to
clearly reject the ouster and revocability doctrines. Even courts that
accepted these doctrines would use condition analysis to enforce
agreements requiring private resolution of "particular controversies
348. BBB, CONDITIONALLY BINDING ARBITRATION, (detailing the procedures and
rules for BBB Auto Line's conditionally binding arbitration program), at http:/www.
dr.bbb.org/autoline/alrules.asp (last visited Oct. 14, 2003).
349. See id. See also Verdier v. Porsche Cars North America, Inc., 680 N.Y.S.2d
596, 597 (App. Div. 1998) (intimating that plaintiff may have been barred from bring-
ing Lemon Act claim by its failure to submit its dispute to Porsche's dispute resolution
mechanism if car sales agreement had clearly stated "that resort to the mechanism is
a prerequisite to obtaining relief under the Lemon Law"). But see Homes of Legend,
Inc. v. McCollough, 776 So. 2d 741, 746-48 (Ala. 2000) (interpreting manufacturer's
warranty arbitration provision in accordance with Federal Trade Commission regula-
tions to require non-binding arbitration, and applying FAA § 4 to order parties' par-
ticipation in the procedure - without even considering contract law remedies).
350. 621 F. Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (applying arbitration law to BBB's non-
binding, advisory arbitration procedures applicable to advertising disputes); supra
notes 71-78 and accompanying text (further discussing AMF decision). See also Ce-
cala v. Moore, 982 F. Supp. 609, 612-14 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (holding court had power to
stay litigation pending mediation per the contract, but nonetheless holding that Illi-
nois' UAA applied to provide authority for the stay); Kelley v. Benchmark Homes,
Inc., 550 N.W.2d 640, 645-46 (Neb. 1996) (holding that FAA applied to require specific
enforcement of an agreement to submit disputes to non-binding arbitration). One
commentator noted that the court's labeling the non-binding advisory opinion process
"arbitration" under the FAA "is farfetched." Steven J. Burton, Combining Concilia-
tion with Arbitration of International Commercial Disputes, 18 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMp. L. REV. 637, 645 n.13 (1995) (further concluding that the contract argument "is
more plausible"). See also Harrison v. Nissan Motor Corp., 111 F.3d 343, 349-50 (3d
Cir. 1997) (refusing to apply the FAA to the BBB's Auto Line procedure).
351. See supra notes 201-05 and accompanying text (discussing New York's failure
to clearly reject ouster).
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or special questions" when the requirement was stated as a clear con-
dition precedent in the parties' contract. 352 Nonetheless, this limita-
tion to discrete issues is not necessary.353 In addition, courts should
not assume an ADR agreement is unenforceable merely because
participation in the process is not a clear condition precedent to
352. See 17A C.J.S. CONTRACTS § 242 (2003) ("At common law, and except where
the rule is relaxed or where such agreement is authorized by statute, an agreement to
submit all disputed questions under a contract to arbitration to the exclusion of the
courts is void, although agreements to submit particular controversies or special
questions are valid. Provisions that the decision of a specified person as to classifica-
tion, quantity, or quality or work done or things furnished under a contract, shall be
final may be valid."); 4 AM. JuR. 2D ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOL. §§ 110-111 (2003)
(stating that despite common law refusal to specifically enforce agreements to arbi-
trate, courts will require parties to comply with an agreement requiring them to sub-
mit "differences as to certain factual matters" as a valid condition precedent to suit);
Hamilton v. Liverpool, London & Globe Ins. Co., 136 U.S. 242, 254-56 (1890) (holding
insurance policy appraisal provision was valid and specifically enforceable condition
precedent to legal action that did not oust the courts' jurisdiction). But see Hamilton
v. Home Ins. Co., 137 U.S. 370, 385-86 (1890) (holding nearly identical agreement to
arbitrate amount of loss under insurance policy did not bar judicial action because it
was stated as a "separate and independent provision," and not a clear condition prece-
dent to action). These cases both involved provisions requiring that named appraisers
"shall appraise and estimate the loss by fire," but Justice Gray distinguished the two,
stating that the Liverpool & London agreement did not specifically bar action until
after an appraisal award. Home Ins. Co., 137 U.S. at 385-86. In fact, it is difficult to
see this distinction under the facts of the cases, and the opinions seem to highlight the
strained analysis caused by ouster and revocability doctrines. See also Sigal v. Three
K's Ltd., 456 F.2d 1242, 1243 (3d Cir. 1972) (refusing to enforce parties' contractual
attempt to "establish as a condition precedent to the right of any legal action the
arbitration of 'all questions in dispute,"' citing the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CON-
TRACTS §§ 550-51); Pa. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Elec. Ry. &
Motor Coach Employees of America, Div. 1063, 105 F. Supp. 537, 539-40 (W.D. Pa.
1952) (finding under Pennsylvania common law, resort to arbitration as a condition
precedent to action is legal but not specifically enforceable in the absence of statute,
at least where no arbiter is named in the agreement).
353. Before it finally rejected ouster in 1999, Hetrick v. Friedman, 602 N.W.2d
603, 605-10 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999), the Michigan Court of Appeals had based its en-
forcement of a duty to arbitrate on a condition precedent, or, in the alternative, a
construction contract "exception" to revocability. E.E. Tripp Excavating Contractor,
Inc. v. County of Jackson, 230 N.W.2d 556, 567-71 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975) (criticized in
Hetrick). See also Burton, supra note 350, at 644-49 (discussing the unsettled law
regarding enforceability of agreements to submit disputes to private processes,
namely conciliation); Sigal, 456 F.2d at 1243 (refusing to enforce parties' contractual
attempt to "establish as a condition precedent to the right of any legal action the
arbitration of 'all questions in dispute,"' citing the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CON-
TRACTS §§ 550-51 (1932)); Pa. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Elec.
Ry. & Motor Coach Employees of America, Div. 1063, 105 F. Supp. 537, 539-40 (W.D.
Penn. 1952) (finding under Pennsylvania common law, that resort to arbitration as a
condition precedent to action is legal but not specifically enforceable in the absence of
statute, at least where no arbiter is named in the agreement).
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recovering on a claim in court.354 Still, condition analysis provides
courts with additional common law means for staying litigation to
enforce ADR agreements. 355
C. Courts' Inherent Power to Control Their Dockets
In addition to the power to order participation in an ADR process
using specific performance remedies or condition analysis, a court
also may stay litigation to foster a related ADR process based on the
court's power to "control the disposition of the causes on its
docket. ' 356 Federal courts have exercised this power to foster arbi-
tration by staying litigation related to an ongoing arbitration pro-
ceeding. This means courts use this power to stay litigation that is
not subject to arbitration or the FAA.3 5 7 Nonetheless, courts are
fairly stingy in exercising this power because it allows a court to stall
parties' access to judicial remedies, without the parties' agreement.
354. Even in many administrative exhaustion cases, the key question is whether
the statute or the parties' contract clearly states that a party must pursue adminis-
trative remedies before filing suit. See Watts v. BellSouth Telecomm. Inc., 316 F.3d
1203, 1208-09 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding the contract could reasonably be interpreted to
permit filing a lawsuit without exhausting administrative remedies, and noting that
the problem could be rectified through clear drafting).
355. See Kemiron Atlantic, Inc. v. Aguakem Int'l, Inc., 290 F.3d 1287, 1291 (11th
Cir. 2002) (enforcing mediation as a condition precedent to arbitration under the par-
ties' agreement); Brennan v. King, 139 F.3d 258, 269-70 (1st Cir. 1998) (enforcing
employment grievance dispute procedure as condition precedent to filing suit on em-
ployment claims); White v. Kampner, 641 A.2d 1381, 1385-86 (Conn. 1994) (enforcing
negotiation as a condition precedent to arbitration); Lynch v. American Family Mut.
Ins. Co., 473 N.W.2d 515, 518-19 (Ct. App. Wis. 1991) (enforcing appraisal procedure
as a condition precedent to filing suit on an insurance policy). But see Fluor Enter.,
Inc. v. Solutia, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 2d 648, 650-53 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (finding contract
provision precluding suit until 30 days after commencement of mediation allowed
plaintiff to file suit while continuing to pursue mediation); Kelley v. Benchmark
Homes, Inc., 550 N.W.2d 640, 643-46 (Neb. 1996) (noting binding arbitration agree-
ments are void under Nebraska common law, but holding agreement to submit to non-
binding arbitration was enforceable under the FAA); Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. of
New York v. Penick, 401 P.2d 514, 519-20 (Okla. 1965) (holding appraisal was not a
condition precedent to suit where insurer in his demand for an appraisal, reserved the
right to litigate the question of liability); Bill Call Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 830 F.
Supp. 1045, 1053 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (holding plaintiffs failed to fulfill a condition prece-
dent to suit by failing to submit warranty repairs disputes to mediation before the
Dealer Policy Board); In re Weekley Homes, 985 S.W.2d 111, 113-14 (Tex. Ct. App.
1998) (noting that trial court had denied Weekley's motion to arbitrate and ordered
the parties to first mediate in accordance with the parties' agreement requiring medi-
ation as "an express condition precedent to the arbitration").
356. Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936).
357. See Nederlandse Erts-Tankersmaatschappij, N.V. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 339
F.2d 440, 441 (2d Cir. 1964) (indicating a stay may be appropriate where issues in-
volved are subject to arbitration).
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As a precursor to exercising the power, a court first asks "(1)
whether there are common issues in the arbitration and the court
proceeding, and (2) if so, whether those issues will be finally deter-
mined by the arbitration."358 If the answer to both questions is yes,
then the movant must show that the party not bound to arbitrate will
not hinder the arbitration procedure, that the procedure will be re-
solved within a reasonable time, and that any delay will not cause
undue hardship to the parties.35 9 Furthermore, a court may grant a
stay of litigation even where the movant has not satisfied its burden
to show necessity for the stay where it appears arbitration will not be
hindered by the non-arbitrating party and no prejudicial delay will
result from the stay.360
In Cosmotek Mumessillik v. Ticaret Ltd. Sirkketi, for example, a
contract between a United States company and its Turkish distribu-
tor required binding arbitration.36' The manufacturer was not a
party to, or otherwise bound by, the distributorship contract contain-
ing the arbitration clause. 362 Therefore, the distributor's action
against the manufacturer was not governed by the FAA, and the
manufacturer could not otherwise be compelled to arbitrate claims
related to the contract. 363 Nonetheless, the court found that it had
inherent power to stay the non-FAA litigation pending arbitration of
the claims between parties to the distributorship contract. This was
because the arbitration and litigation involved the same product
quality issues, the non-arbitrating party (the manufacturer) was not
likely to hinder the arbitration, and the distributor was not likely to
suffer undue prejudice from delay of its litigation against the manu-
facturer.364 The court further emphasized that a stay of the non-FAA
litigation was appropriate to promote cooperative resolution of the
product defect disputes among all the parties. 36 5 The court concluded
that the stay would benefit the distributor, despite its opposition to
358. Am. Shipping Line, Inc. v. Massan Shipping Indus., 885 F. Supp. 499, 502
(S.D.N.Y. 1995). See also Sierra Rutile, Ltd. v. Katz, 937 F.2d 743, 750 (2d Cir. 1991)
(stating same rules).
359. Am. Shipping Line, 885 F. Supp. at 502.
360. Cosmotek Mumessillik v. Ticaret Ltd. Sirkketi v. Cosmotek USA, Inc., 942 F.
Supp. 757, 761-62 (D. Conn. 1996).
361. Id. at 759-60.
362. Id. at 759-61.
363. Id.
364. Cosmotek Mumessillik, 942 F. Supp. at 761. In this case, the manufacturer
supported the stay, was represented by the same attorney who represented the com-
pany bound by the arbitration agreement, and seemed otherwise willing to pursue a
unified resolution of the distributor's claims against the two parties. Id.
365. Id.
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the stay, "[by] putting the two targets in one forum," thereby reduc-
ing their costs and augmenting the resources they could apply to set-
tling claims with the distributor. 366
It is unclear how eager courts would be to exercise their inherent
power to stay litigation in order to advance ADR outside the scope of
the FAA.36 7 Cosmotek Mumessillik, for example, involved promotion
of related arbitration that was governed and compelled under the
FAA.368 Nonetheless, these cases indicate that courts may use their
inherent power to stay litigation in order to advance ADR. A court
would not need to rely on such power when it could compel parties'
participation in an ADR process by ordering specific performance. A
court may need this power, however, in order to stay litigation that is
not subject to an ADR agreement.3 69 For example, it may be proper
for a court to rely on its inherent power to stay litigation not subject
to an ADR agreement where multiple parties with incentive to reach
a global settlement had not all previously agreed to participate in one
ADR process. In such a case, it may be appropriate for a court to stay
litigation that significantly threatens an ongoing ADR process, if the
litigating parties will not be unduly prejudiced by delay or any estop-
pel effects caused by the stay. In this way, a court may use its inher-
ent power to foster process values of ADR.
V. CONCLUSION
Contracting parties have been left without adequate guidance re-
garding the enforceability of their ADR agreements at a critical time
366. Id. The court seemed to question the prudence of the distributor's opposition
to the stay, and advocated "faster resolution" through the arbitration "if counsel are
[sic] conscientious." Cosmotek Mumessillik, 942 F. Supp. at 761. However, the court
sought to insure against prejudice to the distributor by requiring periodic updates
regarding the arbitration to verify 'that the early hearing and decision which are the
hallmark of arbitration are in fact afforded to [the distributorship]." Id. Further-
more, the distributor remained free to seek to vacate the stay if a risk of prejudice
from delay became apparent. Id.
367. See Sierra Rutile, Ltd. v. Katz, 937 F.2d 743, 750 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding that
a court has inherent power not stemming from the FAA, to stay a pending action
related to a pending arbitration in which issues involved in the litigation may be de-
termined, but nonetheless declining to grant a stay where the litigated claims would
not be affected by the arbitration).
368. Cosmotek Mumessillik, 942 F. Supp. at 759-61.
369. See AMF Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 621 F. Supp. 456, 460-61 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)
(finding it had power to order participation in non-binding arbitration under both the
FAA and the court's equitable power). See also Parisi v. Netlearning, Inc., 139 F.
Supp. 2d 745, 750 n.10 (E.D. Va. 2001) (stating the AMF court relied on its "inherent
equitable powers" to stay litigation).
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of growth for creative ADR. This has been caused by courts' misap-
plication of the FAA's and UAA's summary enforcement remedies,
and courts' continued adherence to antiquated common law doctrines
and narrow perceptions of private dispute resolution processes.
Meanwhile, policymakers have not cured this lack of judicial gui-
dance by enacting enforcement rules tailored to these ADR agree-
ments. Instead, they have assumed that common contract and
remedy principles provide for such enforcement.370 Accordingly, it is
time to clarify and modernize these common law principles in order
to foster proper enforcement of ADR agreements.
Contract and remedy law provide courts with the tools to develop
a coherent and refreshed approach for determining proper enforce-
ment of these ADR agreements. This approach should allow courts to
flexibly and equitably analyze such agreements. Courts may enforce
agreements where parties' participation in an ADR process will foster
fair settlement or provide other collateral benefits that outweigh bur-
dens of compelled participation in the process. For example, a court
may be wise to order corporate parties to negotiate price adjustments
under an ADR agreement in a ten-year installment sales contract. It
may not be proper, however, for a court to order harassment victims,
such as Vicky in the Introduction, to mediate sensitive claims in an
intimidating relational environment.37 1 Under this approach, courts
may use common law tools to equitably enforce ADR agreements. At
the least, courts may use this analytical model to encourage policy-
makers to craft ADR enforcement rules that account for process val-
ues of ADR in varied relational contexts. Indeed, this also may cause
legislators to rethink the FAA/UAA automatic compulsion mandate
as it applies to arbitration in unequal or emotionally charged rela-
tional contexts.
370. See supra notes 48-64 and accompanying text (discussing assumptions of
UMA and RUAA drafters).
371. Some commentators have recognized that participation in a non-binding dis-
pute resolution process may be beneficial, even when a party resists such participa-
tion. See Katz, supra note 19, at 580-85 (arguing against the assumption that
settlement will not occur merely because one party resists participation in a proce-
dure). But see Klintworth, supra note 74, at 193-95 (focusing on external policies and
potential problems, and not the parties' relations, in discussing enforceability of
agreements to submit to non-arbitral procedures); Burton, supra note 350, at 644-52
(focusing on presumptions against compelled cooperation and parties' intentions "to
attach legal consequences" to conciliation agreements in proposing that agreements to
conciliate generally should not be specifically enforceable).
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